Real Exchange Rate Misalignments in the Euro Area

Open Economies Review - Building upon a Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate model, estimated at a quarterly frequency since 1999 on a broad sample of 57 countries, this paper assesses both the...     

Uncertainty in the Austrian Theory of Capital

This paper is based on the traditional Austrian Theory of Capital which deals with expected values of future returns of investments over various periods of time. The longer the time period that elapses between the beginning of a production process and its end, the higher the (expected) productivity must be due to positive time preferences of individuals. This paper focuses on the uncertainty of future returns and on uncertainty preferences, instead. Based on the Hayekian idea of the dispersion of knowledge in society, it will be shown that there is a systematic relationship between the structure of capital and uncertainty. This result will be derived for a production process characterized by complete vertical integration and one which is not completely vertically integrated. The distinction between these two settings is crucial, if one accepts the distinction between an individual and a social period of production and the planning horizon which are introduced in this paper.     

WHERE'S THE CAT GOING? SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CATASTROPHE BONDS

This article provides an assessment of the current state of the market for catastrophe (or "Cat") bonds. Given the changes in insurance markets since September 11th, the demand for Cat bonds is likely to increase. For issuers, Cat bonds have the effect of transferring risks to the capital markets that would normally be underwritten by insurance or reinsurance companies. And as a substitute for insurance, Cat bonds have the potential to help issuers address problems such as lack of capacity and real risk transfer, cyclicality, and credit risk that are commonly associated with insurance and reinsurance markets. Investors value Cat bonds in part because of their low correlations with stocks and conventional bonds. Notable trends in the structuring of the products involve higher levels of risk transfer, longer-term contracts, and linkage to a portfolio of catastrophic risks.     

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A MICROECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This paper provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Depending on whether an individual can be considered as selfish, or whether she has also social preferences, motives for CSR, can be explained in different ways. Furthermore, we explicitly highlight the influence of different Corporate Governance System on CSR as well as the relationship between firms' size and social commitment. Because it is difficult to distinguish between different theories in empirical studies, we argue that an experimental approach might be suitable to test theories of CSR.     

Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany

Pischke and von Wachter (Review of Economics and Statistics 2008; 90 (3): 592–598) find zero earnings returns to compulsory schooling in the basic school track in Germany. We reanalyze their study using a different dataset. In an extension, we use additional instruments which allow estimation of heterogeneous effects for different groups of compliers. We can confirm the previous result and also find zero returns for other compliers in higher track schools. Moreover, we do not find a causal effect of schooling on cognitive skills. This is in line with a potential reason Pischke & von Wachter (2008) give for their result, namely that basic skills are learned earlier in Germany and additional years of schooling are no longer effective. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.