A General Equilibrium Approach to the Nonequivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under International Duopoly

We examine the nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas under international duopoly in a simple general equilibrium trading model; in particular, we study the welfare effects of a change in regime from a tariff to a quota. We first show that the results established by our predecessors in a partial-equilibrium segmented domestic market model do not straightforwardly carry over to a general equilibrium context. We next extend the segmented domestic market model to an integrated world market model and re-examine the equivalence of tariffs and quotas as well as the welfare aspects of the change in the regime.     

Voluntary Export Restraints under Imperfect Competition

The paper studies the effects of a change in the level of voluntary export restraints (VERs) on the behavior of the domestic firm and on the welfare of the importing country. The author constructs a simple two‐country Cournot duopoly model in which each firm produces a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost. It is shown that the results obtained by predecessors based on linear demand, constant‐elasticity demand, strategic substitutes and so forth all emerge as special cases.     

Efficiency properties of binary ecolabeling

We investigate efficiency properties of binary ecolabels in a homogeneous good market with heterogeneous consumers. Faced with the minimum technology standard, firms make endogenous entry, certification, and price/quantity decisions. We consider both perfect and imperfect competition with or without sunk fixed costs. Our findings are as follows. Ecolabeling alone does not achieve the first-best outcome and, to achieve the second best, may need to set the standard less strict than the efficient level. Without sunk fixed costs, ecolabeling can achieve the first-best outcome provided that both the technology standard and the complementary pollution tax are set at efficient levels. With sunk fixed costs, however, differential excise taxes that would restore allocative efficiency induce more entry than optimal, and thus, can be even welfare decreasing relative to no tax outcome. Tightening the technology standard may ameliorate such an adverse effect of the corrective tax system by reducing excessive entry and pollution per output by the certified firms.     

An Explicit Finite Difference Approach to the Pricing Problems of Perpetual Bermudan Options

The pricing problem of options with an early exercise feature, such as American options, is one of the important topics in mathematical finance. Pricing formulas for options with the early exercise feature, however, are not easy to obtain and the numerical methods are thus frequently required to derive the price of these options. The value function of perpetual Bermudan options is characterized with the partial differential equation and this is solved by the finite difference method in this article.     

Gravity in International Finance

The past decade has witnessed an explosion of papers estimating gravity equations for cross-border financial holdings without much of a theoretical foundation. In this paper we develop a theory for bilateral asset holdings that takes a gravity form. We discuss how to estimate international financial frictions and conduct comparative statics analysis within the context of the theory. We also find though that reasonable extensions of the model no longer generate a gravity form. While this does not significantly complicate estimation and comparative statics analysis, it raises questions about the empirical validity of gravity specifications for cross-border financial holdings that need to be addressed in future work.     

International Income Transfer under Imperfect Competition

This paper examines the effects of an international income transfer under international monopoly. One of the markets in the donor country is monopolized and there exist two distinct types of agent: monopolist and factor owners. The transfer is provided by the agents with different lump sum tax (burden‐share) rates. The burden‐share rate plays a key role concerning the welfare effects of a transfer. We show that the government of the donor country can raise both its social welfare and the wellbeing of the recipient country by providing a further transfer and by simultaneously adjusting the burden‐share rates.     

Factor Price Equalization under Imperfect Competition

The paper describes a class of imperfectly competitive world economies for which factor price equalization is inevitable. Specifically, it is shown that factor price equalization must prevail if the trading economies differ at most in scale, if they share a constant-returns no-joint-products technology, and if each oligopolistic industry produces a commodity which, directly or indirectly, is internationally tradable.     

Welfare‐improving Coordinated Tariff and Sales Tax Reforms under Imperfect Competition

This paper studies the welfare effects of coordinated domestic sales tax reform associated with a reduction of the import tariff under imperfect competition. We set up a simple oligopoly trading model where domestic and exporting firms compete in the home market. We show that, if the initial levels of import tariff and sales tax are positive, there always exist welfare‐improving sales tax reforms. In some cases, a reduction of the sales tax accompanied by a reduction of the import tariff increases social welfare, whereas in other cases, raising the sales tax can increase social welfare.     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic relationships

We analyze a delegation game relevant to the conduct of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in which the firm’s owner offers the manager a contract consisting of firm profit and social welfare. We derive three results that distinctly differ from existing findings. First, CSR decisions are strategic complements for firms. Second, with simultaneous CSR decisions, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, despite the fact that firms compete in a Cournot duopoly. Finally, with sequential CSR decisions, unlike the follower firm, the leader firm never exhibits CSR. However, the follower firm can enjoy a profit equal to that derived by the leader in a Cournot–Stackelberg game.