IS EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY POLITICALLY FEASIBLE?

We develop a political-economy model where the amount of education subsidies is determined in a majority vote and spending is financed by revenues from taxation. Our analysis demonstrates that limiting the extent of subsidization and thus excluding the poor from gaining enough education can be a political equilibrium. Despite being the main beneficiaries of subsidies, the politically decisive middle class hesitates to extend monetary benefits, since improved access to higher education diminishes the return to education. Moreover, a non-monotone relation between inequality and the extent of redistribution through tax-financed educational subsidies obtains.     

Human–capital investment and the wage gap

Summary. According to empirical studies, the wage differential by skills evolved non–monotonically in the past decades although the relative supply of skilled labor steadily increased. The present paper provides a theoretical explanation for this finding. In our setting, technological change intertemporally alters the human–capital investment incentives of heterogeneous individuals. As a consequence of changing incentives, the time path of the relative wage is U–shaped while there is a rise in the share of skilled workers. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: January 30, 2001     

Human Capital and Growth Cycles

This paper studies the dynamic interaction between human capital accumulation and economic growth. Capital market imperfections and an indivisibility in human capital investment prevent poor agents from accumulating skills, the acquisition of which positively affects technological progress. More productive technologies in turn require more sophisticated qualification and involve higher training costs. The equilibrium dynamics can be characterized by the joint evolution of productivity growth, the schooling costs, and the income distribution. Under our assumptions, individual incomes follow a non-linear Markov chain. This non-linearity generates endogenous fluctuations of schooling activities and the rate at which productivity improvements occur. We thank an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions. Support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) under grant KA1519/2-2 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Recent developments in the analysis of fires,explosions, and production disruption incidents in chemical plants and oil refineries

Significant changes in computing power, regulatory climate, safety culture and globalization of business ventures have occurred since the original publication of MTI Publication No. 30, Guidelines for Assessing Fire and Explosion Damage. The implications of these changes are reviewed with regard to the work of investigators charged with the analysis of fires, explosions and major production disruption incidents in chemical processing plants and refineries. A review of advances in computer modeling of large-scale energy release events is presented. Storm damage assessment and the analysis of incidents involving sabotage are discussed. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009     

Monopolistic competition and the cyclicality of pricing and productivity—A typology of industries

We develop a market model which explains how prices and productivity react to short-run demand variations when the number of price-setting firms is held fixed on its long-run level and profits are endogenous. We assume that for each firm the average production cost function is U-shaped, that customers are imperfectly informed about offer prices, and that customers may search for better offers.For low degrees of market transparency the long-run market outcome exhibits price dispersion with an endogenous finite number of firms. In this case, in the short run, prices and price mark-ups respond countercyclically to demand variations (while input prices are exogenously fixed) and productivity is procyclical. In the complementary case of higher degrees of market transparency, in the long run we have a single-price equilibrium. In that case, in the short run, prices are procyclical while mark-ups remain countercyclical and productivity diminishes with any deviation of demand from its long-run level.Thanks for helpful discussions go to the participants of workshops at the Winter Symposium of the Econometric Society at Warsaw 1990, at the 6th World Congress of the Econometric Society at Barcelona 1990, at the Annual Meetings of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Lugano 1991 and of its Ausschuß für Industrieökonomik in Basel 1992, and at several university workshops. Thanks go also to two anonymous referees. Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation, grants No 12-26387.89 and 12-28722.90, are gratefully acknowledged.     

Die richtige Spritztechnik

Information der Diabetiker ist enorm wichtig - Die meisten Diabetiker spritzen ihr Insulin selbst. Da es nicht in jedem Krankenhaus eine Diabetesberaterin oder -assistentin gibt, geh?rt die Schulung und Beratung der Patienten zu den Aufgaben des Pflegepersonals.     

Human capital investment with competitive labor search

We study human capital accumulation in the presence of labor search frictions. Given that unemployed workers can default on their education loans, skilled individuals with a larger debt burden prefer riskier but better paid careers than is socially desirable. A higher level of employment risk in turn depresses the skill premium and the incentives to invest in education. The equilibrium allocation is characterized by too low employment, underinvestment by the poor, and too little investment in skill-intensive technologies. A public education system funded by graduate taxes can restore efficiency, and it would also reduce wage inequality.