Contest architecture

A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the optimal architecture is a single grand static contest. (2) If the designer maximizes the expected highest effort, and if there are sufficiently many competitors, it is optimal to split the competitors in two divisions, and to have a final among the two divisional winners. Finally, if the effort cost functions are convex, the designer may benefit by splitting the contestants into several sub-contests, or by awarding prizes to all finalists.     

Estimating the term structures of corporate debt

This paper investigates the corporate bond market by estimating monthly interest rate term structures for investment grade credit classes using both S&P's and Moody's ratings. Term structures are modeled by a piecewise constant forward rate curve and estimated on noncallable coupon paying bonds issued by industrial firms. The iterative estimation algorithm minimizes the sum of squared errors between market prices and model prices while identifying and removing outliers from the sample. Although the forward rate model is successful at pricing corporate debt, additional factors are found to be significant at explaining the residual price error that remains after the forward rate model is fit to market prices. Six necessary no-arbitrage conditions are derived for the term structures of risky and risk-free debt. Occasionally, some of these no-arbitrage conditions are violated and a few violations are asymptotically statistically significant. Finally, trading strategies that capture mispricing in the corporate debt market and violations of no-arbitrage bounds are discussed.This paper was adapted from my dissertation, completed at Cornell University. An earlier version of this paper was titled The Term Structures of Corporate Debt. Thanks to participants at the Cornell University finance workshop, Warren Bailey, Peter Carr, Antoine Giannetti, and especially Robert Jarrow for their helpful comments.     

Opportunity costs in buying and short selling—Do they really matter?

The experimental results of the paper reveal that people do not take into consideration opportunity costs or opportunity profits when buying and short selling lottery tickets. These results are inconsistent with basic economic and finance theories.     

Travel behavior of immigrants: An analysis of the 2001 National Household Transportation Survey

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationships between travel behavior and immigrant status. The National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) allows us to explore the relationships between travel behavior and characteristics that are usually hard to discern in surveys with smaller samples. The correlation between travel behavior and immigrant characteristics such as place of birth and year of immigration in the US was tested while controlling for spatial and socio-demographic variables. The effects of place of birth and year of arriving to the US were found to be significant for some places of birth and for immigrants who entered the US in recent years. Understanding the differences in travel behavior and the possible explanations for these differences can help in modeling travel demand, finding policies best suited to meeting the travel needs of foreign-born communities, and addressing environmental justice concerns.     

Subjective evaluation of delayed risky outcomes for buying and selling positions: the behavioral approach

This paper analyzes time discounting as a function of risk, using reservation prices. Based on experimental data, we compare bidder reservation prices for riskless assets with those for risky assets. The experiments rely on a second price auction with real monetary incentives and real delay in payoffs. We estimate the pure time discount rate for different maturities, considering riskless assets (bonds) and risky assets (delayed lotteries). An innovation in the experimental design allows disentangling pure time from pure risk discounting effects. If subjects bid for assets, we find implied discount rates for risky assets to be uniformly lower than those for riskless assets, across all maturities (the risk moderation effect). However, there is no risk moderation effect if subjects quote ask prices. We argue that delaying a payoff has a stronger effect on the price of bonds than on the price of risky assets since, in the case of bonds, the investor moves from a position of certainty to a position of risk, or uncertainty. Our findings on the risk moderation effect may be used to explain the attractiveness of compensation contracts with options, as commonly used in the financial industry.