Recreation Demand and Residential Location

We use the properties of competitive location equilibrium to study the demand for recreation and the choice of primary residence location. Location-specific recreation and employment lead to pooling equilibria in which consumers reside according to their preference for recreation. In general, the stronger the taste for recreation, the greater the attraction of living close to the recreation site and the lower the demand for other goods, including housing. We explore the effects of trip frequency, trip length, and recreation cost on the spatial distribution of consumers. We also consider the effect of the wage rate on recreation and location demands.     

Critical factors in computing externalities for electricity resources

The New York State Environmental Externalities Cost Study and computerized externality model (EXMOD) are used to examine the specification of methods design and application factors in the computation of electricity externalities. We report the sensitivity of externality estimates with alternative specifications for 15 different factors in the analysis, including the selection of facility type, site, and operating characteristics; air emission assumptions and air modeling procedures; dose-response assumptions; economic valuation assumptions; and other modeling procedures and assumptions. Many of the factors that most influence externality computations can be well specified in the analysis, such as the facility type, age, characteristics, emission rates, whether there is SO₂ trading, and the inclusion of long range impacts. Most significant among the factors for which there remains significant scientific uncertainty are the selection and application of air dispersion models, selection of air pollution thresholds for health impacts, reduced life span risks associated with ozone exposure and with long-term exposure to PM₁₀, values for CO₂ damages, and the value to be applied to increased risks of reduced life span for individuals age 65 or older.     

The Effect of Illegal Insider Trading on Takeover Premia

This paper empirically investigates whether illegal insidertrading increases the premium a bidder pays for a target. Illegalinsider trading is trading by traditional corporate insiders,as well as others in a position of trust and confidence (e.g.investment bankers, lawyers), based on material, non-publicinformation (‘inside information’). The paper examinesthe premia of takeovers with known illegal insider trading andcompares them to a control sample of takeovers matched by industry,time period, and size that do not have detected illegal insidertrading. After controlling for differences in merger characteristics,such as number of bidders, type of offer, form of payment, etc.,we find that takeovers with detected illegal insider tradinghave takeover premia which are approximately 10 percentage points,or almost one-third, higher than the control sample. We conductadditional tests in an attempt to determine the direction ofcausality between illegal insider trading and takeover premiasize and explore the effect of potential detection bias. Theresults suggest both that illegal inside traders base theirtrades on factors other than premia size, and that illegal insidertrading in takeovers with large premia is not necessarily morelikely to be detected. Our findings are consistent with thehypothesis that the illegal insider trading itself tends tocreate larger takeover premia.     

An Application of Keaveney's Model of Service Switching Behaviour to GP Fundholders

The introduction of competition within the National Health Service (NHS), with the purchasers having a degree of choice among providers, has raised a variety of issues for buyer-supplier relationships. Purchasers, especially GP fundholders, have power in relation to their provider in the sense that they may ultimately take their custom elsewhere and by transferring their business, or part of their business, from one trust provider to another. As GP fundholders increase in number, and in confidence, this practice seems likely to grow. Using evidence from commercial markets, this article explains why fundholders might switch provider and the implications this has for hospital trusts.     

A Bio-Economic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Under CAMPFIRE

This paper formulates a bio-economic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Three agents influence the wildlife stock: a parks agency determines hunting quotas, outside poachers hunt illegally, and a local community may choose to protect wildlife by discouraging poaching. Wildlife generates revenues from hunting licenses and tourism; it also intrudes on local agriculture. We consider two benefit-sharing regimes: shares of wildlife tourism rents and shares of hunting licenses. Resource sharing does not necessarily improve community welfare or incentives for wildlife conservation. Results depend on the exact design of the benefit shares, the size of the benefits compared with agricultural losses, and the way in which the parks agency manages hunting quotas.     

Charity registration and reporting: a cross-jurisdictional and theoretical analysis of regulatory impact

Governments increasingly regulate charities to restrict the number of organizations claiming taxation exemptions, reduce charities’ ability to abuse state support, and detect and deter fraud. Public interest theory arguments suggest that regulation could increase philanthropy through enhancing public trust and confidence in charities. Nevertheless, public choice theory argues that regulators seek to maximize political returns, ‘manage’ charity-government relationships, and reduce potential regulatory capture.

We analyse charity regulatory regimes using these two regulatory theories and the relative costs and benefits of different regulatory regimes. Heeding these should reduce regulatory inefficiency and balance accountability and transparency demands against benefits charities receive from regulation.     

Border effects and the availability of domestic products abroad

Abstract.  Trade between countries could fall short of trade within a country because (1) the volume of international trade is less than the volume of domestic trade for a given product (the intensive margin); or (2) some goods that are sold domestically are simply not exported (the extensive margin). My theoretical model illustrates that either of these two factors could explain a given aggregate 'border effect.' I examine the empirical relevance of this distinction by isolating the fraction of total domestic production attributable only to exporters, finding that around one‐half of the border effect may be attributed to each explanation. JEL classification: F1