Min, Max, and Sum

This paper provides characterization theorems for preferences that can be represented by U(x₁, …, x_n)=min{x_k}, U(x₁, …, x_n)=max{x_k}, U(x₁, …, x_n)=∑ u(x_k), or combinations of these functionals. The main assumption is partial separability, where changing a common component of two vectors does not reverse strict preferences, but may turn strict preferences into indifference. We discuss applications of our results to social choice. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C0, D1, D6.     

A Model of Declining Standards

This paper presents a model in which relative standing determines standards. There are three kinds of agents in the model: candidates who wish to pass a test, members of the elite who have passed the test, and the judge who decides who passes. In order to pass, a candidate's performance must be at least as good as the performance of a representative member of the elite. Without perturbations in the underlying data, the model predicts that standards will not change. Perturbations in the preferences used to judge candidates lead to a reduction in standards.     

Automobile Safety Regulation and the Incentive to Drive Recklessly: Evidence from NASCAR

When safety regulation makes automobiles safer, drivers may drive more recklessly, partially or completely offsetting effects on the overall level of safety. Evidence of these offsetting effects has been hard to find, however, primarily because of the aggregate nature of accident data. In this paper we explore how changes in the safety of automobiles used in the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) has altered the incentive of drivers to drive recklessly. This unique data set allows more accurate and objective measurement of the necessary variables to test for these effects at a microlevel. Our results strongly support the presence of these offsetting behavioral effects.     

The Political,Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina

In this paper, we examine the resiliency of community recovery after a natural disaster. We argue that a resilient recovery requires robust economic/financial institutions, political/legal institutions, and social/cultural institutions. We explore how politically and privately created disaster preconditions and responses have contributed to or undermined institutional robustness in the context of the Gulf Coast's recovery after Hurricane Katrina. We find that where postdisaster resiliency has been observed, private-sector responses contributing to the health of these institutional arenas are largely responsible. Where postdisaster fragility and slowness has been observed, public-sector responses contributing to the frailty of these institutional arenas are largely the cause. In other words, we engage in a comparative institutional analysis of civil society, entrepreneurial commercial society, and government agencies and political actors in the wake of a natural disaster.     

Hedging Strategies of Financial Intermediaries: Pricing Options with a Bid-Ask Spread

This paper uses a model similar to the Boyle-Vorst and Ritchken-Kuo arbitrage-free models for the valuation of options with transactions costs to determine the maximum price to be charged by the financial intermediary writing an option in a non-auction market. Earlier models are extended by recognizing that, in the presence of transactions costs, the price-taking intermediary devising a hedging portfolio faces a tradeoff: to choose a short trading interval with small hedging errors and high transactions costs, or a long trading interval with large hedging errors and low transactions costs. The model presented here also recognizes that when transactions costs induce less frequent portfolio adjustments, investors are faced with a multinomial distribution of asset returns rather than a binomial one. The price upper bound is determined by selecting the trading frequency that will equalize the marginal gain from decreasing hedging errors and the marginal cost of transactions.     

Marginal decision-making in the treatment of refractory epilepsy

Objective: Epilepsy surgery is one of the most effective treatments in modern medicine. Yet, it remains largely under-utilized, in spite of its proven efficacy. The referrals for epilepsy surgery are often delayed until it is too late to prevent the detrimental psychosocial effects of refractory seizures. The reluctance towards epilepsy surgery is influenced by the perceived risks of the procedure by practitioners and patients. This review discusses how, in general decision-making processes, one faces a natural tendency towards emphasizing the risks of the most immediate and operational decision (surgery), at times without contrasting these risks with the alternative (uncontrolled epilepsy).

Methods: In the field of economics, this bias is well recognized and can be overcome through marginal analysis, formally defined as focusing on incremental changes as opposed to absolute levels.

Results: Regarding epilepsy surgery, the risks and benefits of surgery are considered separately from the risks of uncontrolled epilepsy. For instance, even though surgery carries an ～0.1–0.5% risk of perioperative mortality, the chance of sudden unexpected death with refractory epilepsy can be as high as 0.6–0.9% per year. It is suggested that the inadequate way of phrasing clinical questions can be a crucial contributing factor for the under-utilization of epilepsy surgery.

Significance: It is proposed that examining decision-making for epilepsy surgery in the context of marginal analysis may enable providers and patients to make more accurate informed decisions.