Daniel M. Abramson. Building the Bank of England: Money, Architecture, Society, 1694-1942

Daniel Abramson's thorough study examines the architecturalhistory of the Bank of England as a reflection of the bank'spriorities and interests and as the institution and the buildingdeveloped into vital players in Britain's image. In the processof tracing the evolution of the various structures occupiedby the bank during the period from 1694 to 1942, he has createda model interdisciplinary study that places the Bank of Englandas a structure and financial institution within     

Cystadenoma of the seminal vesicle: US and CT findings

Ultrasonographic (US) and computed tomographic (CT) features of a cystadenoma of the seminal vesicle are presented.     

William Faricy Condee. Coal and Culture: Opera Houses in Appalachia. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005. xii + 210 pp. ISBN 0-8214-1588-3, $34.95 (cloth).

In Coal and Culture William Condee examines Appalachian small-towntheaters built between the 1860s and 1930s that appropriatedthe high-culture term ‘opera house’ for spaces presentingdiverse activities from high school graduations to travelingtheatrical troupes. The title ‘opera house,’ ratherthan ‘theater,’ conveyed an aura of culture, refinement,and acceptability in an era when theater was sometimes regardedas having questionable morals. ‘Opera house’ soundedgrand, but many structures were modest buildings whose facadesdiffered little from     

Inflation volatility and economic growth in Bolivia: a regional analysis

This paper analyses the effects of inflation and its volatility on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for the regions of Bolivia over the period 1989–2011. Results show the existence of a positive relationship with inflation but a negative one with respect to volatility. Moreover, we identify a threshold for volatility and inflation. Our conclusions imply that economic agents are more tolerant to relatively high levels of inflation than to high inflation volatility.     

PARTY CUES,POLITICAL TRENDS,AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Recent theoretical and empirical research has suggested that similarities in party affiliations across space will alter voters' comparisons, thus influencing fiscal policy mimicking. We employ a two‐regime spatial panel data model applied to U.S. state governors from 1970 to 2012, and find rather weak empirical evidence of influence of political party affiliations in fiscal yardstick competition. Our observed cross‐state interdependence in fiscal policies suggests voters may not weigh party affiliation heavily in their measure of comparative quality, treating each incumbent individually and independently. Incumbents strategically choose policy accordingly. This provides indirect support for the median voter theorem, in which incumbents' objective function is to maximize votes, independent of political affiliation. (JEL D72, H2, H7)