Heterogeneity in sales districts: Beyond individual-level predictors of satisfaction and performance

This article examines the influence of heterogeneity within a sales unit on the unit’s satisfaction and performance.Sales unit refers to a set of salespersons working out of the same office and for the same supervisor, andheterogenity refers to salespersons’ dispersion or variance on key dimensions. Specifically, drawing on theories in social psychology, the authors study the influence of sales unit heterogeneity in terms of (1) demographic characteristics (e.g., gender dispersion), (2) skills and rewards (e.g., reward dispersion), and (3) goal orientations (e.g., learning orientation dispersion) on a sales unit’s performance and job satisfaction levels. The hypotheses developed are tested using data from a study involving 476 salespeople belonging to 105 sales units in a large organization. The authors find that the focal heterogeneity variables account for nearly 25 percent of the total variance explained by the full set of independent variables included in the model. R. Venkatesh is an assistant professor of business administration at the University of Pittsburgh’s Katz Graduate School of Business. His articles on product bundling, cobranding and sales force management have appeared or are forthcoming in theInternational Journal of Research in Marketing, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Business, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, andMarketing Science. Goutam Challagalla is an associate marketing professor at Georgia Tech. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from the University of Texas at Austin, where he won the Outstanding Dissertation Award. He has published articles on sales management and marketing theory in marketing and psychology journals. Ajay K. Kohli is Isaac Stiles Hopkins professor of marketing at Emory University’s Goizueta Business School. During 2000–2001, he is on leave from Emory and working at the Monitor Company. He has published in several journals on market orientation, sales management, and organizational buying behavior.     

Control system diversity: Implications for selling centers

It is often the case that members of selling centers are governed by different control systems (i.e., some selling center members are governed more by behavior controls while others are governed more by outcome controls). Surprisingly, there is little research which examines the impact of control system diversity (CSD) on selling center processes (e.g., decision comprehensiveness) and outcomes (e.g., performance). The present research integrates the literature on psychological stakes to show that CSD is positively related to decision comprehensiveness when psychological stakes are high but not when they are low. Decision comprehensiveness, in turn, is positively related to performance. This research uses data from multiple sources across 61 selling centers to provide novel insights into a new form of diversity and the under researched context of selling centers.     

The Effect of Single and Dual Sales Targets on Sales Call Selection: Quota versus Quota and Bonus Plan

Ross (1991) demonstrated that a salesperson's quota acts as a reference point (target or goal) and influences sales call selection. Ross, however, focused only on the effect of a single reference point. The use of multiple goals is quite common in the sales environment, for example in the quota plus bonus compensation structure and in the use of incentive plans. Our study compares and contrasts call selection when a single goal (quota) is given versus when dual targets are assigned (a quota plus bonus level). Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that call selection patterns are influenced by the number of targets assigned to the salesperson.     

The moderating influence of firm market power on the transaction cost economics model: An empirical test in a forward channel integration context

Transaction cost economics (TCE) has guided a variety of research on governance in the strategic management literature. An important question arises, however, as to whether the TCE framework is equally appropriate for all types of firms in all business settings. In this paper, we argue that TCE is not and suggest that firms with high market power may be able to lower transaction costs under high asset specificity and uncertainty in nonintegrated distribution channels, avoiding the need to utilize highly integrated channels as a result. We test our hypotheses with data collected from 40 manufacturers of electronic and telecommunications products in 109 product‐markets in the United States. The results support our hypothesis that transaction cost factors are better at explaining forward channel integration for firms with low market power than for firms with high market power. Our results indicate that the basic TCE framework must be supplemented by the market power construct to adequately explain forward channel integration decisions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.