CAN INEFFICIENT TRADERS CREATE VALUE?

I examine the aggregate expected profit generated by informed traders of diverse ability in a competitive market. I assume that efficient traders get perfect information on asset values whereas inefficient traders get noisy information. In the presence of order size restrictions, I show that the aggregate expected profit generated by efficient and inefficient traders together can be higher than that generated by efficient traders alone. Thus, inefficient traders can create value in a constrained trading environment.     

Who Herds? Who Doesn't? Estimates of Analysts’ Herding Propensity in Forecasting Earnings

We develop parametric estimates of the imitation‐driven herding propensity of analysts and their earnings forecasts. By invoking rational expectations, we solve an explicit analyst optimization problem and estimate herding propensity using two measures: First, we estimate analysts’ posterior beliefs using actual earnings plus a realization drawn from a mean‐zero normal distribution. Second, we estimate herding propensity without seeding a random error, and allow for nonorthogonal information signals. In doing so, we avoid using the analyst's prior forecast as the proxy for his posterior beliefs, which is a traditional criticism in the literature. We find that more than 60 percent of analysts herd toward the prevailing consensus, and herding propensity is associated with various economic factors. We also validate our herding propensity measure by confirming its predictive power in explaining the cross‐sectional variation in analysts’ out‐of‐sample herding behavior and forecast accuracy. Finally, we find that forecasts adjusted for analysts’ herding propensity are less biased than the raw forecasts. This adjustment formula can help researchers and investors obtain better proxies for analysts’ unbiased earnings forecasts.     

Financial crises and labor market turbulence

Financial crises in emerging markets trigger a significant reallocation of labor as exchange rate depreciations and interest rate increases cause relative prices to change drastically. Household survey data for Mexico reveal that individuals who switched industry or occupation during the 1994–1995 crisis lost about 10% of their hourly earnings on average compared to similar workers who did not move. This suggests that many workers became less productive in the process of migrating to different economic activities. These productivity losses, in turn, can explain about 40% of the observed fall in TFP in Mexico in 1995.     

Examining bank SEOs: Are offers made by undercapitalized banks different?

Despite extensive monitoring, banking operations are often considered opaque, and despite explicit capital adequacy regulation, banks may have substantial discretion in their financing. Both monitoring and capital regulation have changed substantially over time, with the adoption of FDICIA being one important breakpoint. This article empirically studies seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by banks to understand how opacity and capital regulation interact to determine the timing of bank SEOs and their market valuation. SEOs both by banks that are undercapitalized relative to regulatory standards and also well-capitalized banks are fully discretionary when it comes to SEOs, even before FDICIA. Both undercapitalized and well-capitalized banks experience similar and significantly negative stock price reactions to SEO announcements, and also have similar prior patterns of insider trading and similar economic drivers of the issuance decision. Moreover, post-SEO abnormal stock returns are similar to benchmark returns for both types of issuers in the long run, suggesting that, contrary to the well-documented evidence for industrial SEOs, investors understand the value implications of bank SEOs upon announcement. The evidence implies that undercapitalized banks' SEOs are more discretionary and that all bank SEOs are less opaque than implied by earlier studies.     

Product innovation for the people's car in an emerging economy

As product offerings of multinational enterprises (MNEs) continue to primarily serve the relatively well-to-do consumers in emerging economies, innovations to meet the unique affordability and acceptability criteria of masses at the base of the pyramid (BoP) continues to remain a daunting challenge. The academic literature is sparse on comprehensive in-depth studies about the intricate processes involved in shaping and managing technology development for the masses. Focusing on product innovation by Tata Motors of India with the Nano—the world's cheapest car, our case study aims to understand how the innovator's choices regarding the use of technology, product design and organizational practices for new product development enabled it to meet the challenge of innovation for India's masses. Drawing on Christensen's work on disruptive innovations, our analysis shows how frugal use of resources through a new combination of existing component technologies created a new modular product to achieve the unique price–performance requirements demanded by the BoP. Our findings show that collaboration with suppliers for component design and their early integration in the design phase substantially lowered costs and helped eliminate unnecessary frills whilst incorporating features valued by mass markets. Our study has important managerial implications for MNEs and provides critical insights into the processes for a new blueprint for an untapped market segment in the automobile industry.     

Why Developing Countries Have Failed to Increase Their Exports of Agricultural Processed Products

The article uses the case study of coffee, tea and cocoa to analyse whether tariff escalation constitutes a barrier to market access that thwarts diversification efforts of developing countries into exports of value‐added agricultural processed products. It also examines the extent to which non‐tariff barriers act as market access barriers that constrain developing countries from developing their exports of agricultural processed products. Our analysis shows that tariff escalation is not the main barrier; rather it is the prevalence of non‐tariff barriers (including domestic non‐tariff barriers) that limits the ability of developing countries to increase their agricultural processed exports. This has important policy implications in terms of the emphasis that trade negotiators and policy planners should place on addressing non‐tariff barriers.     

Supplier Selection Practices among Small Firms in the United States: Testing Three Models

One of the issues investigated in recent studies on small business enterprises involves the role of supply chain management. Supply chain management has become an important part of strategic planning in both large and small businesses in the 1990s as firms increasingly choose outsourcingas an externally-driven strategic growth path. This study examines the supplier selection practices among 78 small business executives in the midwest United States by testing three models: rational/normative, external control, and strategic choice. Although the results show support for all three models, the rational/normative model emerges as the most significant model for predicting the supplier selection practices of small firms.     

Predicting credit spreads

Predictions of firm-level credit spreads based on the current spot and forward credit spreads can be significantly improved upon by using the information contained in the shape of the credit-spread curve. However, the current credit-spread curve is not a sufficient statistic for predicting future out-of-sample credit spreads; predictions can be significantly improved upon by exploiting the information contained in the shape of the riskless yield curve. In the presence of credit-spread and riskless factors, other macroeconomic, marketwide, and firm-specific risk variables do not significantly improve predictions of credit spreads. These results have important implications for credit-spreads modeling as well as for better understanding corporate capital structure and risk management policies.