Markovian equilibrium in a class of stochastic games: existence theorems for discounted and undiscounted models

Summary We study a strategic version of the neoclassical growth model under possible production uncertainty. For a general specification of the problem, we establish (i) the existence of stationary Markov equilibria in pure strategies for the discounted game, and (ii) the convergence, under a boundedness condition, of discounted equilibrium strategies to a pure strategy stationary Markovian equilibrium of the undiscounted game as the discount factor tends to unity. The same techniques can be used to prove that such convergence also obtains in all finitestate, finite-action stochastic games satisfying a certain full communicability condition. These results are of special interest since there are well known examples in the literature in which the limit of discounted equilibria fails to be an equilibrium of the undiscounted game.We are grateful to Marcus Berliant, M. Ali Khan, Mukul Majumdar, and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions, and to Bonnie Huck for technical assistance. The first author acknowledges research support from the Columbia University Council for the Social Sciences.     

Farsighted network formation

This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield efficient outcomes.     

The Managerial Lineages of Neoliberalism

Managerialism is often depicted as a key practice of neoliberalism yet relatively little has been written by scholars of neoliberalism about the actual relationship between managerialism and neoliberalism. Usually subsumed under a functional reading of neoliberalism, managerialism has too often been understood simply as a means for neoliberal ends (i.e. to promote market rule or competition). This paper challenges this perspective on the grounds that it conflates practices that stem from two different historical lineages. As we show, managerial governance not only has a very different history than neoliberal theory, but it also rests on different principles. Its development can be traced back to the US defence sector in the 1950s and the pivotal role of the RAND Corporation. On the basis of this historical perspective, we argue for the need to analyse managerialism on its own terms and make the case for considering the rise of managerial science as a paradigmatic shift in governance. In doing so, we show how managerial governance represented a radical rupture from previous management practices and show how it profoundly reshaped how we have come to understand governance.     

Making Economics More Useful: How Technological Eclecticism Could Help

Keynes thought it would be “splendid” if economists became more like dentists. Disciplinary economics has instead become more like physics in focusing on concise, universal propositions verified through decisive tests. This focus, the author argues, limits the practical utility of the discipline because universal propositions form only a part of new policy recipes. The author further suggests that, as in engineering and medicine, developing economic recipes requires eclectic combinations of suggestive tests and judgment. Additionally, the author provides a detailed example of how a simulation model can help evaluate new policy combinations that affect the screening of loan applications.     

Do Potential Skilled Emigrants Care about Political Stability at Home?

In this paper, we consider the role of political stability in the source country as a potential reason for skilled emigration. We control for all prospective source country characteristics, and yet skilled emigration is seen to be driven by a relatively better situation of political stability in the home country. Our research clearly shows that government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profiles, democratic accountability, internal conflict, and ethnic tensions in source nations have significant impacts on the rate of skilled emigration for a sample of developed and developing countries. The results retain robustness even for a subset of only developing nations.     

What determines international tourist arrivals in India?

Using data for 18 major tourist originating countries to India from 2001 to 2015, this study examines the major determinants of international tourist arrivals in India. The results indicate that past experiences of the tourists, per capita income in the tourist originating country, relative costs of living between India and the country of origin, and the level of infrastructure development in India are key determinants of international tourist arrivals in India. Furthermore, both transportation and communication infrastructure are important in attracting tourists to India. In particular, evidence suggests that availability of road and air network and telephone connections has favourable impacts on international tourist arrivals in India. These results are robust to the inclusion of additional variables. These results have important policy implications.     

Long‐run price competition

We generalize the standard repeated‐games model of dynamic oligopolistic competition to allow for consumers who are long‐lived and forward looking. Each period leaves some residual demand to future periods and pricing in one period affects consumers' expectations about future prices. We analyze this setting for an indivisible durable good with price‐setting firms and overlapping cohorts of consumers. The model nests the repeated‐game model and the Coasian durable‐goods model as its two extreme cases. The analysis is mostly focused on constant‐price collusion but conditions for collusive recurrent sales are also identified.