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We extend the entrepreneurship literature to include positive psychological capital — an individual or organization's level of psychological resources consisting of hope, optimism, resilience, and confidence — as a salient signal in crowdfunding. We draw from the costless signaling literature to argue that positive psychological capital language usage enhances crowdfunding performance. We examine 1726 crowdfunding campaigns from Kickstarter, finding that entrepreneurs conveying positive psychological capital experience superior fundraising performance. Human capital moderates this relationship while social capital does not, suggesting that costly signals may, at times, enhance the influence of costless signals. Post hoc analyses suggest findings generalize across crowdfunding types, but not to IPOs.  相似文献   
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Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model.  相似文献   
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We examine potential information transfers from companies that announce dividend omissions to their industry rivals. Specifically, we examine the abnormal stock returns and abnormal earnings forecast revisions of rivals after a company makes a dividend‐omission announcement. Our results show negative and significant abnormal stock returns and negative and significant abnormal forecast revisions for rival companies in response to the announcement, and a significant and positive relation between the two. We conclude that a dividend‐omission announcement transmits unfavorable information across the announcing company's industry that affects cash flow expectations and ultimately stock prices.  相似文献   
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Private charities often publicise generous individual contributions or contributors, possibly to encourage others to give. In contrast, public good experiments used to study voluntary giving commonly tell participants only of total contributions. This paper reports an experimental test of the effect on contributions of supplying additional selective information. A control treatment is run that reveals only total contributions over ten one‐shot decision rounds. This is compared to a second treatment that also informs subjects of the maximum contribution made in their group after each round. In a third treatment, subjects are further given the opportunity to make costly rewards to the maximum contributor. Revealing generous contributions appears to raise average contributions slightly. Surprisingly, adding the ability to reward large contributors does little to generate further increases, though it significantly raises the variance of contributions. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
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The paper explores the specific challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry regarding the exploitation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the context of developing new frameworks supporting knowledge activity and the wider innovation process. The paper seeks to provide a framework to view these changes but also highlights gaps in our current conceptualization of the role of ICTs in facilitating and effecting change within the pharmaceutical industry.  相似文献   
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Goldberg JH 《Medical economics》1992,69(4):162-6, 169-70, 172-5
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