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We analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of “credence goods” via alternative labelling procedures.
When consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute, producers can either self-label their
products, or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on
either the “green” or the “brown” producers. Our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of
third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information. We extend our analysis
to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers. When corrupt producers can affix spurious labels, the
government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities. We find that mandatory self-labelling
schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling, unless the “market share effect” greatly exceeds the “incentive-to-cheat
effect”.
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Soham Baksi 《The Canadian journal of economics》2014,47(1):232-249
The paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets, and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff‐reducing countries, regionalism also reduces production in a non‐participating country and may decrease its consumption. Consequently, regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff‐reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for global pollution. When pollution is global, regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries. 相似文献
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Due to differences in information disclosure mechanisms, consumer misinformation about the quality of many credence goods is more endemic at intermediate levels of the quality spectrum rather than at the extremes. Using an oligopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we examine how consumers’ overestimation of the quality of intermediate-quality products affects firms’ incentives to improve product quality. The firms non-cooperatively choose the quality of their product before choosing its price or quantity. Irrespective of the nature of second stage competition, Bertrand or Cournot, we find that quality overestimation by consumers increases profit of the intermediate-quality firm, and motivates it to raise its product’s quality. In response, the high-quality firm improves its product quality even further but ends up with lower profit. Overall, average quality of the vertically differentiated product improves, which raises consumer surplus. Social welfare increases when the firms compete in prices but falls when they compete in quantities. 相似文献
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Soham Baksi Pinaki Bose Manish Pandey 《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2009,72(1):214-224
Liberalization increases the number of goods available for consumption within a country. Since bureaucrats value variety, this raises the marginal utility of accepting a bribe. This “benefit effect” is counteracted by an increasing “cost effect” from corruption deterrence activities that arise due to greater international pressure to curb corruption. The interaction of these two effects can lead to a non-monotonic relation between liberalization and corruption. Moreover, pre-commitment to deterrence activities is shown to be more effective in controlling corruption. Empirical evidence supports the existence of a non-monotonic relation between economic openness and corruption among developing countries. 相似文献
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