Nuclear bombs and economic sanctions

We examine the efficacy of trade sanctions when a target's action causes an irrevocable change in the status quo; for example, sanctions to stop a target's nuclear weapons development program. We find that when a sanctioning country cannot precommit to maintain sanctions long after a target becomes a nuclear power, sanctions are not only inefficacious but they backfire, spurring a target to intensify its effort to complete the nuclear program. If the nuclear program has several stages to complete, gradually increasing sanctions as the nuclear threat becomes more imminent may also backfire even though the program is potentially stoppable when sufficient pressure is applied earlier on. We also discuss the policy implications of our analysis.     

Credibility of Protection and Incentives to Innovate

In recent trade policy debates it is often argued that temporary protection stimulates innovation. This paper shows that the validity of the argument depends on the perceived credibility of protection policy. If it is suspected that temporary protection will be removed early should innovation occur before its terminal date, the protected firm invests less in R&D than it does under free trade. If it is expected that protection will be extended should no innovation have occurred by its terminal date, investment falls below the free-trade level, and eventually to zero, as the terminal date is approached.     

Economic Development in Asian Countries, and the Effectof Trade in Asia on Employment and Wages in Japan

There is a controversy in the USA and several European countries on whether or not an increase in imports in manufacturing goods from low-wage developing countries has major effects on employment and wages in industrialized countries. This paper examines the issue for Japanese imports, paying a particular attention to the effect of manufacturing imports from Asian countries on employment and wages in Japan. It is found that the effect has not been large to date, but that there could be negative effects on employment and, in particular, wages if imports from China and India were to increase substantially.     

Planting Disinformation through Voluntary Export Restraints

Voluntary export restraints typically are determined in bilateral negotiations between an importing country and a major exporting country, and have the appearance of forcibly limiting exports from the latter while leaving minor exporters unrestrained. However, during the negotiation process the major exporter can acquire insight into the nature of the importing country government. This private information may actually motivate the major exporter to restrain exports voluntarily.     

On the Effects of Wage Pressure on the Unemployment Rate and Capital Share

Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to understand the behaviour of the capital share and the unemployment rate in Europe over the past quarter of a century. We consider a model with monopolistic competition, increasing returns and an imperfect labour market, assuming that the elasticity between capital and labour is less than unity. Previous works have generally assumed constant returns to scale. Our results offer an important conclusion, namely that increased wage pressure will increase the unemployment rate and the capital share even though the latter initially decreases, which fits the stylized facts about the studied economies.     

International transmission of business cycles: Evidence from dynamic correlations

We exploit dynamic correlations to estimate determinants of output comovement between OECD countries. Trade intensity, financial integration, and specialization patterns have significantly different effects on comovements at different frequencies. This sheds more light on previous results based on statistical filters.     

The Foreign Exchange Origins of Japan's Economic Slump and Low Interest Liquidity Trap

Japan's macroeconomic problem has yet to be properly diagnosed. Throughout the 1990s, policy makers could not decide on the proper macro economic measures to combat the country's severe economic slump. We propose a unified explanation, with deep historical roots, of why aggregate private demand failed to recover after Japan's stock and real estate bubbles burst in 1991 and deflationary pressure continues. The problem is not purely ‘made in Japan’. It arises from Japan's unbalanced mercantile relationship with the United States. Starting in the early 1970s, numerous trade disputes between the two countries created tensions that were (temporarily) resolved by the yen going ever higher against the dollar up to 1995. In the last two decades, this persistent pressure for the yen to rise was further aggravated by Japan's large current‐account (saving) surpluses as the counterpart of America's large current account (saving) deficits. The legacy is the expectation that trade and financial tensions will recur so that the yen will be higher 10, 20, or 30 years from now –with Japan's (wholesale) price level forced correspondingly lower and nominal interest rates on yen assets remaining more than four percentage points less than those on dollar assets. This fear of yen appreciation, whose timing is erratic and unpredictable, now inhibits private domestic investment by both Japanese firms and households. Our theory also explains why, in the late 1990s, nominal interest rates on short‐term yen assets were compressed toward zero so as to destroy the normal profit margins of the banking system. In this liquidity trap, the Bank of Japan –whose monetary policy has been quite ‘expansionary’–is powerless to stimulate the flagging economy. To spring the liquidity trap, eliminate deflationary pressure, and restore macro economic balance in Japan, the American and Japanese governments must act jointly to quash the expectation that the yen will be higher in the future than it is today.     

Structuring incentives to elicit work effort during the process of industrialization: evidence from Vietnamese businesses

Industrial advancements in developing economies have brought with them the primacy of discretionary tasks over simple tasks in production. Differing characteristics of these separate types of tasks may require distinct incentive mechanisms to elicit work effort from employees. Using the data collected from 954 blue-collar production workers, this study examines changes in incentive mechanisms with industrial advances by testing the relative validity of major motivation models between low- and high-skill industries in Vietnam. Our results indicate that the gift exchange model gains ascendancy over the mainstream economic model as developing economies upgrade their industrial structures.