Comparison between specific taxation and volume quotas in a free entry Cournot oligopoly

We revisit the classic discussion of the comparison between tax and quota, but in a free-entry Cournot oligopoly. We investigate a quantity ceiling regulation as a quota policy. We find that tariff-quota equivalence holds if the firms are symmetric and the number of firms is given exogenously. However the equivalence does not hold and taxes dominate quotas in the free entry market because quota can increases the number of entering firms and increases the loss caused by excessive entries.     

How does the entrepreneurial orientation of scientists affect their scientific performance? Evidence from the quadrant model

In order to identify the effect of academic entrepreneurship on science, this work compares the publication performance of entrepreneurial scientists with that of conventional scientists. Using Stokes's ‘quadrant model’, this paper examines how the entrepreneurial orientation affects scientific performance. The results on advanced materials research in Japan found that (i) entrepreneurial scientists publish more papers than conventional scientists do; (ii) the papers of conventional scientists demonstrate better citation performance than those of entrepreneurial scientists do, on average; (iii) coming to the top-cited papers, entrepreneurial scientists show higher propensity for publishing high-impact papers than conventional scientists do; and (iv) the portfolio interdisciplinarity of papers authored by entrepreneurial scientists is higher than that of conventional scientists. Although the influence of academic entrepreneurship on scientific performance is still unclear, our findings suggest that entrepreneurial scientists could make a relatively large contribution to furthering the scientific frontier by relying on innovation rather than convention.     

International duopoly with overseas production and strategic trade policies

This paper examines the strategic export policies in a reciprocal market model of an international Cournot duopoly where two firms in domestic and foreign countries reciprocally supply their products to other countries through overseas production as well as export. It also considers the fact that the firms must incur export costs in addition to production costs. Thus, this paper shows, among others, that the effects of export policies on firms' output and export choices do not depend on the slopes of firms' reaction curves. It is also shown that firms' total outputs are independent of the export policies, and the optimal domestic and foreign export subsidies are zero (laissez-faire).     

Product R&D Investment Policies in an International Duopoly

This study analyzes the optimal product R&D investment policies of a developed and a developing country in an international Cournot duopoly where firms from these two countries compete through endogenous quality–quantity decisions. We explore a new international trade model by using demand functions derived from utility functions. We find that the optimal product R&D investment policies for both countries are subsidies. This study counters a finding that used Hotelling‐type demand functions and it partially modifies another result that adopted the same demand functions but with an international Bertrand duopoly.     

The effects of oil price shocks on expenditure category CPI

In this study, we apply a two-block structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model proposed by Kilian and Park (2009) in order to investigate the dynamic effects of changes in oil price on the expenditure category consumer price index (CPI) in the United States and Japan. Our results confirm that each expenditure category price index responded very differently to the same structural shock, and that whether changes in oil price function as a positive stimulus or a negative shock for the individual expenditure category prices also depends on the kind of underlying shock that drives the changes in oil price. Finally, our results also reveal that the manner in which changes in oil price affect each expenditure category price differs between the United States and Japan and these detailed-level differences may lead to aggregate-level differences in the price response of both countries to changes in oil price.     

On the theory of monopolistic competition under demand uncertainty

Establishing a model of a monopolistically competitive industry in which risk-averse Cournot firms act under demand uncertainty and in which the output of individual firms and the number of firms in the industry are both endogenously determined by free entry and exit, this paper attempts to investigate the effects of demand uncertainty on the market equilibrium of a monopolistically competitive industry. It is assumed, for calculus simplification, that the firms are identical in the sense that they have the same monopolistic power and the same production technology. The paper presents some interesting and useful comparative statics results which are contrary to those proposed in the existing papers.This is a revised version of my paper which was firstly presented to the annual meeting of the Japanese Association of International Economics held in 1988 and then included partially in my book published in 1989. I am indebted to professors D. Bös, S. Fujino, M. Ohyama, M. Nishijima, to the members of the Public Economics Research Seminar in Bonn, and to two anonymous referees for their helpful discussions and useful suggestions. Any remaining errors, however, are my responsibility.     

Asymptotic expansions of the distributions of the estimates of coefficients in a simultaneous equation system

In this paper asymptotic expansions are derived for the density functions of the TSLS and LIML estimates of coefficients in a simultaneous equation system when the sample size increases and the effect of the exogenous variables increases along the sample size. These approximations are used to compare the asymptotic moments of the TSLS and LIML estimates and the concentration of probability around the true value of the estimates.     

Cooperative choice of corporate social responsibility in a bilateral monopoly model

This article presents an examination of a linear bilateral monopoly model with endogenous and cooperative choice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) level. This article also describes an investigation of the effects of cooperative choice of CSR on the market and welfare. New findings are explicit derivation of the necessary and sufficient condition for solving a double marginalization problem in the bilateral monopoly model with CSR. In addition, this report is the first demonstrating that cooperative CSR with Nash bargaining improves consumer surplus, social welfare and each firm’s profit to a level higher than that achieved through noncooperative CSR. Furthermore, cooperative CSR with Nash bargaining is shown to be capable of completely solving the double marginalization problem generated by a bilateral monopoly, although the manufacturer and the retailer are not vertically integrated.     

Multinational Firms and Strategic FDI Subsidies

A simple three‐stage game model of an international Cournot duopoly, consisting of domestic and foreign multinational firms, is exploited to examine strategic FDI subsidies. While in the first stage the governments decide the optimal FDI subsidies, the firms endogenously choose their FDI levels (or subsidiary plant sizes) in the second stage and their output–export levels in the third stage. Thus, this paper finds that while the outflow and inflow FDI subsidies have different effects on firms’ FDI choices, the FDI subsidies are used as tools for the implementation of strategic policies and that the optimal FDI subsidies vary, depending on whether the governments assess labor employment.