Das Finanzierungssystem der EU und die Nettozahlerdebatte

Die deutsche Nettozahlerposition innerhalb der EU wird in der ?ffentlichen Meinung h?ufig kritisch beurteilt. Wie funktioniert das Finanzierungssystem der EU? Worauf l?sst sich die Auszahlungsstruktur zurückführen? Ist der Nutzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft allein anhand der Zahlungsstr?me zu messen? Prof. Dr. Lars P. Feld, 40, ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Finanzwissenschaft am Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Ruprecht-Karls-Universit?t Heidelberg und Mitglied des wissenschaftlichen Beirats des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen; Dr. Jan Schnellenbach, 33, ist wissenschaftlicher Assistent am Alfred-Weber-Institut.     

The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach

The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. The political economy argument against centralisation of Besley and Coate (J Public Econ 87:2611–2637, 2003) does therefore not apply. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy under reasonable assumptions. In the case of non-cooperative centralisation, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.     

Creative destruction and fiscal institutions: a long-run case study of three regions

We analyze the rise and decline of the steel and mining industries in the regions of Saarland, Lorraine and Luxembourg. Our main focus is on the period of structural decline in these industries after the second world war. Differences in the institutional framework of these regions are exploited to analyze the way in which the broader fiscal constitution sets incentives for governments either to obstruct or to encourage structural change in the private sector. Our main result is that fiscal autonomy of a region subjected to structural change in its private sector is associated with a relatively faster decline of employment in the sectors affected. Contrary to the political lore, fiscal transfers appear not to be used to speed up the destruction of old sectors, but rather to stabilize them.     

New Political Economy, Scientism and Knowledge: A Critique from a Hayekian Perspective, and a Proposal for an Extension of the Research Agenda

New Political Economy has something very important in common with welfare economics: its focus on static, technical efficiency criteria to judge the rationality of a social, political or economic order. This often leads theorists to perceive their objects of research as well-defined problems to which clear-cut solutions can be found and prescribed as policy proposals, addressed at the policymaker or the democratic sovereign. This perspective frequently excludes important empirical phenomena from the research agenda. Although, for example, certain well-defined informational asymmetries are frequently modeled, fundamental knowledge problems such as ignorance of the true model of the economy are usually ignored. In the present paper, this approach is criticized from a Hayekian point of view, with an emphasis on the problems of "scientism" (i.e., the inappropriate transfer of methods from the natural to the social sciences) and irremediably imperfect knowledge, troubling both the agents in the theoretical model and the theorist. Furthermore, it is argued and illustrated with two examples that an extension of Public Choice's research agenda along Hayekian lines may be fruitful, because it leads to a fresh perception even of such problems that already have been extensively researched within the traditional framework.     

Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan

An explanation for tax morale based upon a simple model of psychological costs that depend on the perceived legitimacy of public policies is introduced. It is shown that empirically observed low levels of tax evasion can be explained even for a risk-neutral taxpayer with such a model. In a discussion of aggregate tax revenue, it is argued that tax revenue as a function of tax rates may differ fundamentally from the notorious Laffer curve. It is then necessary to look at the interaction of formal and informal institutions to predict the nominal tax rates chosen by a revenue maximizer.      

A tale of two federalisms: Germany,the United States and the ubiquity of centralization

This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.     

The Dahrendorf hypothesis and its implications for (the theory of) economic policy-making

The sociologist R. Dahrendorf has recently suggested that thereis no and there ought to be no convergence of economic policiestowards some common ideal model. On the contrary, he statesthat ‘diversity is [...] at the very heart of a worldthat has abandoned the need for closed, encompassing systems’.It is shown in this paper that the Dahrendorf hypothesis isdifficult to reconcile with orthodox economic approaches toeconomic policy-making. A perspective on policy-making thatintroduces either fundamental uncertainty or endogenous policypreferences or both is, however, shown to be consistent withthe Dahrendorf hypothesis.     

Model uncertainty and the rationality of economic policy

This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing.JEL Classification: D78, D83, H73