Education and the empowerment of women in household decision‐making in Spain

It was analysed whether investment in the education of both women and men serves to empower wives resulting in more balanced household decisions being taken on matters related to consumption and financial management. They considered that household decision‐making could be made by mainly the wife, mainly the husband or the couple acting jointly. They then applied multinomial probit models to the Spanish Living Conditions Survey of 2010. Results show that, when controlling for demographic, family and labour market characteristics, the level of education of both the husband and wife has a positive effect in terms of a more egalitarian decision‐making process in relation to three areas of expenditure: daily shopping, expensive purchases of consumer durables and significant expenditure on children. However, only women's education has a positive effect on borrowing money and no effect of education is observed with regard to the use of savings. Results are less conclusive for households where decisions are taken primarily by the wife or husband, since men's education increases the role of husbands in the household making‐decision process whereas no effect of wives' education is observed.     

Towards a measure of financial fragility

The paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on economic welfare in a general equilibrium model calibrated against UK data. The model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a central bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors and how the response of the economy to shocks relates to our measure of financial fragility. Finally we use panel VAR techniques to investigate the relationships between the factors that characterise financial fragility in our model, i.e. banks’ probabilities of default and banks’ profits – to a proxy of welfare.      

Who buys newspapers in Spain? An analysis of the determinants of the probability to buy newspapers and of the amount spent

In this paper, we examine the determinants of household consumption of newspapers and the amount spent on their purchase by considering several explanatory variables related to household characteristics and the main household wage earner. Results show that the variables have quite similar effects on both the relative probability of buying newspapers and the amount spent. The key variables are the age and occupational status of the main wage earner, the number of household members, income and having to pay for the house, as well as a number of geographical variables. However, certain differences are also observed. The most important is the education of the main wage earner: while its effect on buying newspapers is very small (only those who did not complete primary education are less likely to buy), its effect on the amount spent increases with the level of education. As other studies of cultural goods and services consumption have suggested, education and occupational status are more relevant determinants than income.     

The ethics of creative accounting some Spanish evidence

Creative accounting involves accountants in making accounting policy choices or manipulating transactions in such a way as to convey a preferred and deliberately chosen impression in the accounts. Although it is regarded as unethical by most observers, a defense of creative accounting can be based on the assumption that users of accounts can identify bias in accounting policy choices and make appropriate adjustments. In this paper we take the example of the Barcelona Football Club where the club management made three key accounting policy choices that resulted in the presentation of a favourable position, and a supporters club presented an alternative report choosing three alternative accounting policies that presented an unfavourable position. We presented each of these financial reports to one of two groups of Spanish bank loan officers: we found that the more favourable set of accounts was significantly more likely to attract a positive response to a loan request. This result undermines the validity of defending creative accounting based on the argument that accounts users can identify manipulation.     

Essential equilibria in normal-form games

A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for games that are generic in the set of compact, quasiconcave, and generalized payoff secure games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result are also established.     

Using emojis in mobile web surveys for Millennials? A study in Spain and Mexico

Quality & Quantity - To involve Millennials in survey participation, and obtain high-quality answers from them, survey designers may require new tools that better catch Millennials'...     

An alternative to natural monopoly

Journal of Regulatory Economics - We consider a shared ownership arrangement among consumers/owners as a means to organize production with an underlying decreasing average cost function typical of...     

On the existence of pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games

We provide sufficient conditions for a (possibly) discontinuous normal-form game to possess a pure-strategy trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We first show that compactness, continuity, and quasiconcavity of a game are too weak to warrant the existence of a pure-strategy perfect equilibrium. We then identify two classes of games for which the existence of a pure-strategy perfect equilibrium can be established: (1) the class of compact, metric, concave games satisfying upper semicontinuity of the sum of payoffs and a strengthening of payoff security; and (2) the class of compact, metric games satisfying upper semicontinuity of the sum of payoffs, strengthenings of payoff security and quasiconcavity, and a notion of local concavity and boundedness of payoff differences on certain subdomains of a player's payoff function. Various economic games illustrate our results.     

Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games

We compare the properties of several notions of trembling-hand perfection within classes of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of trembling-hand perfection fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium.