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A large, but inconclusive, literature addresses how economic heterogeneity affects the use of local resources and local environmental quality. One line of thought, which derives from Nash equilibrium provision of public goods, suggests that in contexts in which individual actions degrade local environmental quality, wealthier people in a community will tend to do more to protect environmental quality. In this paper we report on experiments performed in rural Colombia that were designed to explore the role that economic inequality plays in the ‘provision’ of local environmental quality. Subjects were asked to decide how much time to devote to collecting firewood from a local forest, which degrades local water quality, and how much to unrelated pursuits. Economic heterogeneity was introduced by varying the private returns to these alternative pursuits. Consistent with the Nash equilibrium prediction, we found that the players with more valuable alternative options put less pressure on local water quality. However, the subjects with less valuable alternative options showed significantly more restraint relative to their pure Nash strategies. Furthermore, they were willing to bear significantly greater opportunity costs to move their groups to outcomes that yielded higher average payoffs and better water quality than the Nash equilibrium outcome. 相似文献
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In contrast with what we perceive is the conventional wisdom about setting a second-best emissions tax to control a uniformly
mixed pollutant under uncertainty, we demonstrate that setting a uniform tax equal to expected marginal damage is not generally
efficient under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and damages from pollution. We show that efficient taxes
will deviate from expected marginal damage if marginal damage is increasing and there is uncertainty about the slopes of the
marginal abatement costs of regulated firms. Moreover, tax rates will vary across firms if a regulator can use observable
firm-level characteristics to gain some information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary. 相似文献
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Maria Alejandra Velez John K. Stranlund James J. Murphy 《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2009,70(3):485
This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self-interest and preferences for altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, or conformity. Using data from experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia that depend critically on a local fishery, we test whether an econometric summary of the subjects’ pure Nash strategies is consistent with one or more of these models. We find that a model that balances self-interest with a strong preference for conformity best describes average strategies. 相似文献
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Maximilian?AuffhammerEmail author Bernard?J.?Morzuch John?K.?Stranlund 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2005,30(4):377-391
Anticipation of an International Environmental Agreement provides an incentive for countries to change their production behavior prior to negotiations in order to gain a favorable bargaining position. Increased historical production figures at the time of negotiations may influence the magnitude of the baseline from which cutbacks will be specified. In this paper we empirically measure the magnitude of such strategic production behavior in the case of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987. Due to data limitations we specify a two player Nash–Cournot game between the United States and the rest of the world. We find evidence of asymmetric strategic behavior, which resulted in a net increase of aggregate world chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) production. 相似文献
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John K. Stranlund 《Journal of Economics》1996,64(1):1-22
Prior to noncooperative choices of abatement of a transboundary pollutant, a technologically advanced country considers making an unconditional transfer of abatement technology to its less-advanced rival. Even though technological aid is given unconditionally and abatement strategies are chosen noncooperatively, in a number of plausible circumstances, a transfer of a superior control technology will induce Pareto-superior pollution abatement. 相似文献
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Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have often employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing compliance
with these agreements once they are in place. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance
an independent monitor who audits the compliance performance of the members of an agreement. These audits reveal instances
of noncompliance so they can be sanctioned. We find that costly monitoring of compliance limits the circumstances under which
international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will often involve greater
participation than IEAs that do not require costly monitoring. Consequently, costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher
international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly
monitoring.
相似文献
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Effective Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
We propose an enforcement strategy to achieve complete compliance in a transferable emissions permit system when firms are required to provide reports of their own emissions. Like the literature on self-reporting in the enforcement of standards, we find that self-reporting can conserve monitoring costs, but for a different reason. In addition, we show that targeted monitoring—the practice of monitoring some firms more closely than others—is not necessary in a competitive permit system. Furthermore, tying penalties to the equilibrium permit price can stabilize the monitoring effort necessary to maintain full compliance in the face of permit price fluctuations. 相似文献