Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem

This paper studies the effect of managerial compensation terms on the well-known “underinvestment” incentive. We extend the Mauer and Ott (2000) real-option model of corporate expansion, and show that, when the manager maximizes the value of his compensation package (rather than equity value), the underinvestment problem can be substantially mitigated. Further, by designing an appropriate compensation contract, it is possible to eliminate the underinvestment incentive altogether. This managerial contract, consisting of fixed salary and equity ownership, is explicitly derived in the model. The equity ownership level is found to be an increasing function of the manager's fixed salary and the company's earnings growth rate, and a decreasing function of leverage ratio, earnings volatility, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the manager's severance pay at bankruptcy.     

Beyond internal capital markets: The in-house transmission of adverse sales shocks and the collateral channel

We study how shocks to some business segments affect investment in a firm's non-shock segments. We find that subsequent investment in the non-shock segments is significantly lower compared to segments of firms that do not experience shocks. Surprisingly, lower availability of internal funds does not account for the lower investment. We find that segment shocks propagate within the firm by decreasing the value of collateral assets and reducing the availability of external finance. Our results support the operation of an external finance collateral channel ([Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105, 211–248.]) previously discussed in the literature.     

Risky debt,jump processes,and safety covenants

The usual assumptions in the continuous-time contingent claims pricing of risky debt are (1) the firm is in default only when the value of its remaining assets falls short of the currently due promised payment and (2) the firm value follows continuous diffusion-process dynamics. It is the joint relaxation of these two simplifying assumptions that motivate this paper in its study of the valuation of risky debt and safety covenants when the firm value follows (possibly) discontinuous sample paths. Explicit solutions are derived and compared to the work of Black and Cox (1976).     

Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

The debt hangover: Renegotiation with noncontractible investment

This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a levered company to undertake noncontractible investments. This noncontrability is shown to seriously impede the efficiency of any renegotiation process in the debt overhang problems. Conditions for obtaining a fully efficient level of investment choice are derived.     

Can tax convexity be ignored in corporate financing decisions?

The standard modeling practice in corporate finance has been to assume a linear tax schedule. This paper extends the structural contingent-claim model of corporate finance to incorporate a more realistic convex tax schedule. It is shown that tax convexity raises the optimal default boundary and thus increases the likelihood of default, and also reduces the optimal leverage ratio. While the former effect seems insignificant in general, the effect of tax convexity on the optimal leverage ratio can be quantitatively significant. We conclude that tax convexity should not be ignored in corporate financing decisions, and theoretical models should use a convex tax schedule instead of a linear one. Thus, the short answer to the question in the title is “No”.     

Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms

A bargaining model of regulation is developed. It is shown that regulated firms can improve their bargaining positions and induce the regulator to set higher prices for firm output by choosing more debt. Firms, in choosing an optimal level of debt, trade off this bargaining advantage against expected bankruptcy costs. The model predicts that firms would tend to choose higher levels of debt in harsher regulatory environments. This prediction is shown to be consistent with cross-sectional evidence for U.S. electric utilities for the sample period 1972–1983.