Choosing Price or Quantity? The Role of Delegation and Network Externalities in a Mixed Duopoly

This paper considers a differentiated goods managerial mixed duopoly composed of one social welfare‐maximising public firm and one profit‐maximising private firm. We model the firm choice of the strategic contract. We find that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently strong, the price competition can become the unique equilibrium market structure. Furthermore, we show that there exists an area of the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects such that the situation wherein the public firm chooses its price contract whereas the private firm chooses its quantity contract can become the unique equilibrium structure.     

The impact of the presence of biased managers as strategic commitment on endogenous market structures

We consider the endogenous selection of strategic contracts in an asymmetric duopoly with substitutable goods. The market includes a biased manager, in terms of the market size the manager expects, in a managerial duopoly with separation between ownership and management. In particular, we focus on how the types of managers selected by owners affect the equilibrium market structures. Furthermore, by considering that each manager's expectation of market size depends on their own type and the type of the rival manager, we examine a situation in which the owner is less certain of the type of manager.     

Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs

This paper examines endogenous merger formations in a mixed oligopoly. Applying the core as a solution concept, we analyze which market structure(s) remain(s) stable when three firms—two symmetric private firms and one inefficient public firm—are allowed to merge with each other in a mixed Cournot industry. We show that according to the value of the marginal cost of the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged) public firm and the (pre-merged) private firm such that the market structure with the merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core. When the initial market structure is a mixed triopoly, it can only be blocked when one public firm and one private firm merge. Furthermore, we conduct a similar analysis in a general mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n private firms.      

The impact of different scenarios for intermittent bladder catheterization on health state utilities: results from an internet-based time trade-off survey

Aims: Intermittent catheterization (IC) is the gold standard for bladder management in patients with chronic urinary retention. Despite its medical benefits, IC users experience a negative impact on their quality of life (QoL). For health economics based decision making, this impact is normally measured using generic QoL measures (such as EQ-5D) that estimate a single utility score which can be used to calculate quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). But these generic measures may not be sensitive to all relevant aspects of QoL affected by intermittent catheters. This study used alternative methods to estimate the health state utilities associated with different scenarios: using a multiple-use catheter, one-time-use catheter, pre-lubricated one-time-use catheter and pre-lubricated one-time-use catheter with one less urinary tract infection (UTI) per year.

Methods: Health state utilities were elicited through an internet-based time trade-off (TTO) survey in adult volunteers representing the general population in Canada and the UK. Health states were developed to represent the catheters based on the following four attributes: steps and time needed for IC process, pain and the frequency of UTIs.

Results: The survey was completed by 956 respondents. One-time-use catheters, pre-lubricated one-time-use catheters and ready-to-use catheters were preferred to multiple-use catheters. The utility gains were associated with the following features: one time use (Canada: +0.013, UK: +0.021), ready to use (all: +0.017) and one less UTI/year (all: +0.011).

Limitations: Internet-based survey responders may have valued health states differently from the rest of the population: this might be a source of bias.

Conclusion: Steps and time needed for the IC process, pain related to IC and the frequency of UTIs have a significant impact on IC related utilities. These values could be incorporated into a cost utility analysis.     

Competition and Privatisation Policies in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly: The Pay‐off‐interdependence Approach

I revisit the relationship between competition and privatisation policies in a mixed oligopoly with differentiated goods, following the pay‐off‐interdependence approach in the fashion of Matsumura and Okamura. We find that although the intensity of market competition increases with the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance, the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease in a differentiated goods mixed oligopoly in both the increasing marginal costs case and the constant marginal costs case. Further, given the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance and the number of private firms, we find that the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease as the degree of product differentiation declines. Finally, by considering an alternative‐pay‐off model in both cases, we compare the optimal degree of privatisation of the public firm.     

Aggressiveness of Managers in the Market with Network Effects: The Case of Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment

This paper analyzes a model wherein firms' owners hire biased managers in a differentiated goods duopoly with network effects. We show that whether firms hire an aggressive manager or not depends on both the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects in price competition whereas it does not depend on the degree of product differentiation or the strength of network effects in quantity competition. Thus, the attitudes of firms' managers depend on the type of competition and the relative magnitude of the strength of network effects to the degree of product differentiation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price Versus Quantity in a Duopoly with a Unilateral Effect and with Bargaining over Managerial Contracts

This study examines the endogenous choice of each firm’s strategic contract, that is, a price contract or a quantity contract, in a duopoly in which their demand functions are asymmetric when the content of their managerial contracts is determined through bargaining between the owner and the manager. The degree of asymmetry between their demand functions corresponds to the relation between the goods they produce. In contrast to the case wherein each firm’s delegation parameter is determined through profit maximization, we show that the quantity competition cannot become the equilibrium market structure when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner is sufficiently low. In particular, when the relation between the two goods is complementary, two asymmetric market structures can be observed in equilibrium. Furthermore, we consider the situation in which the relative bargaining power of the manager to that of the owner within each firm is different between the two firms.     

Price versus quantity in a duopoly with network externalities under active and passive expectations

This study examines the endogenous choice of strategic contracts in a duopoly composed of firms that produce goods with network externalities with some sort of compatibility. We adopt two types of expectations—active and passive—as consumers' expectations for each firm's equilibrium market share. In addition, we take into account the managerial case and entrepreneurial case with and without separation between ownership and management, as firms' internal structures. We derive the properties in the Cournot competition and the Bertrand competition as the equilibrium market structures under both passive and active expectations under imperfectly compatibility of networks.     

Asset price prediction using seasonal decomposition

We propose a new forecasting procedure for asset prices using seasonal decomposition methods (SD hereafter), e.g., SABL and X-11. Such SD's are based on moving average methods, and they are thus easy to use and are capable of computing the seasonal pattern that changes over time. A SD typically decomposes a series intoT (trend),S (seasonal component), andR (residual or sometimes referred to as the irregular component). We use an ARIMA model onR to obtain its forecast. TheS component is forecasted by an extrapolation taking into account its changing pattern within the sample period. We propose to set up some scenarios on theT component by examining its possibly nonlinear and nonstationary behavior, and in the paper we suggest one possible way for this. Suppose that the forecasting horizon is relatively short compared toT's several cycles just before the end of the sample. Then we may safely extrapolateT linearly into the forecasting period. LinearizingT in such a case, makes sense. As to the slope of the linear line, we suggest the average rate of change of the most recent upward phase of a cycle to be used if we needed an optimistic scenario. Obviously, that of the downward phase may be used for constructing a pessimistic scenario, and that of one entire cycle is suitable for ‘average’ scenario. Once the forecasted values of the three components are obtained, we may put them back to make predictions on the original series based upon various different scenarios. In addition to proposing a new prediction method, we looked into the following issues, among others, in the paper: (1) on what sort of asset prices would our forecasting method work well? (2) Any significant differences if we used X-11 instead of SABL?