Green Public Procurement: A Neglected Tool in the European Green Deal Toolbox?

Intereconomics - Public procurement amounts to around 14% of European Union GDP and, given this size, could well represent an important tool to foster the green transition. However, green public...     

Stock market volatility forecasting: Do we need high-frequency data?

The general consensus in the volatility forecasting literature is that high-frequency volatility models outperform low-frequency volatility models. However, such a conclusion is reached when low-frequency volatility models are estimated from daily returns. Instead, we study this question considering daily, low-frequency volatility estimators based on open, high, low, and close daily prices. Our data sample consists of 18 stock market indices. We find that high-frequency volatility models tend to outperform low-frequency volatility models only for short-term forecasts. As the forecast horizon increases (up to one month), the difference in forecast accuracy becomes statistically indistinguishable for most market indices. To evaluate the practical implications of our results, we study a simple asset allocation problem. The results reveal that asset allocation based on high-frequency volatility model forecasts does not outperform asset allocation based on low-frequency volatility model forecasts.     

Broadcasting and Sport

The broadcasting of sport is heavily regulated. Our main findingis that common trends, and differences, in the quality, quantity,and price of televised sport across Europe and USA cannot beadequately explained without reference to policy interventionsby national and supranational government, and by competitionand regulatory authorities. These interventions have a significantimpact on the organization and governance of sports, as wellas the structure of broadcasting markets and the conduct ofbroadcasting companies. Foreclosure of broadcasting marketsthrough exclusive, long-term contracts, bundling and verticalintegration, access of viewers to major sporting events, andcollective selling stand out as the most significant policyissues. We conclude by noting a number of policy implications.     

A market model of analysts’ opinions to explain changes in the dispersion of opinions

The demand for and supply of analysts’ opinions in this model yield an equilibrium that demonstrates how the information content of the opinions reacts to changes in exogenous parameters. The model also shows how changes in the parameters make analysts’ opinions more or less dispersed; for example, a decline in investor risk aversion, a decrease in market volatility, and an increase in information costs can lead to analysts’ opinions becoming more similar. Recognizing how exogenous factors can affect the supply and demand of analysts’ opinions gives additional insights into questions concerning what may appear to be herd behavior by analysts and also the relationship between forecast dispersion and information content. (JEL: G29, C71)     

The LeChatelier-Samuelson principle revisited

Within the context of a linear Leontief model, the LeChatelier-Samuelson principle examines the effects of an increase in some final demand on the output levels under the constraint that the production of certain goods is held at its original value. The principle states that the increase in any output is larger when fewer output levels are kept constant. The present paper discusses bounds for such incremental changes, second-order effects, the consequences on the markets for the products with restricted output levels, and generalizations of the original assumptions.I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

Managing Price Risk in the Pakistan Wheat Market

The government intervenes in the wheat market in Pakistan toensure food security for consumers and to provide adequate andstable incomes for producers. The cost of this interventionis high, and its impact on the performance of agriculture hasbeen significantly negative. The World Bank is urging policychanges such as removing agricultural trade restrictions, pricesupports, and subsidies. However, policymakers often resistsuch reforms, fearing that they will expose the domestic marketto fluctuating international commodity prices. This article assesses the risk management needs of the sectorand evaluates whether using financial instruments—suchas commodity hedging using futures, options, or swaps—wouldimprove risk management. Simulations based on monthly data for1994 show that market-based methods of risk management couldreduce the impact of international price volatility on the domesticmarket without incurring high government cost or distortingprice signals.     

Means-Testing the Child Benefit

Improving the distributional impact of transfers may be costly if it reduces labor supply. In this paper we show how effects of changes in the design of the child benefit program can be examined by employing information from behavioral and non-behavioral simulations on micro data. The direct distributional effects are assessed by tax-benefit model calculations, while female labor supply responses to alternative child benefit schemes are simulated under the assumption that choices are discrete. Distributional effects after labor supply responses are also shown. The study confirms that greater targeting of the child benefit is traded against reductions in female labor supply.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze priceformation and liquidity in a non-anonymous environment withsimilarities to the floor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis isthat the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probabilitythat a trader trades on the basis of private information. Heuses this knowledge to price discriminate. This can be achievedby quoting a large spread and granting price improvement totraders deemed uninformed. Consistent with our hypothesis wefind that price improvement reflects lower adverse selectioncosts but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit.Further, the quote adjustment following transactions at thequoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustmentafter transactions at prices inside the spread. Our resultsindicate that anonymity comes at the cost of higher adverseselection risk. JEL Classification: G10.     

Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity

Using data from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange we analyze price formationand liquidity in a non-anonymous environment with similarities to thefloor of the NYSE. Our main hypothesis is that the non-anonymity allows the specialist to assess the probability that atrader trades on the basis of private information. He uses this knowledgeto price discriminate. This can be achieved by quoting a large spread and granting price improvement to traders deemed uninformed.Consistent with our hypothesis we find that price improvement reflects loweradverse selection costs but does not lead to a reduction in the specialist's profit. Further, the quote adjustmentfollowing transactions at the quoted bid or ask price is more pronounced than the quote adjustment aftertransactions at prices inside the spread. Our results indicate that anonymity comes at the cost ofhigher adverse selection risk.