What do interest rates reveal about the functioning of real business cycle models?

This paper begins by documenting the extent to which the predictions of standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) models are incompatible with observed movements in real interest rates. The main finding of the paper is that extending the baseline model to include habit persistence in consumption and adjustment costs to capital significantly improves the model's empirical performance. In our evaluation of the model's performance, we take special care of estimating and testing predictions of the model using both moments drawn directly from the data and moments calculated after identifying shocks to the stochastic trend.     

Exploring the contextual and individual factors on ethical decision making of salespeople

This paper studies how salespeople make ethical decisions. For this purpose a structural model has been developed which configures how the organization's environment, the organizations's climate, and personality traits affect ethical decision making. Internal communication and the choice of a control system especially affect ethical decision making. Internal communication also affects the attraction of salespeople with unethical personality traits (Machiavellism), while the control system affects the ethical climate. Ethical climate and salespeople's personality traits also affect the ethical decision making. In fact the study shows that ethical decision making can be influenced by management.Willem Verbeke is assistant professor in marketing, School of Economics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. His research concentration is sales management.Cok Ouwerkerk is founder and director of the CSA, a consulting firm for statistical applications, in Mijnheerenland, The Netherlands. He has been involved in many research projects at different Dutch universities and firms.Ed Peelen is associate professor at the School of Economics, The University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. His research concentration is marketing management and logistics.     

The adaptive consequences of pride in personal selling

This study examines the adaptive consequences of pride in personal selling and its self-regulation with colleagues and customers. Study 1 investigates the effects of experiencing pride, where two benefits were found. First, pride increases salespersons’ performance-related motivations. Specifically, it promotes the use of adaptive selling strategies, greater effort, and self-efficacy. Second, pride positively affects organizational citizenship behaviors. Study 2 takes an emotion-process point of view and compares excessive pride (hubris) with positive pride. The results show that salespeople are capable of self-regulating the expression of these emotions differently toward colleagues and customers via anticipated feelings of fear, shame, and regret. Salespeople, in other words, are affected by their emotions, but they also are capable of controlling them to their advantage. Willem Verbeke (verbeke@few.eur.nl) is a chaired professor of sales and account management at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. His research has appeared in a number of academic journals, including theJournal of Marketing, theInternational Journal of Research in Marketing, theJournal of Management, theJournal of Organizational Behavior, and theJournal of Applied Psychology. His area of research interests includes personal selling, sales management, emotions and emotion regulation, social capital, and knowledge management. Frank Belschak (belschak@few.eur.nl) is an assistant professor of marketing and organizational behavior at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. He received his Ph.D. in organizational behavior from the University of Cologne in Germany. His current research interests include emotions and emotion regulation in organizations and across cultures, as well as social capital and networks. Richard P. Bagozzi (bagozzi@rice.edu) is the J. Hugh Liedtke Professor of Management in the Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Management and a professor of psychology at Rice University in Houston, Texas. He conducts research on human emotions, the theory of action, goal setting and goal striving, and structural equation methods.     

More pessimism than greediness: a characterization of monotone risk aversion in the rank-dependent expected utility model

Summary. This paper studies monotone risk aversion, the aversion to monotone, mean-preserving increase in risk (Quiggin [21]), in the Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) model. This model replaces expected utility by another functional, characterized by two functions, a utility function u in conjunction with a probability-perception function f. Monotone mean-preserving increases in risk are closely related to the notion of comparative dispersion introduced by Bickel and Lehmann [3,4] in Non-parametric Statistics. We present a characterization of the pairs (u,f) of monotone risk averse decision makers, based on an index of greediness G _u of the utility function u and an index of pessimism P _f of the probability perception function f: the decision maker is monotone risk averse if and only if . The index of greediness (non-concavity) of u is the supremum of taken over . The index of pessimism of f is the infimum of taken over 0 < v < 1. Thus, , with G _u = 1 iff u is concave. If then , i.e., f is majorized by the identity function. Since P _f = 1 for Expected Utility maximizers, forces u to be concave in this case; thus, the characterization of risk aversion as is a direct generalization from EU to RDEU. A novel element is that concavity of u is not necessary. In fact, u must be concave only if P _f = 1.Received: 10 April 2001, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D81. Correspondence to: Michéle CohenAlain Chateauneuf, Michéle Cohen, Isaac Meilijson: We are most grateful to Mark Machina, Peter Wakker and two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions and comments.     

Diversification, convex preferences and non-empty core in the Choquet expected utility model

Summary. We show, in the Choquet expected utility model, that preference for diversification, that is, convex preferences, is equivalent to a concave utility index and a convex capacity. We then introduce a weaker notion of diversification, namely “sure diversification.” We show that this implies that the core of the capacity is non-empty. The converse holds under concavity of the utility index, which is itself equivalent to the notion of comonotone diversification, that we introduce. In an Anscombe-Aumann setting, preference for diversification is equivalent to convexity of the capacity and preference for sure diversification is equivalent to non-empty core. In the expected utility model, all these notions of diversification are equivalent and are represented by the concavity of the utility index. Received: July 27, 1999; revised version: November 7, 2000     

Some results about averaging in stochastic approximation

The paper presents some results concerning the averaging approach in a general linear regression model in one dimension under suitable conditions about the martingale structure of errors. At first asymptotics of the primary and averaged estimators are discussed. Then it is shown that variances of estimators can be consistently estimated by appropriate integrated squared deviations functionals. Finally applications to the construction of confidence regions are considered.     

Optimal growth and cycles in overlapping generations models

Summary This paper investigates the dynamical properties of optimal paths in one-sector overlapping generations models without assuming that the utility function of the representative agent is separable. When the utility function is separable, the optimal growth paths monotonically converges toward the modified golden rule steady state. In the non-separable case, we show that the optimal growth path may be oscillating and optimal two-period cycles may exist. Applying these results to the model with altruism, we show that the condition of operative bequest is fully compatible with endogeneous fluctuations provided that the discount factor is close enough to one. All our results are illustrated using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.We thank C. Blackorby, J. Blot, P. Cartigny and one anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions which generally improved the exposition of the paper. We would also like to thank the participants of the Population and demography session of the European Economic Association 10th Annual Congress (Prague, The Czech Republic, September 1–4, 1995).     

REAL OPTIONS WITH COMPETITION AND REGIME SWITCHING

In this paper, we examine irreversible investment decisions in duopoly games with a variable economic climate. Integrating timing flexibility, competition, and changes in the economic environment in the form of a cash flow process with regime switching, the problem is formulated as a stopping‐time game under Stackelberg leader‐follower competition, in which both players determine their respective optimal market entry time. By extending the variational inequality approach, we solve for the free boundaries and obtain optimal investment strategies for each player. Despite the lack of regularity in the leader's obstacle and the cash flow regime uncertainty, the regime‐dependent optimal policies for both the leader and the follower are obtained. In addition, we perform comprehensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the properties of solutions and to gain insights into the implications of regime switching.