Ownership coordination in a channel: Incentives,returns, and negotiations

In many industries firms have to make quantity decisions before knowing the exact state of demand. In such cases, channel members have to decide which firm will own the units until demand uncertainty is resolved. The decision about who should retain ownership depends on the balance of benefit and risk to each member. Ownership, after all, is costly. Whichever member owns the units accepts the risk of loss if more units are produced than can be sold. But ownership also grants firms the flexibility to respond to demand once it becomes known by adjusting price. In this study, we analyze ownership decisions in distribution channels and how those decisions are affected by demand uncertainty. We model demand based on micro-modeling of consumer utility functions and capture demand uncertainty related to market size and price sensitivity. This study shows that as long as the degree of uncertainty about market size is intermediate, the retailer and the manufacturer both benefit when the manufacturer maintains ownership of the units. But when there is substantial uncertainty about market size, the retailer and the channel are better off if the retailer takes ownership but the manufacturer still prefers to maintain ownership. Thus, there is potential for channel conflict regarding ownership under high levels of uncertainty. We show that, using product returns, the manufacturer can achieve the same outcome under retailer ownership as under manufacturer ownership. This provides an additional new rationale for the prevalence of product returns. The first-best outcome (from the perspective of total channel profit), however, is under retailer ownership without product returns when uncertainty is high (i.e., product returns reduce the total channel profit). Negotiations between the manufacturer and the retailer can lead to the first-best outcome but only under quite restrictive constraints that include direct side payments by the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer being pessimistic about its outside option (when an agreement cannot be reached) during the negotiation.     

Clicks and Mortar: The Effect of On-line Activities on Off-line Sales

Retailers did not immediately extend their business to the Internet environment, fearing that on-line activities could adversely impact their off-line sales. To facilitate assessment of the impact of on-line activities on off-line sales, we develop a method that allows retailers to use readily available market data for making informed decisions. The proposed method determines (1) the extent to which on-line sales cannibalize off-line sales, and (2) whether on-line activities build on-line equity for the firm. We illustrate the method using data from Tower Records' Internet sales division. We find that on-line sales do not significantly cannibalize retail sales and that the firm's web activities build long-term on-line equity. While the proposed method can be used by any clicks-and-mortar firm, our firm-specific results indicate that Towers' fears regarding cannibalization due to its own Internet activities were unfounded.