Hölder continuity of the policy function approximation in the value function approximation

We show that given a value function approximation V of a strongly concave stochastic dynamic programming problem (SDDP), the associated policy function approximation is Hölder continuous in V.     

Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity

This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex post intertemporal preferences, only the rational agents make their savings and labor supply decisions according to these preferences. Individuals are also distinguished by their productivity. The social objective is “paternalistic”: the utilitarian welfare function depends on ex post utilities. We examine how the presence of myopic individuals affects both the size of the pension system and the degree of redistribution it operates, with and without liquidity constraints. The relationship between proportion of myopic individuals and characteristics of the pension system turns out to be much more complex than one would have conjectured. Neither the impact on the level of pensions nor the effect on their redistributive degree is unambiguous. Nevertheless, we show that under some plausible assumptions adding myopic individuals increases the level of pension benefits and leads to a shift from a flat or even targeted scheme to a partially contributory one. However, we also provide an example where the degree of redistribution is not a monotonic function of the proportion of myopic individuals.      

Is there adaptation to predictable climate change along the temperature-conflict nexus? Evidence from the El Niño Southern Oscillation

A growing body of research connects short-run deviations in weather with violence. Less well understood is the scope for agents to adapt to medium and longer-run climate fluctuations. We follow existing research and use the existing climactic forces of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) to analyse climate change – exploiting the fact that in 1989 published forecasts of these fluctuations became available. In a generalized differences framework, we contrast the impact of ENSO in affected areas of the globe relative to unaffected areas before and after 1989, finding no robust evidence that adaptation efforts are successfully mitigating conflict or civil unrest occurring as a result of these fluctuations.     

Collateral or utility penalties?

In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways of enforcing the honoring of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. First, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also an equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized in their utility if his or her delivery rate is lower than the payment rate of the financial market. Second, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also an equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true, the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.     

The effects of public infrastructure on the cost structure of Spanish industries

This paper examines the impact of public infrastructures on the performance of Spanish private business at a disaggregated industry level. We use duality theory to recover the productivity effects of public capital by calculating the cost saving effects that are associated to public services. Using a translog cost function we present panel estimates for 14 Spanish industries during the period 1980–1991. Our results strongly suggest that public capital formation can be considered to be an instrument to improve competitiveness by reducing production costs. However, the results also indicate that there is a technologically induced labor saving effect through higher public investment. Furthermore, our estimates suggest that a distinction among industries is of importance because the effects of public infrastructures vary across industries considerably.     

Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic

This paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far-sighted and myopic individuals. All individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short-term view (instant gratification) when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply. Consequently, they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions. Henceforth, when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving. We consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters: the payroll tax rate (that determines the size or generosity of the system) and the “Bismarckian factor” that determines its redistributiveness. Individuals vote sequentially. We examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system. Our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind (all far-sighted or all myopic), while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far-sighted agents. Furthermore, while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far-sighted counterparts, the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics.     

Education policies and optimal taxation

This paper studies the design of education policies in a setting in which optimal redistributive labor taxation is available. It is usually argued that the crucial parameter to guide education policy is the complementarity of education and ability. This is true only when labor supply is fixed or when income taxes are not allowed. I show that, if labor supply is endogenous and if the government can tax income in a nonlinear way, the crucial parameter is how the education elasticity of wage changes with ability. Taking the elasticity criterion into account, education subsidies are optimal in cases in which, under the complementarity criterion, education taxes would be optimal. To do this, I use an asymmetric information setting that motivates nonlinear taxation of income and education. JEL Classification H21 · H23 · H52 · I28     

Electoral Experience,Institutional Quality and Economic Development in Latin America

In a panel of 18 Latin American countries from 1900 to 2007, we test the degree to which institutions and geography affect country income. Using a new instrument, we find strong evidence that both institutions and geography are important determinants of country income. However, the penalty for economically unfavourable geography is much smaller than the potential benefits from good institutions. The coefficient estimates do not vary significantly when there are changes in the number of countries included in the analysis; the results for institutions are robust to the inclusion of country-fixed effects.