Coping with coopetition—Facing dilemmas in cooperation for sustainable development: The case of the Dutch smart grid industry

This paper is amongst the first to examine coopetition strategy for sustainable development at the network level. Companies who want to successfully implement complex innovative technologies that support sustainable development need to collaborate with other actors of the innovation ecosystem, including their competitors, so that they can develop standards, interoperable products, pool knowledge, and resources and bundle forces to compete against other technologies. Collaboration with competitors brings benefits, but also many risks. We investigated how firms cope with these risks when establishing an innovation ecosystem to implement a new technology in society. We conducted research in the Dutch smart grids sector and explored how these firms minimize inherent risks of coopetition. We found that system‐building actors in the Dutch smart grid field not only minimize inherent risks, but from the start of their collaboration they implement so‐called enablers to prevent these risks upfront.     

Non-GAAP reporting following debt covenant violations

Review of Accounting Studies - We investigate whether firms change their non-GAAP reporting practices after debt covenant violations. We find that the likelihood that a firm will disclose non-GAAP...     

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Without `Reinventing the Wheel': Business Accounting Applied to the Public Sector

This article considers why a business accounting model was applied in an early adoption of public-sector accrual accounting. The history of that change shows that large private-sector consulting firms were active in the promotion and implementation of a commercial model of public-sector accrual accounting. It is argued here that the consulting firms' actions are best understood using concepts of mimetic isomorphism and the interplay between self-interest and perceived public interest. They formed an epistemic community in which self-interest was present but with a zealous belief that private-sector accounting was an inherently righteous objective for the public sector.     

Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation

We emphasize the role of accounting policies, and their audit, in an earnings management setting. We use a two–period agency in which three frictions interact: the agent privately observes action (or effort) supply and output, and the initial contract is subject to renegotiation. This creates a setting in which both players' behavior is of concern, and, importantly, information rationing is efficient. Moreover, this information rationing is directly interpretable as being produced by an accounting policy whose application is ensured by an auditor.     

Environmental reporting within the forest and paper industry

Research on environmental reporting within individual sectors and industries is limited. Generic studies have typically focused on the reporting practices of the world's largest corporates. Some industries and sectors are under‐represented within these studies, limiting the potential for industry‐ or sector‐specific analysis. Forest and paper is one industry frequently under‐represented. This study examines environmental reporting amongst the top 100 forest and paper companies. The scale of environmental report publication is investigated, and the breadth and depth of reporting on the key industry issues of forest management and fibre procurement examined. The results show reporting is more prevalent amongst larger corporates but marked regional variations are evident. Most noticeably, Scandinavian companies are reporting more extensively, both in terms of the number of levels at which they report and the depth of information included on forest management and fibre procurement. Reasons for the marked regional variations in reporting are considered and markets for forest products and preferences within those markets for specific certification schemes identified as potential influencing factors. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Dimensions of quality upgrading

The impact of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies’ trade integration with European markets on CEE trade structures has been studied extensively. These studies frequently observe a quality upgrading of CEE exports. In this paper we consider three dimensions of quality upgrading: upgrading across industries, upgrading across different quality segments within industries and, finally, product upgrading within quality segments inside industries. For the analysis we partition industries into quality segments based on EU‐15 import unit values. The results for ten CEE countries (comprising the CEE‐5, the Baltics and South East Europe) and thirteen industries suggest fundamental differences, both across country groups and across the three different notions of quality upgrading. The CEE‐5 show no evidence of entering a ‘low‐quality trap’ in all three dimensions. By contrast, while there is a general catching‐up process across industries and inside quality segments, the second notion of low‐quality specialization may be applicable within the high‐tech industries to the performance for the Baltics and South East Europe as a group.     

Fiscal Consolidation and Decentralisation: A Tale of Two Tiers*

This paper contributes to the established literature on fiscal consolidations by investigating the distinct behaviour of central and sub‐central tiers of government during general government consolidation attempts. In the light of different degrees of decentralisation across OECD countries, and the different responsibilities devolved to sub‐central tiers, we believe that this approach offers an illuminating insight into the analysis of fiscal consolidations and their success. We show that the involvement of the sub‐central tiers of government is crucial to achieving cuts in expenditure, particularly in relation to the overall size of the government wage bill. In addition, central governments appear to exert a strong influence on the expenditure of sub‐central tiers through their grant allocations, and control of these allocations appears to have a considerable impact upon the overall success of consolidation attempts. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a skewness in cuts towards sub‐central capital expenditure both when central governments cut grant allocations and when sub‐central governments engage in lone consolidation attempts.     

Der neue Standard zur bilanziellen Abbildung von Versicherungsverträgen (IFRS 17) – Eine kritische Analyse der Auswirkungen auf die Versicherungsbranche

The new standard for the accounting of insurance contracts (IFRS 17) will entail substantial changes for the insurance industry. In the following article the new standard is critically analyzed. First and foremost the coming valuation model, the so-called building block approach, is presented which will be the basis for all insurance contracts within the scope of IFRS 17. (For certain insurance contracts, especially those with direct participation features, or for less complex or short-term insurance contracts, there are some modifications.) To be more precise, IFRS 17 introduces an enterprise-specific valuation approach that is grounded on the so-called fulfilment value. This fulfilment value is determined by four separate building blocks (fulfilment-cashflow, discount rate, risk margin and contractual service margin), which will be addressed in detail. Finally, major changes in performed accounting practices that insurance enterprises are confronted with and will have to adapt to in their financial statements and accounts are pointed out.     

Late for a very important date: financial reporting and audit implications of late 10-K filings

Delays in financial reports often reflect issues related to period-end accounting and audit processes. We investigate the impact of filing delays in connection with auditor characteristics on the quality of financial statements in a sample of firms that filed Form 10-K after the statutory due date. We find that late filing firms are associated with lower financial reporting quality compared to timely filing firms matched by propensity scores, where financial reporting quality is measured by the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals and the probability of a late filing being restated in subsequent periods. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the adverse consequences of late filings can be largely mitigated by having a Big 4 auditor. The differential audit quality stems primarily from Big 4 auditors in large offices and is more pronounced when an auditor may need to draw on additional resources in a limited period.