Day-of-the-Week Effects in the Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the influence of day-of-the-week patterns in security returns on long-run IPO underperformance. Comparisons are made between the IPOs in Ritter's [20] database, and a constructed set of matching firms based on SIC code and size, using NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities. It is found that virtually all of the IPO underperformance occurs on Mondays and Tuesdays and that the degree of underperformance significantly differs from other days. Thus, a common explanation may exist for the general day-of-the-week pattern in security returns and IPO long-run underperformance.     

UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.     

Common Stock Returns in Corporate Takeover Bids: The Case of Brokerage House Acquisitions

This paper examines the common stock returns of three groups of bidders that purchased brokerage houses. Only in the cases of horizontal mergers, one brokerage house purchasing another, are there abnormal returns associated with the purchase. Neither bank holding company bidders nor non-financial bidders gain significantly when purchasing a brokerage house. Bank holding company bidders face considerable regulatory delays, and these economic disturbances may eliminate their gains. Bank holding company expansion into these non-bank activities does not appear, at the time of announcement, to either hurt or benefit them; hence, this expansion does not appear to further the loss exposure of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.     

The Impact of Option Introduction on Stock Return Variances: The Role of Bid-Ask Spreads, Return Autocorrelations, and Intrinsic Variances

The purpose of this paper is to examine changes in stock return variances following option introduction. The sample consists of National Market System stocks and employs both transaction returns and returns based on bid and ask quotes. Variances are decomposed into portions attributable to bid-ask spreads, return autocorrelations, and intrinsic variances. Spreads play a negligible role in explaining variance changes. A generally positive component to short-term autocorrelations falls following option introduction, increasing variances over short holding periods. Intrinsic variances fall prior to the October 1987 crash, but do not change after the crash with option introduction.     

Voting Rights and Market Reaction to Dual Class Common Stock Issues

This paper examines the return of the original class of common stock around the announcement of the creation of a second class of stock. As in previous studies, this one finds a generally ambiguous market reaction on the first public announcement. However, this paper offers new evidence that both the voting rights and the compensation for loss of voting rights are important determinants of the market's reaction. Specifically, it demonstrates that a second class stock issue that contains no compensation for the lost voting rights results in negative returns. When the original stockholders are compensated for lost voting rights, they experience positive abnormal returns.     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CEO tenure,turnover, and risk aversion

Using a sample of CEO turnover from 1999 to 2005, we find that CEOs become significantly more risk averse following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX. Their increased risk aversion may serve as an explanation for why CEO tenure is not significantly shortened and forced CEO turnover is not more likely post-SOX, as we document in this paper. In addition, we provide evidence that financial restatements have some effects on CEO tenure and the probability of forced CEO turnover. This may be due to intensified monitoring activities by the board and the financial press in the post-SOX era, but we cannot contribute all of it to SOX. In some occasions, SOX seems to weaken the effect of board monitoring on CEO tenure and the effect of firm performance on CEO risk aversion. Though the increased monitoring level post-SOX contribute to the increased CEO risk aversion, little impact is found from the SOX-mandated accuracy and transparency of financial reporting.