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Asymmetric demand responses to price changes are not an observable implication of classical demand theory, which predicts that consumers will react to a small price increase in much the same way as they do to a small price decrease. Yet applied researchers have long speculated that consumers are more sensitive to price increases than they are to price decreases. In addition, recent empirical studies generally support the theory of asymmetric demand responses. We construct a dynamic model based on data gathered from monthly telephone bills for 128 New York Telephone customers over a five-year period. Our results support the conclusion that customers react more quickly and strongly when prices go up than they do when prices go down.We would like to thank Manny Haas and Bernie Reddy for their comments and suggestions.  相似文献   
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This paper discusses the welfare effects of entry by a vertically integrated access and long-distance service provider into the long-distance market. Using a stylized model of these markets, we conclude that substantial net consumer benefits arise when a vertically integrated firm is created by the entry of a LEC into the long-distance market, and these gains are mostly achieved from declines in supra-competitive profits received by long-distance incumbents. We find that these gains dominate losses in producer surplus that could arise even if integrated firm entry were to displace more efficient long-distance providers.  相似文献   
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This study examines the antecedents of corporate scandals. Corporate scandals are defined as rare events occurring at the apex of corporate fame when managerial fraud suddenly emerges in conjunction with a significant gap between perceived corporate success and actual economic conditions. Previous studies on managerial fraud have examined the antecedents of illegal acts in isolation from strategic decisions and in terms of CEOs’ individual responses to the external context. This study frames the antecedents of corporate scandals in terms of the interplay of CEOs’ personal traits with corporate strategy and stakeholders’ cohesion. With this aim, this study builds on extant theory to examine the case of Banca Popolare di Lodi, an Italian bank involved in a corporate scandal in year 2005. The model contributes to advance understanding of the complex dynamics underlying the emergence of corporate scandals.  相似文献   
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In this paper, we examine seven indicia of the effect of regulated competition in long-distance telecommunications. The evidence we have examined suggests that regulation or the threat of antitrust intervention are the major factors which constrain AT & T's prices to small customers. We conclude that small customers have yet to enjoy the full benefits of competition in long distance.  相似文献   
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Interactions between CEOs and their boards of directors are a prominent focus of management and strategy research. Despite the extensive literature on CEO–board relations, to date there has been limited integration of theoretical perspectives and measurement schemes. Through an extensive analysis of published studies, we hope to facilitate future research on CEO–board relations. We begin with a comparison of key theoretical approaches. Next, we conduct a content analysis of 51 empirical articles. We find that prior studies have an unbalanced focus regarding both topics and theoretical perspectives, and that there is limited consistency in the choice of measures. Based on this review, we lay out a number of promising directions for future research. We also find that, while there has been progress in international research on CEO–board relations, there are still many unanswered questions regarding the generalizability of governance theories across different geographic settings.  相似文献   
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