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1.
On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We consider the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee in a linear city framework where firms compete in price. We show that offering royalty is best for an outsider patentee for both drastic and non-drastic innovations. For an insider patentee, offering no license is the best when the innovation is drastic, while royalty is optimal when the innovation is non-drastic. The incentive for innovation is higher for an outsider patentee compared to an insider patentee. The overall increase in welfare due to an innovation is the same for both outsider and insider patentees. 相似文献
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The marketing literature exhibits a consistent lack of concern to recognize the distinct differences among the various possible manifestations of compulsiveness in the consumer-marketplace domain. The practice of using terms pertaining to different manifestations of compulsiveness synonymously, especially when the meaning of the term “compulsive behavior” is itself under debate, creates further semantic uncertainties that hinder typological endeavors in the budding area of abnormal or deviant consumer behavior. This article attempts to remove such uncertainties by elucidating and establishing the differences among the above manifestations. 相似文献
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This paper presents an analytical approach to the tactical question: ‘What level of enforcement over time allows one to eliminate a street market for illicit drugs while expanding the least possible total effort?’ The analysis is done in the context of Caulkins' model [6] which predicts the rate of change of dealers as a function of enforcement level and several market parameters. Our analysis suggests that the simple strategy of using the maximum available enforcement intensity until the market has been eliminated minimizes the total enforcement effort required. 相似文献
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Dr. R. Rajan 《Empirical Economics》1990,15(4):347-366
In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional institutional approach of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions.The author is grateful to two anonymous referees whose comments led to a considerably improved version of the paper. 相似文献
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Using a comprehensive database of European firms, we study the effect of market entry regulations on the creation of new limited-liability firms, the average size of entrants, and the growth of incumbent firms. We find that costly regulations hamper the creation of new firms, especially in industries that should naturally have high entry. These regulations also force new entrants to be larger and cause incumbent firms in naturally high-entry industries to grow more slowly. Our results hold even when we correct for the availability of financing, the degree of protection of intellectual property, and labor regulations. 相似文献
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At an analytical level, economists have often categorised the international dimensions of environmental problems and policies as being national (or competitiveness), psychological (as opposed to physical) and transboundary (global) in nature. Focusing on transboundary pollution problems, the reasons why a multilateral approach among sovereign nations to solve such global externalities may be difficult are discussed within a simple analytical framework. The paper examines the Southeast Asian experience at a regional approach to tackling the haze problem due to the Indonesian forest fires. It goes on to explore multilateral policy options and constraints for dealing with such transboundary environmental pollution problems. 相似文献