国有风险资本与企业融资约束: 如愿以偿还是事与愿违?

我国国有风险资本是否实现了设立之初的目标,即是否纾解了企业融资困难呢?文章基于上市企业微观数据和手动采集的国有风险资本数据对此进行了系统研究.实证结果稳健地显示,国有风险资本可有效缓解企业后续融资约束,我国政府参与风险投资活动是有效的.进一步地,高持股比例、多联合投资、高政治层级的国有风险资本对受资助企业融资约束的缓解作用更强;且国有风险资本对经济欠发达、低制度质量环境下的企业、面临高环境不确定性和高竞争程度企业、民营企业、成长期与动荡期企业能产生更大的影响.机制检验表明,国有风险资本既能通过认证作用显著降低企业信息不对称程度,又能发挥政治关联的资源效应,包括显著促进银企关系和企业的商业信贷获取能力,并提升企业获得政府补贴的水平,从而减轻企业资金负担,缓解其融资约束.经济后果分析表明,国有风险资本能显著降低企业外部融资的股权资金成本和债务资金成本,帮助改善企业融资贵的难题,而且国有风险资本有助于企业在创新和经营方面的良性发展.但国有风险资本并未起到有效监督作用,不能缓解企业代理问题,尤其是会导致第一类代理成本的明显提高,而高管薪酬提升是其中的重要原因.据此,文章认为在未来的国有风险资本发展中,要把握"政府角色"介入的尺度,完善国有风险资本对企业的监督管理机制.同时适当兼顾各地区发展不平衡的情况,对中西部地区的国有风险资本发展提供适当且必要的帮助,以促进国有风险资本在新时期的长足发展.     

互联网使用与个体生育意愿——基于信息成本和家庭代际视角的分析

探究生育意愿的影响因素,助力人口转变升级成为当前研究的重要方向.文章置身中国具体情境,基于中国社会状况综合调查数据(CGSS2017),从信息成本视角和家庭代际视角两个维度考察互联网使用对个体生育意愿的影响.研究结果表明,使用互联网以及互联网使用频率越高的个体,其生育意愿越低.进一步研究发现,已育史对于互联网使用频率影响个体再育意愿存在负向调节效应,对于已育个体而言,上网频率越高对再育意愿的抑制作用越加显著;代际"数字鸿沟"对于互联网使用频率影响个体生育意愿也存在显著的负向调节效应.当子代和父辈存在较大的代际"数字鸿沟"时,对于互联网使用频繁的个体,父辈沿袭下来的传统育儿经验和子代通过网络获取的育儿知识相冲突可能会引致更多的家庭矛盾,进而抑制个体生育意愿.反之,当代际"数字鸿沟"较小时,互联网使用频率对个体生育意愿的抑制效应亦有所减弱.文章的发现对于提升个体生育意愿以及生育率的研究具有一定启示意义.     

Patterns of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Decisions

This paper examines the pattern of settlements, investor wins and state wins in investor-state dispute settlement cases, focusing on the impact of arbitration rules, the resources and experience of the litigants, the type of treaty breach under investigation, and the pattern of state intervention. Logistic regression results show that settlements are more likely when investors do not disclose their allegations publicly, when the host state has been involved in a greater number of past cases, and when the respondent state has a higher control-of-corruption rating. Panel awards to investors are more likely in cases of alleged direct expropriation and less likely for indirect expropriation. Panel decisions favoring the state increase with higher per capita income and rule-of-law ratings.     

Liking what others “Like”: using Facebook to identify determinants of conformity

In this paper we explore the micro-level determinants of conformity. Members of the social networking service Facebook express positive support to content on the website by clicking a Like button. We set up a natural field experiment to test whether users are more prone to support content if someone else has done so before. To find out to what extent conformity depends on group size and social ties we use three different treatment conditions: (1) one stranger has Liked the content, (2) three strangers have Liked the content, and (3) a friend has Liked the content. The results show that one Like from a single stranger had no impact. However, increasing the size of the influencing group doubled the probability that subjects expressed positive support. Friendship ties were also decisive. People were, on average, four times more likely to press the Like button if a friend, rather than a stranger, had done so before them. The existence of threshold effects in our experiment clearly shows that both group size and social proximity matters when opinions are shaped.     

Cuba,Trade Dependency and the GATT/WTO System

Cuba sought economic independence from the U.S. and its reliance on sugar exports after its 1959 revolution, but subsequently developed new dependency relationships. In the meantime, Cuba remained inside the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), despite conducting most of its trade outside it. This paper explores the political economy of Cuba’s participation in the GATT and later the World Trade Organization (WTO). Documents show that Cuba sought to use its participation to gain new markets and influence in the developing world. While Cuba has gained little economically from its participation, in recent years it has diversified its exports and trade partners, and its trade interests now align more closely with WTO rules. Economic reforms will be necessary in order for Cuba to benefit.     

Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource

We study the exploitation of a common groundwater resource, first as a static and then as a differential game, in order to take into account the strategic and dynamic interactions among the users of the resource. We suppose that firms can form coalitions or can decide not to cooperate. The non-cooperation regime is characterized by pumping that lead to depletion of the aquifer; the cooperation preserves the resource. Open-loop and feedback equilibria have been computed and compared in order to characterize the existence of cooperators and defectors in water resources management.