Third‐person perception and purchase behavior in response to various selling methods

Two studies investigated whether various tactics of personal selling that generate different levels of resistance also produce different degrees of third‐person perceptions. Furthermore, the studies compared third‐person perceptions to the actual influence on behavior. Study 1 showed that more direct and blatant selling methods produce more TPP. Study 2 showed that people tend to underestimate the influence of the more direct method, especially with regard to themselves. The study concludes by identifying the ideal selling method as one in which the customers are asked about their willingness to listen to the sales campaign before they are told about it. This method increases sales and creates satisfied customers. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Estimating the term structures of corporate debt

This paper investigates the corporate bond market by estimating monthly interest rate term structures for investment grade credit classes using both S&P's and Moody's ratings. Term structures are modeled by a piecewise constant forward rate curve and estimated on noncallable coupon paying bonds issued by industrial firms. The iterative estimation algorithm minimizes the sum of squared errors between market prices and model prices while identifying and removing outliers from the sample. Although the forward rate model is successful at pricing corporate debt, additional factors are found to be significant at explaining the residual price error that remains after the forward rate model is fit to market prices. Six necessary no-arbitrage conditions are derived for the term structures of risky and risk-free debt. Occasionally, some of these no-arbitrage conditions are violated and a few violations are asymptotically statistically significant. Finally, trading strategies that capture mispricing in the corporate debt market and violations of no-arbitrage bounds are discussed.This paper was adapted from my dissertation, completed at Cornell University. An earlier version of this paper was titled The Term Structures of Corporate Debt. Thanks to participants at the Cornell University finance workshop, Warren Bailey, Peter Carr, Antoine Giannetti, and especially Robert Jarrow for their helpful comments.     

Contest architecture

A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the optimal architecture is a single grand static contest. (2) If the designer maximizes the expected highest effort, and if there are sufficiently many competitors, it is optimal to split the competitors in two divisions, and to have a final among the two divisional winners. Finally, if the effort cost functions are convex, the designer may benefit by splitting the contestants into several sub-contests, or by awarding prizes to all finalists.     

Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints

We study all‐pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. The designer decides about the size and number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer who wishes to maximize either the total effort or the highest effort. It is shown that if the minimal effort constraint is relatively high, the winner‐take‐all contest in which the contestant with the highest effort wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. Rather, a random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants yields a higher expected total effort as well as a higher expected highest effort.     

The individual dual needs for assimilation and distinctiveness as a segmentation mechanism: developing the concept among students

The present study proposes that the individual's needs for assimilation and distinctiveness serve as a valuable mechanism for consumer segmentation and suggests that augmenting the List of Values with these dual needs enriches the understanding of consumer responses to marketing strategies. Results of a study using a sample of 536 students in an Israeli university identified five segments with significantly different needs for assimilation and differentiation. These segments showed different preferences for marketing communications and distribution channels in their purchasing decision of a cell phone. Mass media and website usage influenced segments marked by high assimilation, while word of mouth influenced segments characterized by high distinctiveness. Augmenting the List of Values with dual needs based segmentation moderated students’ tendencies to favour/dislike marketing communications and distribution channels.     

Return prediction and stock selection from unidentified historical data

The experimental approach was applied to test the value of historical return series in technical prediction. Return sequences were randomly drawn cross-sectionally and over time from S&P500 records and participants were asked to predict the 13th realization from 12 preceding returns. The hypothesis that predictions (nominal or real) are randomly assigned to historical sequences is rejected in permutation tests, and the best-stock portfolios by experimental predictions significantly outperform the worst-stock portfolios in joint examination of mean return and volatility. The participants dynamically adjust their predictions to the observed series and switch from momentum riding to contrarian extrapolation when recent trends get extreme. The implicit tuning of predictions to specific series captures variabilities that could not be inferred by schematic statistical forecasting.     

All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.     

How Can a Ratings-based Method for Assessing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Provide an Incentive to Firms Excluded from Socially Responsible Investment Indices to Invest in CSR?

Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) indices play a major role in the stock markets. A connection between doing good and doing well in business is implied. Leading indices, such as the Domini Social Index and others, exemplify the movement toward investing in socially responsible corporations. However, the question remains: Does the ratings-based methodology for assessing corporate social responsibility (CSR) provide an incentive to firms excluded from SRI indices to invest in CSR? Not in its current format. The ratings-based methodology employed by SRI indices in their selection processes excludes many corporations by creating limited-membership lists. This received ratings-based structure is yet to offer an incentive for most of the excluded corporations to invest in improving their levels of CSR. We, therefore, ask under what circumstances a ratings-based method for assessing CSR could provide an incentive to firms excluded from SRI indices to invest in CSR. In this article, we attempt to offer a theoretical reply to this question. We show that when all firms are publicly ranked according to SRI index parameters, such indices can indeed create a market incentive for increased investment by firms in improving their performance in the area of social responsibility. We further show that this incentive tapers off as the amount of investment required exceeds a certain point or if the amount of payback on that investment fails to reach a certain threshold.     

Opportunity costs in buying and short selling—Do they really matter?

The experimental results of the paper reveal that people do not take into consideration opportunity costs or opportunity profits when buying and short selling lottery tickets. These results are inconsistent with basic economic and finance theories.     

Subjective evaluation of delayed risky outcomes for buying and selling positions: the behavioral approach

This paper analyzes time discounting as a function of risk, using reservation prices. Based on experimental data, we compare bidder reservation prices for riskless assets with those for risky assets. The experiments rely on a second price auction with real monetary incentives and real delay in payoffs. We estimate the pure time discount rate for different maturities, considering riskless assets (bonds) and risky assets (delayed lotteries). An innovation in the experimental design allows disentangling pure time from pure risk discounting effects. If subjects bid for assets, we find implied discount rates for risky assets to be uniformly lower than those for riskless assets, across all maturities (the risk moderation effect). However, there is no risk moderation effect if subjects quote ask prices. We argue that delaying a payoff has a stronger effect on the price of bonds than on the price of risky assets since, in the case of bonds, the investor moves from a position of certainty to a position of risk, or uncertainty. Our findings on the risk moderation effect may be used to explain the attractiveness of compensation contracts with options, as commonly used in the financial industry.