MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Backtesting Value-at-Risk: A Duration-Based Approach

Financial risk model evaluation or backtesting is a key partof the internal model's approach to market risk management aslaid out by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. However,existing backtesting methods have relatively low power in realisticsmall sample settings. Our contribution is the exploration ofnew tools for backtesting based on the duration of days betweenthe violations of the Value-at-Risk. Our Monte Carlo resultsshow that in realistic situations, the new duration-based testshave considerably better power properties than the previouslysuggested tests.     

Beyond Self-Regulation: Towards A Critique of Self-Regulation As A Control Strategy For Hazardous Activities*

After highlighting some of the key issues and positions in the debate around appropriate preventive regulation, the paper presents a number of observations directed at the proponents of greater self-regulation. These observations confront directly a number of familiar, but often unchallenged, arguments for self-regulation. More centrally we address claims concerning, the extent to which the chemicals industries have a good and improving ‘safety’ record; and whether the sector consists of companies both motivated and capable in the context of effective crisis and disaster management. Lastly, the paper sets out some ‘new directions’ for the nature and role of regulation in the effective prevention of crises. Thus the paper indicates a number of regulatory developments which are distinct from any shift towards greater self-regulation, but which would result in more effective crisis and disaster prevention in the UK chemicals industries and, indeed, beyond that specific sector.     

Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses.     

Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

We study Bayesian mechanism design in the context of the siting of noxious facilities. Under incomplete information, we characterize optimal mechanisms facilitating the siting and cost sharing of the facility. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian–Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomenon disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric.      

Meta-ethical Reasoning: Applied to Economics and Business Principles

A bstract . Ethics and ethical thinking involve two primary and interdependent elements of analysis: the individual and the society. Economic thought dichotomized these two elements into the individual (competitive capitalism ) or the society (Marxist socialism ), with one element being the cause, and the other the effect. Views of economic reality were developed not on the basis of the interdependence of the individual and the society but their mutual antagonism.
Economic thought is based on the scientific reasoning of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its abstract definition of reality narrowed the significance of the concrete appearances of things in favor of the rules (science) that define things. Science requires both an objective causal order (independent of human definitions and beliefs) and the development of laws (independent of the human observer or participant) that explain the nature of the objective world. Ethical reasoning requires that economic causality be defined to include both the individual and the society. Ethical reasoning is needed to bring together both the scientific and the metaphysical for human meaning. The science of means must be joined to the human purposes of ends.     

International Comparisons of Australia's Infrastructure Performance

International benchmarking has played a key role in the reform of Australia's infrastructure industries by promoting indirect or yardstick competition, in highlighting the need for further reform and building a consensus for implementing necessary changes. The international benchmarking of infrastructure performance by the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) between 1991 and 1996 did much to focus attention on the need for change. The BIE examined the performance of eight infrastructure industries relative to international best practice: electricity, rail freight, telecommunications, the waterfront, road freight, coastal shipping, aviation and gas supply. Performance comparisons concentrated on indicators of price, service quality, labour productivity and capital productivity. This paper reviews and summarises the performance comparisons the BIE undertook over the last three years of its infrastructure benchmarking program. The BIE international benchmarking program provides a useful role model for other countries wanting to seriously pursue reform of their infrastructure industries.     

Cultural Inertia and Uniformity in Organizations

We analyze aspects of the structure of organizational culture.We show that old and culturally uniform organizations are proneto cultural inertia, that is, they are reluctant to adopt adifferent culture in response to a change in the environment.Cultural uniformity can be beneficial because the associatedinertia ex post protects and therefore ex ante encourages culture-specificinvestments by agents. We also explore the model's implicationsfor such issues as cultural uniformity within an organization,cultural heterogeneity across organizations, the destabilizingeffect of growth and mergers, and the conflicts arising in themanagement of culture.     

Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO₂ emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the US, where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Tax proposal also calls for limits on international emission trading. We find that this limit substantially affects costs of compliance. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is 1/6 that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, the carbon price is lower, and there is a smaller loss of energy-intensive exports. Japan can achieve substantial savings from emissions trading even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets.