A change in market responses to the environmental management ranking in Japan

This article investigates stock price reactions to the release of the environmental management ranking issued by Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei newspaper) from 1998 to 2005, by using a standard event study methodology. An examination of stock price movements of the top 100 manufacturing companies reveals that stock prices during the sample period did not respond significantly to the release of the ranking within a 3-day event window. However, market responses became significantly positive after 2003, while they were significantly negative in 1999 and 2000. The stock prices of upgraded companies in particular reacted negatively before 2000, but positively after 2002. These results indicate that market reactions were changed between 2001 and 2002, when the Japanese government showed its strong commitment to environmental policies by establishing the Ministry of the Environment and signing the Kyoto Protocol, following a number of legislations.     

The global financial crisis and small- and medium-sized enterprises in Japan: how did they cope with the crisis?

In this paper, we examine the nature of the shocks that hit the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan during the global financial crisis that occurred in the wake of the massive number of non-performing subprime loans in the U.S. We examine how the SMEs responded to the shocks, using the unique surveys that were conducted by the Research Institute of the Economy, Trade and Industry in 2008 and 2009. The shocks were identified as demand, supply, and financial shocks. The demand shock was the most prevalent of the shocks, while the financial shock was least frequent. The SMEs took a spectrum of measures against the demand shock by seeking help from suppliers and financial institutions. We find that the measures taken by the SMEs crucially depended on the bank–firm relationship as well as the customer–supplier relationship. The bank-dependent SMEs asked their closely-affiliated financial institutions for help, while the SMEs less dependent on financial institutions sought help primarily from their suppliers. A long customer–supplier relationship plays an important role in mitigating the supply shock.     

Trading and Ordering Patterns of Market Participants in High Frequency Trading Environment: Empirical Study in the Japanese Stock Market

In this study, we investigate ordering patterns of different types of market participants in Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) by examining order records of the listed stocks. Firstly, we categorize the virtual servers in the trading system of TSE, each of which is linked to a single trading participant, by the ratio of cancellation and execution in the order placement as well as the number of executions at the opening of the afternoon session. Then, we analyze ordering patterns of the servers in the categories in short intervals for the top 10 highest trading volume stocks. By classifying the intervals into four cases by returns, we observe how different types of market participants submit or execute orders in the market situations. Moreover, we investigate the shares of the executed volumes for the different types of servers in the swings and roundabouts of the Nikkei 225 index, which were observed in September in 2015. The main findings of this study are as follows: Server type A, which supposedly includes non-market making proprietary traders with high-speed algorithmic strategies, executes and places orders along with the direction of the market. The shares of the execution and order volumes along with the market direction increase when the stock price moves sharply. Server type B, which presumably includes servers employing a market making strategy with high cancellation and low execution ratio, shifts its market making price ranges in the rapid price movements. We observe that passive servers in Server type B have a large share and buy at low levels in the price falls. Also, Server type B, as well as Server type A, makes profit in the price falling days and particularly, the aggressive servers in the server type make most of the profit. Server type C, which is assumed to include servers receiving orders from small investors, constantly has a large share of execution and order volume.     

Quality-Adjusted Prices of Japanese Mobile Phone Handsets and Carriers’ Strategies

In order to discuss oligopolists’ strategic determination of quality-adjusted prices (QAPs), we conducted a hedonic regression analysis using adjacent periods and estimated the QAPs of mobile phone handsets sold in Japan between 2002 and mid-2007 for each carrier. We observed (1) a decreasing trend in QAP for each carrier, (2) a more rapid decrease in the QAPs of the two smaller carriers’ handsets relative to that of the largest carrier, and (3) a turnover cycle of the QAPs between the two smaller carriers. If both small carriers decrease their QAPs at roughly the same time, neither will significantly increase their subscriber share, which can generate a turnover cycle of QAPs.     

Political Accountability,Electoral Control and Media Bias

Are anti‐establishment mass media really useful in preventing politicians from behaving dishonestly? This paper models the direction of media bias, and shows that the probability of a dishonest action by an incumbent is higher (than that in the case of no media bias) if and only if the mass media have some degree of “anti‐incumbent” bias (i.e. information favourable to the incumbent is converted into unfavourable news about the incumbent with a positive probability), provided that the incumbent is less likely to be opportunistic than a challenger in the upcoming election. This result holds irrespective of the degree of “pro‐incumbent” bias.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination, Consumption Externalities, and Market Opening

This study investigates the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on market opening in the presence of consumption externalities between separate markets. Assuming symmetric interdependent linear demands and constant marginal cost, we indicate the possibility that with negative externalities a monopolist can do better by closing the relatively small market from the social welfare viewpoint, while it prefers opening that market if price discrimination is feasible. This result contradicts the previous literature on third-degree price discrimination and market opening which asserts that, in the case of non-increasing marginal cost, price discrimination improves social welfare if it opens new markets that are closed under uniform pricing.     

Yardstick Cost Comparison and Economies of Scale and Scope in Japan's Electric Power Industry

This paper utilizes a fixed-effects model of panel data analysis and estimates the translog cost function of the Japanese electric power industry from 1978 to 1998. First, we investigate whether the Japanese electric power industry is naturally monopolistic. We find that all electric power companies still benefit from both scale and scope economies and therefore, this industry remains a naturally mono-polistic industry. Second, in order to apply the idea of yardstick-type competition to a naturally monopolistic industry where costs are quite different between companies, we introduce two kinds of cost-comparison coefficients, one for the individually specific effects and the other for scale and scope economies.     

Estimating noncooperative and cooperative models of bargaining: an empirical comparison

This paper examines the issue of model selection in studies of strategic situations. In particular, we compare estimation results from a noncooperative formulation of government formulation à la (Baron and Ferejohn in Am Poli Sci Rev 87:34–47, 1989) with those from two alternative cooperative formulations (Nash in Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950; Shapley and Shubik in Am Poli Sci Rev 48:787–792, 1954). Although the estimates of the ministerial ranking are similar, statistical testing suggests that the noncooperative formulation is best fitted to the observed data among the alternative models. This result implies that modeling the noncooperative structure in bargaining situations is crucially important at the risk of possibly misspecifying the details of the game.