WORLD CUP 2010: SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY CHALLENGES INFORMED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF GERMANY 2006

The paper provides an ex post analysis of the financial burden and economic benefits of the World Cup (WC) in Germany 2006. Based on the usual cost-benefit measures, the experience of WC 2006 appears to be in line with existing empirical research on large sporting events and sports stadiums, which have rarely identified significant net economic benefits. The lessons from Germany 2006 provide a context for analyzing the potential risks and benefits for South Africa (SA), the WC hosts in 2010. For SA, a careful analysis might be even more urgent to assure the sustainability of investment in stadiums. The paper also argues that the "feel-good" and public image effects of sports events should no longer be neglected in cost-benefit studies of large sporting events, even though these effects have the character of experience goods, and their value are thus likely to be underestimated ex ante. ( JEL L83, R53, R58)     

Tax Rate Harmonization,Renegotiation, and Asymmetric Tax Competition for Profits with Repeated Interaction

This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between countries is smaller, or if concealment costs of profit shifting are larger when the tax authorities adopt grim‐trigger strategies. Allowing for renegotiation in the tax harmonization process requires more patient tax authorities to implement tax harmonization as a weakly renegotiation‐proof equilibrium. In this case, we find somewhat paradoxical situations where higher costs of profit shifting make tax harmonization less sustainable.     

Measuring a Consumer Energy Conservation Ethic: An Analysis of Components

An energy future based on conservation will require that consumers subscribe to a Consumer Energy Conservation Ethic. This study identifies the components and best predictors of a conservation ethic.     

Inequality and Social Conflict Over Land in Africa

The paper proposes that reports of pervasive competition and conflict over land in sub-Saharan Africa belie a current image of negotiable and adaptive customary systems of landholding and land use but, instead, reveal processes of exclusion, deepening social divisions and class formation. Cases of ambiguous and indeterminate outcomes among claimants over land do occur, but the instances of intensifying conflict over land, deepening social rifts and expropriation of land beg for closer attention. More emphasis needs to be placed by analysts on who benefits and who loses from instances of 'negotiability' in access to land, an analysis that, in turn, needs to be situated in broader political economic and social changes taking place, particularly during the past thirty or so years. This requires a theoretical move away from privileging contingency, flexibility and negotiability that, willy-nilly, ends by suggesting an open field, to one that is able to identify those situations and processes (including com-modification, structural adjustment, market liberalization and globalization) that limit or end negotiation and flexibility for certain social groups or categories.     

What Price British Rail?

The Serpell Report on British Rail was greeted by hysteria from the Opposition benches and an apparently vote-catching cold shoulder from Mr Howell and his Cabinet colleagues. But Serpell's opponents have failed to demonstrate that the supposed benefits of under-used railway lines are worth their enormous costs, both in money and in opportunities and innovations foregone.     

The IASB Agenda — A Moving Target

This paper reviews the agenda of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the opportunities for research that it provides. The paper analyses the progress of topics on the 2001 agenda and concludes that evolution is variable, partly due to the appearance of later priorities. It goes on to discuss how research may inform standard-setting and analyses how major projects currently on the agenda lend themselves to academic research.     

More Uncertainties: German Unions Facing 1992

West German unions' early endorsement of European integration set them apart from many other European unions, but it was in agreement with German business and governments. The completion of the European Internal Market in 1992 and the weakness of its "Social Dimension" are likely negatively to affect German unions' national institutional power base. Nevertheless, German unions have little choice but to continue to support integration at the European level.     

Stochastic programming in production planning: a case with none-simple recourse

Abstract  In modeling real world planning problems as optimization programs the assumption that all parameters are known with certainty is often more seriously violated than the assumption that the objective function and the constraints can be approximated sufficiently accurate by lineair functions. In this paper we discuss the concrete application of stochastic programming to a multiperiod production planning problem in which the demand for the products during the various periods is assumed stochastic with known probability distribution. Since the resulting stochastic program does not possess the property of "simple" recourse no direct use can be made of existing methods that have been proposed in literature for solving problems of this type.     

Non‐Governmental Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies as a Two‐Stage Game of Voluntary Public Good Provision

In small groups, norm enforcement is achieved through mutual punishment and reward. In large societies, norms are enforced by specialists such as government officials. However, not every public cause is overseen by states, for instance those organized at the international level. This paper shows how nongovernmental norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. As a first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to a nongovernmental agency that produces an incentive system. The second stage is the provision of a public good on the basis of private contributions. The incentive system increases contributions by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. It is shown that, even in large populations, nongovernmental norm enforcement can be supported in a noncooperative equilibrium of utility‐maximizing individuals. This result is in sharp contrast to those obtained in the standard situation of voluntary provision of an intrinsic public good which—without altruism or related motives—is eroded by free‐riding. Reliance on altruistic behavior is not required in supplying the second‐order public good “norm enforcement” in large societies.