Optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing of an investment

Corporate investment is an important determinant of economic well-being. The existing literature identifies optimal investment size and timing without the possibility of debt financing, as well as the effect of debt financing on investment timing without the option to choose investment size. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the optimal size, optimal timing and optimal financing for an investment when the firm controls all three decisions (as it usually does in practice). The investment size and investment trigger are generally positively related: when investment is delayed (accelerated) it is larger (smaller) in size, thus the overall effect on investment is ambiguous. However, when tax rate or bankruptcy cost is increased, the trigger rises and size falls, hence the effect on investment is unambiguously negative. The effect of debt financing on investment depends on the amount of debt used; with the optimal amount of debt, investment is delayed relative to the no-debt case, and this delay can be economically significant; however, the investment, when eventually made, will be larger in size. Overall, it is not appropriate to ignore either the firm’s ability to choose investment size or its option to use debt financing, when modeling the investment decision.     

Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem

This paper studies the effect of managerial compensation terms on the well-known “underinvestment” incentive. We extend the Mauer and Ott (2000) real-option model of corporate expansion, and show that, when the manager maximizes the value of his compensation package (rather than equity value), the underinvestment problem can be substantially mitigated. Further, by designing an appropriate compensation contract, it is possible to eliminate the underinvestment incentive altogether. This managerial contract, consisting of fixed salary and equity ownership, is explicitly derived in the model. The equity ownership level is found to be an increasing function of the manager's fixed salary and the company's earnings growth rate, and a decreasing function of leverage ratio, earnings volatility, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the manager's severance pay at bankruptcy.     

Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms

A bargaining model of regulation is developed. It is shown that regulated firms can improve their bargaining positions and induce the regulator to set higher prices for firm output by choosing more debt. Firms, in choosing an optimal level of debt, trade off this bargaining advantage against expected bankruptcy costs. The model predicts that firms would tend to choose higher levels of debt in harsher regulatory environments. This prediction is shown to be consistent with cross-sectional evidence for U.S. electric utilities for the sample period 1972–1983.     

Beyond internal capital markets: The in-house transmission of adverse sales shocks and the collateral channel

We study how shocks to some business segments affect investment in a firm's non-shock segments. We find that subsequent investment in the non-shock segments is significantly lower compared to segments of firms that do not experience shocks. Surprisingly, lower availability of internal funds does not account for the lower investment. We find that segment shocks propagate within the firm by decreasing the value of collateral assets and reducing the availability of external finance. Our results support the operation of an external finance collateral channel ([Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105, 211–248.]) previously discussed in the literature.     

The debt hangover: Renegotiation with noncontractible investment

This paper analyses the incentives of the equityholders of a levered company to undertake noncontractible investments. This noncontrability is shown to seriously impede the efficiency of any renegotiation process in the debt overhang problems. Conditions for obtaining a fully efficient level of investment choice are derived.     

Fiscal consolidation with high growth: A policy simulation model for India

In this paper a fiscal consolidation program for India has been presented based on a policy simulation model that enables us to examine the macroeconomic implications of alternative fiscal strategies, given certain assumptions about other macro policy choices and relevant exogenous factors. The model is then used to estimate the outcomes resulting from a possible strategy of fiscal consolidation in the base case. The exercise shows that it is possible to have fiscal consolidation while at the same time maintaining high GDP growth of around 8% or so. The strategy is to gradually bring down the revenue deficit to zero by 2014–15, while allowing a combined fiscal deficit for centre plus states of about 6% of GDP. This provides the space for substantial government capital expenditure, which translates to a significant public investment program. This in turn leads to high overall investment directly and indirectly, via the crowding in effect on private investment, which drives the high GDP growth. The exercise has also tested the robustness of this strategy under two alternative scenarios of higher and lower advanced country growth compared to the base case.     

Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism

The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confident about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest. When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive stockprice reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between tender offers and proxy contests.     

Risky debt,jump processes,and safety covenants

The usual assumptions in the continuous-time contingent claims pricing of risky debt are (1) the firm is in default only when the value of its remaining assets falls short of the currently due promised payment and (2) the firm value follows continuous diffusion-process dynamics. It is the joint relaxation of these two simplifying assumptions that motivate this paper in its study of the valuation of risky debt and safety covenants when the firm value follows (possibly) discontinuous sample paths. Explicit solutions are derived and compared to the work of Black and Cox (1976).     

Can tax convexity be ignored in corporate financing decisions?

The standard modeling practice in corporate finance has been to assume a linear tax schedule. This paper extends the structural contingent-claim model of corporate finance to incorporate a more realistic convex tax schedule. It is shown that tax convexity raises the optimal default boundary and thus increases the likelihood of default, and also reduces the optimal leverage ratio. While the former effect seems insignificant in general, the effect of tax convexity on the optimal leverage ratio can be quantitatively significant. We conclude that tax convexity should not be ignored in corporate financing decisions, and theoretical models should use a convex tax schedule instead of a linear one. Thus, the short answer to the question in the title is “No”.