Employing New Business Divisions to Exploit Disruptive Innovations: The Interplay between Characteristics of the Corporation and Those of the Venture Management Team

Established firms often create new business divisions in response to new ways of competing, such as those based on disruptive innovations. Using a sample of daily newspapers and their Internet divisions, this study examines the corporate characteristics of orientation, attention, and control and venture management team characteristics of vision, experience, and collective efficacy and their interactive effects on the overall performance of the new division. Findings demonstrate that vision and collective efficacy are related to venture outcomes, orientation affects the experience and vision to venture performance relationships, attention enhances the vision and collective efficacy to performance relationships, and decision autonomy influences the experience and collective efficacy to venture performance relationships. Overall, the results of this study imply that specific venture management team characteristics and corporate characteristics may be tailored to improve chances of meeting specific performance targets and achieving overall venture success.     

The theory and practice of financial stability

Summary This paper reviews sources of market failures in financial institutions and markets and what can be done to alleviate them. It examines game theoretic explanations for financial instability, in particular the role of asymmetric information in generating destabilising behaviour. Parallels are drawn between the forces that can lead to a crisis in financial institutions and those that make for price volatility in asset markets. In the area of remedies, the paper analyses the potential contribution of official safety-nets and what can be done to minimise the associated moral hazard. In this context, it discusses the role of regulation and enhanced transparency. Lastly, the paper discusses techniques for stabilising asset prices in markets.General Manager, BIS. Helpful comments on earlier drafts were provided by Svein Andresen, Claudio Borio, Phil Davis, Peter Dittus, Wim Duisenberg, Charles Freeland, Morris Goldstein, Charles Goodhart, Mervyn King, Bob McCauley, Erik Musch, Philip Turner, and Paul van den Bergh.     

重塑金融体系如何加强金融调控与监管

始于2007年的金融危机其最危险阶段似乎已经过去．现在人们正将注意力转向对金融体系的巩固与完善。决策者开始关注如何消除金融架构中那些曾导致金融危机爆发的缺陷。     

BRITISH MANAGERS: A STUDY OF THEIR EDUCATION,TRAINING, MOBILITY AND EARNINGS

This study uses information from the National Training Survey to investigate the education, qualifications, mobility and earnings of persons with managerial responsibilities. From this analysis, we conclude that there is a need for both private and public organisations to increase the quantity and improve the quality of the training available to their managers and potential managers. More important though is the need to monitor the impact of training programmes and reward managers accordingly.     

Self-monitoring,norms, and attitudes as influences on consumer complaining

Reactions of consumers to marketplace problems vary widely despite the frequent similarity of sources of dissatisfaction. The results of two studies designed to investigate the determinants of consumer inclinations to complain are presented. Two alternative social-psychological explanations of behavior employing self-monitoring, moral and social norms,and attitudes as predictor variables are examined.     

Workouts, Deep Pockets, and Fire Sales: An Analysis of Distressed Real Estate

This paper presents a conceptual analysis of issues that relate to the management of distressed real estate assets. The paper examines the decision implications of the major characteristics of real estate assets and real estate markets in the light of information and incentive problems that emerge when assets fail to perform as anticipated. The paper focuses on the determination of commitments of additional resources to a troubled property, the identification of efficient holders of distressed assets, and the consideration of policies toward the disposition of distressed assets. The paper concludes that in many instances asset sales, rather than causing further destabilization as suggested by the fire sale image, are likely to contribute to reducing the costs associated with distress.     

Competition and Efficiency in Transacting: The Case of Residential Real Estate Brokerage

This paper examines the functioning of the market for brokerage services for residential real estate. The central issue addressed is whether the manner in which brokerage services have traditionally been provided and priced is consistent with efficiency. In approaching this question, the paper first describes the activities usually associated with the brokerage function and develops criteria for the efficient provision of brokerage services. After the structural characterisitcs and pricing practices of the brokerage industry are analyzed, a model of brokerage firm competition is developed. The principal finding is that the traditional absence of price competition among brokers may have led to an inefficiently large commitment of resources to the brokerage industry, supported by excessive rates for consumers of brokerage services. These results stem from the way that competitive pressures emerge when price competition is largely suppressed.     

Learning competitive equilibrium in laboratory exchange economies

A laboratory market for two goods is instituted to examine the hypothesis that individuals will eventually coordinate on the induced competitive equilibrium. The mechanism for exchange strongly restricts the space of agent actions, facilitating the identification of decision rules. Evidence for learning competitive equilibrium is mixed due to strong heterogeneity in decision making. Some subjects forego immediately available gains when they expect the market to move in a more favorable direction, a condition necessary for coordinating on the competitive outcome. However, a majority do not, and many are content to satisfice, though the means to do better was reasonably transparent. I gratefully acknowledge the advice and tutelage of John Duffy and Stephen Spear, and would also like to thank David Grether, Dan Houser, Michael Peress, Bryan Routledge, Shyam Sunder, and participants at the Midwest Theory meetings (Bloomington) and the ESA regional meetings (Tucson) for useful feedback. Two patient and insightful anonymous referees have helped to greatly improve this paper and my future written endeavors. This project was financially supported by the Department of Economics at Carnegie Mellon University, the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics at George Mason University, and the Social and Information Sciences Laboratory at Caltech, as well as by Stephen Spear. Finally, special thanks is owed to Allen Geary, Jr. for co-developing the software used in these experiments, and to the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory for use of its facilities.