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Bhaskar Chakravorti William W. Sharkey Yossef Spiegel Simon Wilkie 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》1995,4(2):345-373
The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. We discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures. 相似文献
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This paper surveys the analysis, by means of cooperative game theory, of economies in which there are increasing returns to scale. In the first section necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a core of a general equilibrium economy are considered. In the second section, the partial equilibrium approach to increasing returns production, which developed along with the natural monopoly literature, is surveyed. The close relationship between the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium approaches is emphasized. 相似文献
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This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts. 相似文献
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The objective of this paper is to examine the role of nonlinear strategies in a standard oligopoly framework. We demonstrate that nonlinear pricing may indeed emerge as an equilibrium strategy, but only when firms produce differentiated products, when one firm retains market power due to a cost advantage, or as part of an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In addition, we examine the role of nonlinear pricing in a spatial-competition framework. Our main conclusion is that in highly competitive markets, nonlinear pricing strategies are not likely to emerge as an equilibrium. 相似文献
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The multinational (MNC) is well established as an arena primed for the creation and sharing of innovations. Within this arena, the creation of innovations is borne from leveraging the unique knowledge and opportunities of its globally dispersed subsidiaries. 相似文献
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A subadditive cost function is one in which a single firm can produce at lower cost than two or more firms and is taken to be a definition of natural monopoly. A supportable cost function is one in which prices exist which cover total costs and make entry unattractive to any rival firm. This paper studies the necessary and sufficient conditions for a natural monopoly to have a supportable cost function. 相似文献
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Jonathan B. Baker Mark Bykowsky Patrick DeGraba Paul LaFontaine Eric Ralph William Sharkey 《Review of Industrial Organization》2011,39(4):297-309
The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission focused on protecting competition in developing online
markets. Our review discusses important economic issues that are raised by the FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking (which is commonly
referred to as “net neutrality”) and its review of Comcast’s programming joint venture with General Electric’s NBC Universal
affiliate. The Open Internet rule focused on established online markets, while the Comcast/NBCU transaction addressed nascent
competition online along with competition in video programming and distribution offline. 相似文献
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This paper relies on an engineering optimization model of the local telecommunication exchange network to calibrate the functions entering various regulatory mechanisms, from both traditional and modern (incentive) regulation, and evaluate their relative performance. The engineering process model is used to generate data, which are econometrically synthesized in a translog economic cost function. Using this estimated cost function and some empirical and institutional information on market and regulatory conditions, we then calibrate demand, social-surplus, and disutility-of-(cost-reducing)-effort functions. These functions, together with probability distributions reflecting the regulator's beliefs about technology characteristics, allow us to quantitatively assess the social value of regulatory transfers and of good cost auditing procedures, the redistributive consequences of the various forms of regulation, and the sensitivity of their relative performance to the cost of public funds. 相似文献