Migration Policy in a Small Open Economy with a Dual Labor Market

The paper uses a two–sector efficiency–wage model to analyze the consequences of immigration for a small open economy with a dual labor market. Immigrants are characterized by an (exogenous) return probability. Legal regulations impose preferential hiring of natives or "old" immigrants. As a result, there is sectoral segregation between natives and immigrants, leading to discrimination of the type equal pay for equal work,but unequal "work." In the short run (with sector–specific capital), immigration has a positive first–order impact on natives' welfare if migration policy favors segregation through high return rates or restrictive hiring practices ("guest–worker system"). In the long run, its effect is only determined by factor intensities (2 ¥ 2 model). Finally, the improved integration of migrants yields efficiency gains and improves aggregate welfare of all residents.     

Tari–tax reforms and market access

Reducing taris and increasing consumption taxes is a standard IMF advice to countries that want to open up their economy without hurting government finances. Indeed, theoretical analysis of such a tari–tax reform shows an unambiguous increase in welfare and government revenues. The present paper examines whether the country that implements such a reform ends up opening up its markets to international trade, i.e. whether its market access improves. It is shown that this is not necessarily so. We also show that, comparing to the reform of only taris, the tari–tax reform is a less efficient proposal to follow both as far as it concerns market access and welfare.     

Do real payments really matter? A re-examination of the compromise effect in hypothetical and binding choice settings

Numerous empirical studies have confirmed the existence of the compromise effect, which stipulates that options positioned between extreme alternatives in a product space are perceived as more attractive, hence becoming more likely to be chosen by consumers. However, literature on the topic frequently addresses the limited realism of prior work due to the artificial designs that were used. In a laboratory-based replication study, we examine the compromise effect across several categories in a more market-like scenario, in which experienced consumers make unforced decisions between real brands. In particular, we investigate whether the compromise effect varies in strength across the choice settings, depending on whether a hypothetical choice setting or a binding setting (in which subjects face buying obligations in terms of real payments for products) has been applied. While our results prove the robustness of the compromise effect for both choice frames, its strength differs significantly. Specifically, the compromise effect is evidently not as strong when real payments are introduced in binding choice settings. In addition, analysis of moderating factors confirms that compromise effects are stronger for categories where subjects are more in agreement about the relative quality of the options.     

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Strategic behavior in financial markets

We describe a financial market as a noncooperative game in strategic form. Agents may borrow or deposit money at a central bank and use the cash available to them in order to purchase a commodity for immediate consumption. They derive positive utility from consumption and from having cash reserves at the end of the day, whereas being bankrupt entails negative utility. The bank fixes interest rates. The existence of Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) of the ensuing game is proved under various assumptions. In particular, no agent is bankrupt at equilibrium. Asymptotic behavior of replica markets is discussed, and it is shown that given appropriate assumptions, the difference between a strategic player and a price taker is negligible in a large economy.