Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly

The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points and faces of the feasible set. We provide a simple algebraic procedure to determine whether a mechanism is an extreme point. We characterize the mechanisms that maximize revenue for some well-behaved distribution of buyer's valuations.     

The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

Summary For a class of infinite signaling games, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies of finite approximating games converge to equilibrium strategies of the infinite game. This proves the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for that class of games. It is well known that in general, equilibria may not exist in infinite signaling games.I am very grateful to Karl Iorio with whom I derived most of the results in this paper. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors. I am also grateful to Robert Anderson, Debra Aron, Eddie Dekel, Raymond Deneckere, Michael Kirscheneiter, Steven Matthews, Roger Myerson, Daniel Vincent and Robert Weber for comments on previous drafts of this paper.     

Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems

Summary This paper explores the possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms yielding satisfactory solutions to the marriage and to the college admissions problem. Our first result is negative. We prove that no strategy-proof mechanism can always choose marriages that are individually rational and Pareto efficient. This strengthens a result by Roth (1982) showing that strategy-proof mechanisms cannot always select stable marriages. The result also applies, a fortiori, to college admissions. Since finding difficulties with strategy-proofness is quite an expected result, we then address a second question which is classical within the incentives literature. Are there restrictions on the preferences of agents under which strategy-proof and stable mechanisms do exist? We identify a nontrivial restriction on the domain of preferences, to be called top dominance, under which there exist strategy-proof and stable mechanisms for both types of matching problems. The mechanisms turn out to be exactly those that derive from the most classical algorithms in the literature; namely, the women's optimal, the men's optimal and the student's optimal. Finally, top dominance is shown to be essentially necessary, as well as sufficient, for the existence of strategy-proof stable matching mechanisms.This work is partially supported by grant PB 89-0294, from the Directión General de Investigatión Ciencia y Tecnología of the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia. Salvador Barberà is also grateful to the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. This research was initiated while both authors were visting GREMAQ, Université des Sciencies Sociales, Toulouse, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The paper extends results that were circulated as GREMAQ W.P. 91.22.232. We are grateful to Matthew Jackson and Marilda Sotomayor for their comments.     

Oil risk contracts,business conduct and performance patterns: Data panel analysis

Using the economic and financial performance data of international companies for the exploration, and exploration–extraction (E&E) of oil, as well as the patterns of institutional situation and orientation with the government market and national oil companies or NOCs that receive project offers, we analyze the institutional development and behavior patterns by type of E&E contract, following the strategic actor approach, or the so-called agency theory. Additionally, in light of Mexico's energy reform being implemented between 2015 and 2019, we analyzed the types of license contracts compared to those for production and shared profit. Subsequently, it was determined-through panel data methods in the analysis of 17 companies between 2005 and 2015-that global companies present bigger yields and commitments compared to specialized companies, confirmed by their net income and returns on equity or ROE.     

论用文化增加旅游商品的附加值

旅游的本质属性是文化属性。文化是旅游消费和旅游经营追求的核心因素。文章以上述观点为基础，探讨了旅游商品开发设计中文化因素的作用，提出文化可以创造旅游商品，文化可以增加旅游商品的附加值。     

Building the Legitimacy of Whistleblowers: A Multi‐Case Discourse Analysis

Evidence suggests that society still does not view whistleblowers as wholly legitimate—despite legal protections now offered in some jurisdictions, such as the United States. Drawing on a discourse analysis (i.e., an examination of statements), we investigate the well‐publicized stories of seven whistleblowers from 69 sources, including books, first‐ and second‐hand interviews, websites, and videos. Our focus is to examine how whistleblower discourses can build legitimacy by more tightly defining the whistleblower role and demonstrating its alignment with social norms. Using whistleblower self‐narratives, we identify four narrative patterns: (i) Trigger(s)—the event(s) leading to whistleblowing; (ii) Personality traits—whistleblower's morality, resourcefulness, and determination; (iii) Constraints—barriers requiring regulatory and organizational change; and (iv) Consequences—the longer term positive impact of the whistleblowing act. These patterns rely on symbolic, analogical, and metaphorical framing to allow others to better understand the role of whistleblowers and enlist their support. Exploring a data set of 1,621 press articles, we find indications that these narrative patterns resonate in the media—which provide a form of support and may be instrumental in legitimizing the whistleblower role. Grounded on these results, we develop a legitimacy construction model of the whistleblower role, that is, a representation of how role legitimacy is produced and sustained. From this model, we identify a number of important areas for future research.     

Is off-farm income reforming the farm? Evidence from Mexico

Does access to off-farm income complement or compete with agricultural production? This article explores the effect of off-farm income on agricultural production activities, using data from the 2003 Mexico National Rural Household Survey. We first discuss the theoretical conditions under which access to off-farm income may influence production in an agricultural household model. Instrumental-variable (IV) estimation methods are then used to test whether agricultural production activities, technologies, and input use differ between households with and without access to off-farm income. We find that off-farm income has a negative effect on agricultural output and the use of family labor on the farm, but a positive impact on the demand for purchased inputs. There is also a slight efficiency gain in households with access to off-farm income. Findings offer insights into how household production evolves as rural households increasingly engage in off-farm income activities.     

The regional wage gap in the Spanish hospitality sector based on a gender perspective

In this work we estimate human capital returns in the Spanish hospitality sector using an expanded version of the Mincer wage equation (1974). In addition, wage differences in the main tourist regions are quantified using the wage decomposition of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) from a gender perspective. Using data from the 2006 Spanish Wage Structure Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial), all the regions under analysis show lower education returns in the hospitality sector when compared to other private services. The same results are found for the other human capital variables used. There are significant differences in education returns between regions, especially in Catalonia and the Canary Islands. The main wage gap in the Canary Islands and the Madrid region is due to differences in returns in the observed variables, whereas in other regions most of the differences are due to the resources allocated. Furthermore, gender wage differences are found in all the regions. The largest estimated wage gap between men and women occurs in the Balearic Islands followed by Catalonia and the Community of Valencia. In contrast, equality between genders is greater in the Community of Madrid.