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1.
In this note, we revisit minimum quality standards (MQS) under a vertically differentiated duopoly. We generalize the model in Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) by introducing asymmetry into the fixed cost of quality improvement and by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity of quality ordering. In the generalized model, we show that the results derived by Ronnen (1991) and Valletti (2000) are largely robust. 相似文献
2.
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu 《Open Economies Review》2013,24(2):361-369
Using the Hamilton–Slutsky extended endogenous timing game of observable delay framework, we analyze the endogenous timing of tariff policy in the presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions. In particular, focusing on the strategic relationships between an importing country’s government and an exporting monopoly firm, we show that a natural Stackelberg situation exists in which the importing country’s government as first mover determines the tariff rate and the exporting monopoly firm as second mover determines the production level. We also find that the natural Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto superior to both the Nash and alternative Stackelberg equilibria. This implies that commitment to an ex ante optimal tariff policy before the production decision is made is optimal for the affected parties. 相似文献
3.
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu 《Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade》2007,7(2):131-142
Introducing network externalities into a model of vertically differentiated products, Lambertini and Orsini (2001, 2003) analyze
the implications of a monopolist’s quality choice for social optimum. Moreover, they examine how the network externality affects
quality, quantity, price, and social surplus. In this note, by looking at the nature of cost functions and the degree of network
externalities, we reconsider their results, at least some of which depend upon the specificity of the cost functions.
相似文献
4.
This paper examines strategic investment subsidies in an international oligopoly. A general oligopoly model is constructed in which firms compete in two stages and governments commit to investment subsidies prior to firms' actions. The paper considers asymmetry among firms that arises from the nature of goods they produce rather than their cost structures. When firms produce asymmetrically differentiated goods, it is found that a change in the number of foreign competitors may alter the sign of the optimal unilateral investment subsidy. An example of policy reversal is provided in the case of strategic research and development subsidies for a quality‐differentiated industry. 相似文献
5.
This paper shows that some of the main policy implications in Park (2001 ) and Zhou, Spencer, and Vertinsky (2002 ) are sensitive to their assumptions on marginal production costs. The unilaterally optimal policy for investment towards quality improvement is analyzed, assuming constant and non‐negative marginal production costs under vertically differentiated international duopoly. If marginal production costs are different across firms, the optimal policy for each exporting country may be opposite in its sign from that shown by the existing papers under Bertrand competition. The policy reversal may also occur for the low‐quality exporting country under Cournot competition. 相似文献
6.
Tsuyoshi Shinozaki Makoto Tawada Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara 《Review of International Economics》2019,27(3):765-785
We investigate the effects of a public intermediate good on trade patterns, capital accumulation, and the gains from trade in a two‐country, three‐sector overlapping generations model. A public intermediate good affects not only the productivity of private production but capital accumulation; thus, the results differ from those obtained in previous studies. First, opening to trade may accelerate capital accumulation in the higher‐savings country. Additionally, the country producing a public intermediate good more (which is labor‐intensive) may be the importer of the investment good (which is the most capital‐intensive). Finally, the lower‐savings country may have lower steady‐state welfare under trade. 相似文献
7.
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu 《Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade》2018,18(2):245-252
Based on a simple model of compatibility choice under differentiated Cournot duopoly with network externalities, we consider how the levels of a network externality and product substitutability affect the choice of compatibility. In particular, if the level of network externality is larger than that of product substitutability, there are multiple equilibria involving imperfect and perfect compatibility. Furthermore, we demonstrate the conditions for constructing such a network alliance so that firms provide perfectly compatible products. The network alliance is stable and socially optimal. 相似文献
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9.
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu 《Metroeconomica》2012,63(3):429-442
We show that the welfare effect of second‐best policies such as a subsidy/tax and quality regulation in the case of a monopoly in a network industry depends on the strength of network effects. That is, focusing on the case in which the network effect is smaller (larger) than the marginal cost of production for the small (large) network effect, it is demonstrated that in the case of a small (large) network effect, an output and a quality‐improving subsidy (tax) policy are socially optimal, and a government should commit to a minimum (maximum) quality standard. 相似文献
10.
A Comparison of Regulatory Awareness and Green Supply Chain Management Practices Among Chinese and Japanese Manufacturers 下载免费PDF全文
Qinghua Zhu Ying Qu Yong Geng Tsuyoshi Fujita 《Business Strategy and the Environment》2017,26(1):18-30
Leading manufacturers in developed countries generally have high environmental awareness and implement proactive environmental management practices such as green supply chain management (GSCM). However, it is uncertain if smaller manufacturers in developed countries are more proactive than all manufacturers in developing countries. To understand this situation, we carried out surveys among small and medium‐sized Japanese manufacturers, leading Chinese manufacturers and traditional Chinese manufacturers. Statistical results show that leading Chinese manufacturers have the highest awareness of both domestic and international environmental regulations/policies, and implement all GSCM practices at the highest level. Leading Chinese manufacturers and Japanese manufacturers are aware of international environmental regulations/policies, but such awareness only motivates them to implement eco‐design practices. Traditional Chinese manufacturers have limited awareness of international environmental regulations/policies, but such awareness brings all types of GSCM practice. Such results can be helpful for different manufacturers in both developed and developing countries to develop suitable environmental strategies. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment 相似文献