THE CLOSED-LOOP EFFECTS OF MARKET INTEGRATION IN A DYNAMIC DUOPOLY

This paper develops a dynamic game model of reciprocal dumping to reconsider welfare effects of market integration, i.e. reductions in transport costs. We show that welfare under trade is unambiguously less than welfare under autarky for any level of transport costs, which is impossible in static models where trade is profitable if the transport cost is low enough. This is because the negative effect through closed-loop property of feedback strategies dominates the positive effects.     

OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PRODUCT R&D WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY ORDERING: ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY*

We examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically differentiated duopoly. In a significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap between firms. In our analysis, the endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We demonstrate the possible anti‐leapfrogging effect of R&D subsidy/tax policy. By committing to a firm‐specific subsidy schedule contingent on firms’ quality choices, the government can not only correct distortions in product quality but also select the socially preferred equilibrium. The latter role is fulfilled by preventing the technologically inferior firm from becoming a quality leader in the industry. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are analysed.     

EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION ON PRODUCTIVITY AND INDUSTRY GROWTH: A STUDY OF STEEL REFINING FURNACES*

This paper examines the impact of new technology on plant‐level productivity in the Japanese steel industry during the 1950's and 1960's. We estimate the production function, considering the differences in technology between the refining furnaces owned by a plant. We find that a more productive plant was likely to adopt the new technology and that the adoption would be expected to occur immediately following the peak of the productivity level achieved with the old technology. The adoption of the new technology primarily accounted not only for the industry's productivity slowdown but also for the industry's remarkable growth.     

The Reserve Army Effect, Unions, and Nominal Wage Growth

This paper analyzes the reserve army effect from a perspective which integrates propositions from the social structures of accumulation and regulation approaches. The magnitude of the reserve army effect on nominal wage growth ought to vary according to the subperiods 1958–1970, 1970–1980, and 1980–1987, and also according to subsectors with different unionization rates. This hypothesis is tested empirically by estimating the effect of demand pressure variables on nominal wage growth for heavily, moderately, and lightly unionized sectors. The results generally confirm the hypothesis, while at the same time showing clear differences in the impact of collective bargaining on the reserve army effect between 1958–1970 and 1980–1987.     

QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION,WELFARE, AND THE MODE OF COMPETITION IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT MARKET: A NOTE*

We analyse the implications of quality differences in a vertically differentiated product market for social welfare by employing an endogenous quality choice model. We find that in of Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, the degree of quality differentiation at equilibrium in an unregulated market is larger or smaller, respectively, than that of the socially second‐best optimum. This implies that a reduction in quality difference, respectively, increases or decreases social welfare in the case of Bertrand or Cournot duopolies.