Inequality and Income Distribution in Global Value Chains

Global value chains (GVCs), led by transnational corporations (TNCs), have reshaped the world division of labor over the past two decades. GVCs are pervasive in low technology manufacturing, such as textile and apparel, as well as in more advanced industries like automobiles, electronics, and machines. This hierarchical division of labor generates wild competition at the lower value-added stages of production, where low wages and low profit margins prevail for workers and contract manufacturers in developing countries. At the top of the hierarchy another kind of competition prevails, centered on the ability to monitor and control intellectual property rights related to innovation, finance, and marketing. We argue that GVCs have had crucial effects on income inequality and the appropriation of rents in modern capitalism.     

Testing the significance and the non-linearity of the Phillips trade-off in the Euro Area

This paper tests the significance and the non-linearity of the Phillips trade-off in the aggregate Euro Area, in an unobserved components model of stochastic NAIRU and trend output featuring the Phillips equation and the Okun law as main identifying equations, with quarterly data for 1970:I-2002:III. The Phillips curve turns out to be linear and its trade-off statistically significant, while non-linearity shows up in the Okun relation. The results prove to be robust to alternative lag length structures of the model, and to alternative non-linear functional forms. The trend-cycle decompositions estimated with the model capture the main features of the Euro Area’s recent macroeconomic record.First version received: 1 September 2003 / Final version received: June 2004CEMPRE - Centro de Estudos Macroeconómicos e Previsão - is supported by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal, through the Programa Operacional Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação (POCTI) of the Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III, which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds.We thank comments on earlier versions by Fabio Canova, Miguel St Aubyn, Alvaro Almeida, Pete Richardson, Kevin Ross, and two anonymous referees. We acknowledge James D. Hamilton’s help with the confidence bands. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Managing Competing Institutional Logics in Public–Private Joint Ventures

Abstract

Cross-sector inter-organizational partnerships, alliances and networks have become extremely popular. Yet, we may expect competing societal-level institutional logics to play an important role in cross-sector alliances, hence making their management central to alliance success. This article responds to the general research question: How do participants of public–private joint ventures manage competing institutional logics? Based on in-depth interviews we empirically characterize two competing logics in a cross-sector collaborative and identify two practices used to cope with them.