Structural identification of high and low investment regimes

We propose a structural model to investigate the existence and possible differences between low and high regimes of investment expenditures in equipment at the firm level. The existence of such differences is predicted by recent theoretical studies of investment behavior stressing the role of asymmetries and non-convexities in the adjustment cost technology. The structural spike model is estimated for a balanced panel of Dutch firms operating in 13 different industrial sectors. The flexibility of the structural approach explains why the proposed method outperforms models applying “ad hoc” spike definitions often encountered in the empirical literature of lumpy investments.     

Introduction to Retail Payments: Mapping Out the Road Ahead

This article introduces four papers that were presented at a payments conference “Retail Payments: Mapping Out the Road Ahead,” which was held at De Nederlandsche Bank in Amsterdam in April of 2016. These papers focus on various behavioral aspects of consumers and merchants in their choice and acceptance of payment instruments and payment activity. End-user behavior has implications for how the retail payment landscape is likely to evolve and, therefore, will need to be considered by policymakers charged with overseeing the development of retail payments.     

Bank competition efficiency in Europe: A frontier approach

There are numerous ways to indicate the degree of banking competition across countries. Antitrust authorities rely on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm while academics prefer price mark-ups (Lerner index) or correlations of input costs with output prices (H-statistic). These measures are not always strongly correlated within or across countries. Frontier efficiency analysis is used to devise an alternative indicator of competition and rank European countries by their dispersion from a “competition frontier”. The frontier is determined by how well payment and other costs explain variations in loan-deposit rate spread and non-interest activity revenues. Overall, differences in competition appear to be small.     

Heavily skewed pricing in two-sided markets

A common feature in two-sided markets is the prevalence of heavily skewed pricing strategies in which price markups are much higher on one side of the market than the other. We show that maximal skewed pricing is profit maximizing under constant elasticity of demand. The most elastic side of the market is used to generate maximum demand by providing it with platform services at the lowest possible price. Full participation of the high-elasticity, low-price side of the market attracts the other side. As this side is less price elastic, the platform is able to extract high prices.     

Strategic bargaining in the variable threat game

Summary. In this paper the alternating offer model with an exogenous risk of breakdown is taken to explicitly model the bargaining process underlying the variable threat game (Nash, Econometrica, 1953). A modified version of the variable threat game without commitment is also analysed within a dynamic context. The limit set of subgame perfect equilibria is characterized in both dynamic versions. The analysis gives rise to different results than in the two standard models. By making additional assumptions the original results can be regained, indicating that these are implicitly present in the standard analysis.Received: August 29, 1995; revised version: November 11, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

On Lumpiness in the Replacement and Expansion of Capital*

We estimate a model of homogeneous capital investment with two installation possibilities – replacement and expansion using observations at the establishment level. We find that regime switches identified by ad hoc measures of lumpy investment do not adequately distinguish expansionary from replacement activities. In fact, during periods of expansion, firms spend just as much on replacement capital. Also, using the common 20% rule would not assign a spike to almost 65% of all observations that include expansionary investment in this dataset. Finally, replacement although less responsive to fundamentals than expansions cannot be regarded as an autonomous part of investment.     

A theory of policy advice

This article analyzes a model of the policy decision processin ministerial governments. A spending minister and a financeminister are involved in making a decision concerning a publicproject. The two ministers have partially conflicting preferences.Policy decisions are made in two stages. In the first stagethe spending minister consults a technical expert to obtaininformation about the technical consequences of the project.If the technical consequences are favourable, in the secondstage the finance minister consults a financial expert to obtaininformation about the financial consequences. The finance ministercan veto a proposal for undertaking the project. This articleillustrates the consequences of specialization for informationtransmission. A drawback of specialization is that projectsare evaluated on the basis of their individual consequencesrather than on the basis of their total consequences.     

Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections

We analyse a game theoretical model in which policy makers have superior knowledge about the working of the economy relative to voters. We show that parties increase their chances of reelection by basing their policies on the model that best fits in with their preferences. Moreover, we show that if parties care much about holding office, they may deliberately base their policies on a model that is electorally attractive, even if this model does not describe the working of the economy correctly. Our paper provides an explanation for the observation that different political parties subscribe to different economic philosophies.     

The Timing of Investment Episodes in the Netherlands

Summary We investigate the timing of large investment episodes at the micro level. On examination of a large sample of Dutch firms we find considerable lumpiness in the accumulation of fixed capital. We therefore define investment spikes and estimate the probability of these spikes, conditional on time since the last spike. We also control for unobserved heterogeneity. Our first result is that the probability of a spike is very high the year following an investment spike. We also find some evidence the hazard rate does increase as time since the previous spike passes by. Therefore, our results indicate the presence of convex adjustment costs or time to build lags. In addition, a tentative conclusion is that fixed adjustment costs are relevant.We like to thank two referees of this journal for their helpful and stimulating comments. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of METEOR at Maastricht University and the PIONIER program (grant number 400-10-041) of the Netherlands Foundation for Scientific Research (NWO). This work was carried out at the Centre for Research of Economic Microdata (CEREM) and we would like to thank Bert Balk, Ellen Hoogenboom-Spijker and Hans Pijpers for their help with the data. The views herein expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies of Statistics Netherlands. All errors remain our own.