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1.
An important role of managers is to motivate subordinates. Monetaryrewards have been the focus of economic analysis. Managers alsouse other means to influence subordinates. If a manager canbetter assess the subordinate's ability than the subordinatehimself, and if ability and effort are complements, the managerfinds it hard not to overstate a junior's ability. Talk is cheap.We analyze under what conditions a manager can use organizationalpractices such as delegation and the selective provision ofattention to credibly communicate his assessment. We comparetheir desirability. Delegation is preferable in case the manager'sassessment is fairly accurate; attention is inescapable if itis inaccurate. 相似文献
2.
Workers' rewards and career perspectives often depend on how their supervisors perceive their performance. However, evaluating a worker's performance is often difficult. We develop a model in which a worker is uncertain about his own performance and about his supervisor's ability to assess him. The supervisor gives the worker a performance appraisal aiming to affect both the worker's self‐perception and his own credibility in assessing the performance. We examine how performance appraisals affect the worker's future performance. Our model's predictions are consistent with empirical findings. Supervisors give, on average, “too” positive appraisals, and both positive and negative feedback can (de)motivate workers. 相似文献
3.
Silvia Dominguez-Martinez Otto H. Swank Bauke Visser 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2008,17(3):667-682
It is often assumed that bad corporate performance means a bad CEO. The task of a board of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it fails to do so, the board is said to be indolent. We take a kinder approach to observed board behavior and point to the problems even well-intended boards would encounter. They face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. We analyze the nature of the retention contract a board uses to discipline and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we find that executives may become overly active to show their credentials, and that the link between bad performance and dismissal is weak. 相似文献
4.
On the Composition of Committees 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This article is concerned with the role of committees in collectivedecision making processes in a world where agents must be motivatedto collect information. Committees improve the quality of decisionmaking by providing information and by coordinating the collectionof information. We address two types of questions. First, howdoes the composition of a committee affect final decisions?Second, what is the optimal composition of a committee fromthe decision maker's point of view? As to the latter question,we show that the cost of information collection plays an importantrole. If this cost is low, then the preferences of the committeemembers should be aligned to those of the decision maker. Memberswith similar preferences as the decision maker collect the properpieces of information. Moreover, manipulation of informationdoes not occur if the preferences of the decision maker andthe members are consonant. If the cost of searching is high,then the committee should be composed of members with polarizedpreferences. Outliers have a strong incentive to search forinformation. 相似文献
5.
Summary MORKMON, De Nederlandsche Bank's new quarterly model of the Dutch economy fits in the last generation of macroeconometric models. Based on an integrated set of national and financial accounts, it combines demand, supply and financial conditions. Distinct features are a detailed financial sector, and endogenous exchange-rate determination. The specification reflects the model-builders inclination to give a great weight to empirical evidence. The model's forecasting performance is quite satisfactory, but not all simulations yield plausible results. In particular the interaction between the real and the financial sector could benefit from further research, for which MORKMON provides an excellent bridgehead. 相似文献
6.
Summary Market-based instruments are believed to create more efficient incentives for firms to adopt new technologies than command-and-control
policies. We compare the effects of a direct technology regulation and of an adoption subsidy under asymmetric information
about the costs of technological advances in controlling the socially undesirable activities. We show that the policy maker
may want to commit to her policy. The reason is that asymmetric information about adoption costs induces the policy maker
to set subsidy levels that increase over time; firms, expecting higher subsidies in the future, postpone investment. Direct
regulation offers a commitment possibility that allows to prevent firms from postponing investment.
The research of the the first author was sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO. We thank the
participants of the First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society on March 29–April 1, 2007 in Amsterdam, and especially
Frans van Winden, for comments. 相似文献
7.
Using a simple game-theoretical model, this paper analyzes the role of policy advisers in the policy-making process. We show that policy makers are inclined to appoint advisers whose preferences coincide with their own preferences. Furthermore, we show that policy makers are biased towards erecting permanent advisory units. This result stems from the policy makers' desire to affect the actions of their successors. A permanent advisory unit induces future policy makers to act in accordance with the preferences of current policy makers. The policy-makers' bias towards erecting permanent advisory units may drive a wedge between actual policy outcomes and socially desired policy outcomes. 相似文献
8.
Benoît S. Y. Crutzen Otto H. Swank Bauke Visser 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2013,22(4):744-767
Organizations differ in the degree to which they differentiate employees by ability. We analyze how the effect of differentiation on employee morale may explain this variation. We characterize sufficient conditions for the manager to refrain from differentiation. She refrains from differentiation when employees are of similar ability, especially if absolute levels are high. Avoiding differentiation boosts the self‐image of employees. To limit the negative effects of differentiation, the manager's strategy often relies on the coarsest message set possible. The likelihood that the manager differentiates depends on the presence of synergies between employees and on the convexity of the cost of effort function. Finally, we show that in the absence of commitment no differentiation is chosen too often. 相似文献
9.
This article analyzes a model of the policy decision processin ministerial governments. A spending minister and a financeminister are involved in making a decision concerning a publicproject. The two ministers have partially conflicting preferences.Policy decisions are made in two stages. In the first stagethe spending minister consults a technical expert to obtaininformation about the technical consequences of the project.If the technical consequences are favourable, in the secondstage the finance minister consults a financial expert to obtaininformation about the financial consequences. The finance ministercan veto a proposal for undertaking the project. This articleillustrates the consequences of specialization for informationtransmission. A drawback of specialization is that projectsare evaluated on the basis of their individual consequencesrather than on the basis of their total consequences. 相似文献
10.
We analyse a game theoretical model in which policy makers have superior knowledge about the working of the economy relative to voters. We show that parties increase their chances of reelection by basing their policies on the model that best fits in with their preferences. Moreover, we show that if parties care much about holding office, they may deliberately base their policies on a model that is electorally attractive, even if this model does not describe the working of the economy correctly. Our paper provides an explanation for the observation that different political parties subscribe to different economic philosophies. 相似文献