Incentives and Performance in Real Estate Brokerage

This article has two objectives. One is to offer a theoretical model to study how the difference in commission structures affects the performance of agents at full-commission firms (e.g., RE/MAX agents) relative to other agents. The other is to provide an empirical test of the relative performance of full-commission agents. We predict that in equilibrium the selling price and the expected time it takes to sell a listing through a full-commission agent are the same as they are with a traditional agent. Our theoretical predictions are supported by our empirical results.     

Market penetration by entry-exit dynamics

A generic characterization of the dynamics of market penetration by technological artifacts is here formulated on the basis of entry rate and exit rate considerations. It is shown that low-order reductions lead to the biologically based logistic dynamic, which—by empirical fit—has been found to be in very good agreement with numerous specific cases. In addition to the derivational justification of the logistic for artifact market penetration, we find that but a small number of parameters are involved in these autonomous characterizations suggesting therefore that market penetration may well be reduced to a similarly small number of dominant operative processes. Some nonautonomous extensions are also discussed.     

Some economics of content protection

We are grateful to a perceptive referee for many constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper entitled The Economics of Content Protection: A Dual Approach. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Individual rights and organizational theory

Rights are very important concepts in everyday life. And they are especially important to participants in organizations. Yet, our theories of organization and management have largely ignored rights — stressing, instead, other concepts, such as goals, roles, etc. This article describes the historical significance of rights and their relevance in understanding social behavior. The advantages of a right-based organizational theory (versus traditional goal-based theories) are discussed.This article draws on the author's forthcoming book,A Social-Contract Theory of Organizations (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).