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1.
Productivity growth in Indian agriculture: is there evidence of convergence across states? 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This paper explores the question of convergence in total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture across fourteen major agricultural states of India. Using a Törnqvist–Theil index for TFP growth for the period 1973–1993, we find no evidence to support convergence to a single TFP level (σ‐convergence). After grouping the various states on the basis of their productivity performance, we find that the high‐performing states show a gradual movement towards the trend, whereas the low‐performing states generally show more volatility. Testing for long‐run convergence in levels of agricultural productivity, we find evidence of conditional beta‐convergence after controlling for state‐specific factors and idiosyncratic year‐specific volatility. The results are robust to alternative specifications of tests of unit root in panel data developed recently. 相似文献
2.
Tariffs, licensing and market structure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124]. 相似文献
3.
We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts. 相似文献
4.
We provide a rationale for the mixed relationship between product market competition and unionized wage, and more importantly, for a generally unexplained empirical evidence of a positive relationship between product market competition and unionized wage. We show that a higher product market competition decreases (increases) unionized wage if the external scale economies are weak (strong). However, a higher product market competition may decrease or increase the unionized wage if the external scale economies are moderate.
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This paper explores how informal information channels impact mutual fund performance. We measure the strengths of two location‐based information channels: 1) information transfers among fund managers (fund‐fund links) and 2) transfers between managers and the companies in which they invest (fund‐company links). We find that each channel increases investment performance in the absence of the other, but decreases it when acting in combination. Stock selection associated with the presence of one channel, but the absence of the other, earns positive future returns. Our results indicate that the economic benefits of informal information channels depend critically on the nature of their interactions. 相似文献
8.
Advertisers often use scarcity appeals to influence consumers, with announcements such as “hurry, limited quantities,” and “limit: two per customer.” Based on a persuasion knowledge framework, we show in three studies that the effect of scarcity appeals on product evaluation is moderated by consumers' expectation of scarcity, such that scarcity appeals have a positive effect when expectation of scarcity is high but not when it is low. We also show that this interaction effect holds for expectation of scarcity due to demand as well as supply, and that cognitive load constitutes a boundary condition for this effect. These findings contribute to the literature by identifying expectation of scarcity as a moderator, persuasion knowledge as a mechanism, and cognitive load as a boundary condition for the effect of scarcity appeals on product evaluation. From a managerial perspective, this research indicates that scarcity appeals are more effective when consumers have high compared to low expectations of scarcity; that activation of persuasion knowledge can eliminate the positive effect of scarcity appeals; and that cognitive load can reinstate the positive effect of scarcity appeals on product evaluation. 相似文献
9.
Leonard F. S. Wang Arijit Mukherjee Chenhang Zeng 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2020,22(5):1462-1480
In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost‐efficient firm to a cost‐inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that (a) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; (b) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization. 相似文献
10.
Common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of incumbent firms. On the contrary, we demonstrate that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and the entrants behave like Stackelberg followers, then entry may benefit the cost efficient incumbents while hurting the cost inefficient ones. And the total outputs of all incumbents may be higher under entry. 相似文献