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Nazaria Solferino Viviana Solferino Serena F. Taurino 《Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination》2018,13(3):601-613
The aim of this paper is to better understand how cooperation mechanisms work in the context of a Q-learning model. We apply a learning reinforcement model to analyse the conditions needed to have a stable cooperative equilibrium when people take part in a common project and could take advantages of free-riding. Our results show that a stable equilibrium can be reached thank to mechanisms of punishment, but the final result strongly depends on the risk-taking individuals’ preferences. In particular, we find that the penalties will be effective only with people having high exploration rates,namely with people able to adapt their strategies and learn to cooperate. Otherwise, it is possible to have an unstable equilibrium with cooperation until individuals have a very high intrinsic motivation to cooperate, whatever the others do. 相似文献
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Becchetti Leonardo Giorgio Federico Solferino Nazaria 《International Review of Economics》2011,58(2):185-211
In this article, we present a model that seeks to illustrate mechanisms that have fostered the diffusion of socially responsible corporate practices with specific reference to Fair Trade. We do so with a simple standard Hotelling approach of competition on product differentiation between a profit-maximising producer (PMP) and a “socially responsible” not for profit “fair trader” (FT) over prices and (costly) “socially and environmentally responsible” features of their products. We show that, under reasonable conditions concerning consumers’ costs of ethical distance, the fair trader’s entry into the market triggers the partial adoption of socially responsible practices by the profit-maximising competitor. We finally compare the ethical choices of the two players with the optimal ones of a domestic benevolent planner. Our findings show that competition between the fair trader and the PMP leads to a level of transfers to marginalised producers in the South, which is above the optimal level fixed by a planner maximising the welfare of the consumers in the North. This finding shows that the competition in social responsibility triggered by fair traders partially compensates for the lack of global governance and global institutions properly representing marginalised producers. 相似文献
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