ON DECREASING MARGINAL IMPATIENCE*

One of the most controversial assumptions in endogenous time preference theory is that the degree of impatience is marginally increasing in wealth. We examine the implications of an empirically more relevant specification whereby time preference exhibits decreasing marginal impatience (DMI). With DMI, there are multiple steady‐state non‐satiated and satiated equilibria. In a constant interest rate economy, the non‐satiated steady‐state point is necessarily unstable. In a capital economy with decreasing returns technology, both the non‐satiated and satiated steady‐state points can be saddlepoint stable. The model is used to examine policy implications for the effects of capital taxation and government spending.     

Arbitrage Asset Pricing under Exchange Risk

This paper extends the APT to an international setting. Specifying a linear factor return-generating model in local currency terms, we show that the usual risk-diversification rule in the APT does not yield a riskless portfolio unless currency fluctuations obey the same factor model as asset returns. We then consider an arbitrage portfolio whose exchange risk is hedged by foreign riskless bonds. Under the resulting no-arbitrage conditions, the expected returns are not on the same hyperplane, unlike the closed-economy APT, unless they are adjusted by the cost of exchange risk hedging.     

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION IN AGENCY CONTRACTS*

We study how a principal uses her subjective evaluation of the agent's performance in an incentive contract. It is shown that the subjective evaluation can be used either 1) when there is no other information about the agent's performance and the principal is able to discard money, or 2) when the principal chooses between wage payment based on subjective evaluation by foregoing objective evaluation, and the one based only on the objective evaluation and when the subjective evaluation is sufficiently accurate. The principal pays a high fixed wage when her rating at the subjective evaluation is above a certain level. On the other hand, when it is below that level, she either pays a low fixed wage or obtains objective evaluation and pays based on its outcome.     

Asymmetric Preferences and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policy Rules

This paper evaluates the stability properties of optimal monetary policy rules when professionals under adaptive learning have asymmetric preferences. The asymmetric preferences require volatility estimates in real time. An expectations‐based rule can stabilize the economy, while a fundamentals‐based rule leads to instability.     

STABILITY OF THE COURNOT SOLUTION AND FREE ENTRY: A NOTE*

Taking a traditional approach, I show that by using the discrete adjustment system, the Cournot solution in a free entry oligopoly with increasing returns to scale is stable only when the number of firms is very small. We must pay attention to stability when using the free entry Cournot oligopoly model.