Trading frequency and asset pricing on the London Stock Exchange: Evidence from a new price impact ratio

This study proposes a new price impact ratio as an alternative to the widely used Amihud’s (2002) Return-to-Volume ratio. We demonstrate that the new price impact ratio, which is deemed Return-to-Turnover ratio, has a number of appealing features. Using daily data from all stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1991–2008, we provide overwhelming evidence that this ratio, while being unequivocal to construct and interpret, is also free of a size bias. More importantly, it encapsulates the stocks’ cross-sectional variability in trading frequency, a relatively neglected but possibly important determinant of stock returns given the recently observed trends in financial markets. Overall, our findings argue against the conventional wisdom that there is a simple direct link between trading costs and stock returns by strongly suggesting that it is the compound effect of trading frequency and transaction costs that matters for asset pricing, not each aspect in isolation.     

Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United Kingdom

This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999–2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm‐specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure.     

Managerial ownership and performance

This study revisits the classical debate about the nature of the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance by using a semi-parametric estimation approach. The semi-parametric approach helps sidestep concerns associated with the potential misspecification of parametric models (e.g., the arbitrary choice of a fixed number and/or location of turning points) and enables the consideration of a wider range of non-linear behaviors. The empirical results support the existence of the initial alignment effect of managerial ownership at levels lower than 15%, while they do not lead to a strong inference on the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance for intermediate and high levels of managerial ownership. The results cast doubt on the findings of recent studies on the subject, which critically rely on fully parametric methods, and instead suggest the use of semi-parametric methods in estimating the shape of the ownership-performance curve.     

Disappointment aversion and the equity premium puzzle: new international evidence

Drawing upon the seminal study of Ang, Bekaert, and Liu [2005. “Why Stock May Disappoint?” Journal of Financial Economics 76 (3): 471–508], we incorporate disappointment aversion (DA, that is, aversion to outcomes that are worse than prior expectations) within a simple theoretical portfolio-choice model. Based on the results of this model, we then empirically address the portfolio allocation problem of an investor who chooses between a risky and a risk-free asset using international data from 19 countries. Our findings strongly support the view that DA leads investors to reduce their exposure to the stock market (i.e. DA significantly depresses the portfolio weights on equities in all cases considered). Overall, our study shows that in addition to risk aversion, DA plays an important role in explaining the equity premium puzzle around the world.     

The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999–2005. To measure managerial entrenchment, we use detailed information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. We develop a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Our findings, which are based on a dynamic panel data analysis, show that there is a strong negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short‐term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices for UK firms. Finally, our findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial entrenchment and agency costs.     

Financial flexibility,corporate investment and performance: evidence from financial crises

This study examines the impact of financial flexibility on the investment and performance of East Asian firms over the period 1994–2009. We employ a sample of 1,068 firms and place particular emphasis on the periods of the Asian crisis (1997–1998) and the recent credit crisis (2007–2009). The results show that firms can attain financial flexibility, primarily through conservative leverage policies and less commonly by holding large cash balances. Financial flexibility appears to be an important determinant of investment and performance, mainly during the Asian 1997–1998 crisis. In particular, firms that are financially flexible prior to this crisis (1) have a greater ability to take investment opportunities, (2) rely much less on the availability of internal funds to invest, and (3) perform better than less flexible firms during the crisis. Our analysis covering the credit crisis period of 2007–2009 suggests that some of the advantages of flexible firms towards investing persist but are significantly less pronounced over that period. We also find that the value of financial flexibility is region/country specific, which may be explained by the fact that different regions/countries often adopt different macroeconomic policies and operate in diverse economic/legal environments.