SEQUENTIAL MERGERS WITH DIFFERING DIFFERENTIATION LEVELS*

We study sequential merger incentives under presence of product differentiation. Two sets of firms produce closely related goods, whereas each set produces more differentiated goods. Merger incentives under product differentiation are found to be stronger for two firms producing closely related goods than more differentiated goods. Also, after one merger, other firms are willing to follow with their own merger, resulting in sequential mergers. This result is consistent with the recent mergers in the video game software industry in Japan.     

SELF‐CONTROL PROBLEMS AND CONSUMPTION‐SAVING DECISIONS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*

Time‐discounting is a fundamental preference which affects wealth accumulation. If people are impatient, they may spend their earnings instantaneously, and do not save enough for the future. People are often time‐inconsistent, i.e., they often put exceptionally high value on immediate consumption compared to any time in the future. Whether they are aware or not, these individuals are susceptible to self‐control problems. In this paper, we review theoretical and empirical research on time‐inconsistency and self‐control problems, particularly on consumption and saving, and discuss their policy implications.     

MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

In a two‐sector model of monopolistic competition, this paper explores what impacts an expansion of government spending on public services has on national income. In the short run where entry and exit of firms are restricted, a rise in government spending on services like health care (which has only a role of substituting for market services) increases national income, but that on services like elderly care (which has not only this role but also another role of contributing to home production of services) decreases it. These results are reversed in the long run. Welfare effects of public services are also examined.     

STABILITY OF THE COURNOT SOLUTION AND FREE ENTRY: A NOTE*

Taking a traditional approach, I show that by using the discrete adjustment system, the Cournot solution in a free entry oligopoly with increasing returns to scale is stable only when the number of firms is very small. We must pay attention to stability when using the free entry Cournot oligopoly model.     

On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests

There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent‐seeking contest. First, effectiveness of player's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent‐seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. This article proves under standard assumptions in the literature that there exists a unique pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in a general asymmetric rent‐seeking contest with these three types of heterogeneity among players.     

A CURRENT JAPANESE INTERPRETATION OF MAX WEBER

The author tries to clarify some characteristics in the context of the intellectual history of Japan with regard to how and what aspects of Max Weber's theories have been introduced by Japanese social scientists. Max Weber's influence on Japan is so great that it is impossible to discuss the whole of it. Accordingly, in this article, the author refers only to a few social scientists who are notable from the viewpoint of some important problems, such as “overcoming modernity,’ etc. Some aspects which are peculiar to the interpretation of Weber's theories on Oriental society in Japan are dealt with in relation to the author's interests in the last part of this article.     

THE CONDITIONS GOVERNING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The author was Director of the Bangkok Office of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies of Kyoto University from 1963 to 1966, during which period he made a study of agricultural development in Thialand and also visited the various countries of Southeast Asia. On the basis of this field-work he makes clear the factors impeding the development of agriculture in Southeast Asia with regard to such matters as decision-making units, capital, socio-economic conditions, technology, and prices, and goes on to advocate some feasible development policies.