WORLD CUP 2010: SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY CHALLENGES INFORMED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF GERMANY 2006

The paper provides an ex post analysis of the financial burden and economic benefits of the World Cup (WC) in Germany 2006. Based on the usual cost-benefit measures, the experience of WC 2006 appears to be in line with existing empirical research on large sporting events and sports stadiums, which have rarely identified significant net economic benefits. The lessons from Germany 2006 provide a context for analyzing the potential risks and benefits for South Africa (SA), the WC hosts in 2010. For SA, a careful analysis might be even more urgent to assure the sustainability of investment in stadiums. The paper also argues that the "feel-good" and public image effects of sports events should no longer be neglected in cost-benefit studies of large sporting events, even though these effects have the character of experience goods, and their value are thus likely to be underestimated ex ante. ( JEL L83, R53, R58)     

Tax Rate Harmonization,Renegotiation, and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction

This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between countries is smaller, or if concealment costs of profit shifting are larger when the tax authorities adopt grim‐trigger strategies. Allowing for renegotiation in the tax harmonization process requires more patient tax authorities to implement tax harmonization as a weakly renegotiation‐proof equilibrium. In this case, we find somewhat paradoxical situations where higher costs of profit shifting make tax harmonization less sustainable.     

The IASB Agenda — A Moving Target

This paper reviews the agenda of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the opportunities for research that it provides. The paper analyses the progress of topics on the 2001 agenda and concludes that evolution is variable, partly due to the appearance of later priorities. It goes on to discuss how research may inform standard-setting and analyses how major projects currently on the agenda lend themselves to academic research.     

More Uncertainties: German Unions Facing 1992

West German unions' early endorsement of European integration set them apart from many other European unions, but it was in agreement with German business and governments. The completion of the European Internal Market in 1992 and the weakness of its "Social Dimension" are likely negatively to affect German unions' national institutional power base. Nevertheless, German unions have little choice but to continue to support integration at the European level.     

Non‐Governmental Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies as a Two‐Stage Game of Voluntary Public Good Provision

In small groups, norm enforcement is achieved through mutual punishment and reward. In large societies, norms are enforced by specialists such as government officials. However, not every public cause is overseen by states, for instance those organized at the international level. This paper shows how nongovernmental norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. As a first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to a nongovernmental agency that produces an incentive system. The second stage is the provision of a public good on the basis of private contributions. The incentive system increases contributions by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. It is shown that, even in large populations, nongovernmental norm enforcement can be supported in a noncooperative equilibrium of utility‐maximizing individuals. This result is in sharp contrast to those obtained in the standard situation of voluntary provision of an intrinsic public good which—without altruism or related motives—is eroded by free‐riding. Reliance on altruistic behavior is not required in supplying the second‐order public good “norm enforcement” in large societies.     

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: A LOAN MECHANISM-DESIGN APPROACH

International Financial Institutions (IFIs) tie resource transfers to capital-scarce countries to improvements in their economic policies and institutions. The objective of this assistance is twofold: to augment the recipient's capital base and to improve its allocation of resources. This paper offers a political-economy explanation for the limited success of some of these loan programs. In our model, governments select policies under the influence of interest groups. Their capacity to absorb IFI loans and their reform efforts are both unobservable to the IFI. An optimally designed loan mechanism must create sufficient incentives – in the form of rewards and punishments – to counter the influence of interest groups on economic policy choices. The loan mechanism is, however, constrained in two ways: it cannot punish a country so severely as to threaten its political stability and it must remain affordable to the IFI. Whenever reform incentives are inadequate, a government will accept the loan but cheat on the implementation of reforms. If, on the other hand, the mechanism design is optimal, it might be so costly to the IFI that a well-entrenched interest group can block the reform program. Nonetheless, the availability of properly designed loan mechanisms will push governments to implement partial reforms even if the optimal mechanism is too costly for the IFI.     

INTEREST GROUPS,ELECTORAL COMPETITION,AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES*

Current models of trade policy formation in representative democracies lack the micro foundations from which the political actions of voters, interest groups, and policy makers can be deduced. This paper provides microfoundations for the most influential of representative democracy models, the Magee-Brock-Young (MBY) model. Probabilistic voting is formally introduced, the conditions for active lobbying are examined, uniqueness of lobbying equilibrium is established, and the responses of different groups' lobbying to exogenous changes are discussed. Finally, the existence of tariff equilibria is studied when, different from MBY, both parties share a common strategy space.     

The Changing International Transmission of Financial Shocks: Evidence from a Classical Time‐Varying FAVAR

We study the changing international transmission of financial shocks over the period 1971–2012. Global financial shocks are measured as unexpected changes of a U.S. financial conditions index (FCI), developed by Hatzius et al. (2010). We model the FCI jointly with a large international data set through a time‐varying parameter factor‐augmented VAR and find that financial shocks have a considerable impact on growth in the nine countries considered. Moreover, financial shocks during the global financial crisis are found to be large by historical standards. They explain approximately 20% of GDP growth variation on average over 2008–9, compared to an average of 5% prior to the crisis.     

On the Frequency of Interior Cournot–Nash Equilibria in a Public Good Economy

In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions leading to an interior Cournot–Nash equilibrium in which all individuals contribute to the public good. Furthermore, we give an estimate for the frequency that all members of a certain subgroup of the population are contributors.