Attribution Biases in the Evaluation of New Product Development Team Members*

Managers are often concerned with the potential negative reputation impact of being assigned to a new product development project. Social psychology theories, and in particular the group attribution error theory, suggest that their worries might be justified, with individual team members being evaluated on the basis of the overall project performance, without regard for the processes by which the team outcome was reached. The objective of this paper is to empirically test for the existence of such biases in the evaluation of new product development team members. For this purpose, three independent experiments based on scenarios test the extent to which the group attribution error is at play in the evaluation of new product development team members and the extent to which it can be removed. Overall, this paper indicates that this bias does indeed affect the evaluation of new product development team members as well as decisions based on these evaluations. In the studies presented in this paper, analysis of variance showed that subjects inferred that team members' attitudes were consistent with the decision made and failed to adjust adequately for the decision rule used. Subjects then used these summary judgments as the basis for deciding on reward allocations and making competence attributions about the team members. In Study 1 , the decision rule used was either a vote or a team leader decision, and therefore the bias might have been explained by the lack of information available. Study 2 , however, provided unambiguous information about team members' positions, yet subjects did not adequately take this information into account. Study 3 replicated these results with experienced new product team managers, suggesting that theses biases are likely to be at play in the workplace. Moreover, subjects in Studies 2 and 3 felt quite confident that their judgments were being fair, even in the cases where these judgments truly were not, which suggests a lack of awareness of the bias on their part. The robustness of this bias should be cause for concerns for managers working in new product development teams or involved in the evaluation of the performance of such teams. The studies conducted in this paper suggest that team members can get unfairly rewarded or punished for decisions over which they have little or no control and that their reputation can also get affected by these decisions. Moreover, the fact that the group attribution error affected evaluations even in the case where experienced participants had specific information about team members' positions suggests that this bias will not be easy to remove.     

Presidential Election 2022: A Euroclash Between a “Liberal” and a “Neo-Nationalist” France Is Coming

Intereconomics - The main question surrounding the re-election of Macron is the uncertain balance of France’s flexilateral policy vis-à-vis the EU in a post-Brexit and COVID-19 context:...     

Household internal and external electricity contract switching in EU countries

Using a representative sample of more than 13,000 households from eight countries in the European Union (EU), this article empirically studies the factors related to household electricity contract switching by distinguishing between internal switchers (households that switched contracts but stayed with the same supplier) from external switchers (households that switched to a new supplier). The econometric analysis includes individual preferences, household structural factors and socio-demographic characteristics, as well as electricity market characteristics. The study explicitly explores the role of risk and time preferences on switching behaviours, with risk and time preferences elicited through incentivized experiments as well as self-assessment scales. The main results suggest that internal and external switching are not related to the same factors, that risk and time preferences affect switching behaviours, and that renters are less likely to switch than homeowners; further, electricity market characteristics are found to affect household electricity contract switching.     

The ownership of ratings

We identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution. We assume that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a rating is a strategic variable. Clients hiding their ratings can be an equilibrium only if they are ex ante uncertain of their quality and if the hiring decision is not observable. For some distribution functions, a competitive rating market is necessary for this result to obtain. In this context, competition between rating intermediaries will lead to less information in equilibrium.     

REDUCING INEQUALITIES AMONG UNEQUALS

This article establishes an equivalence between four incomplete rankings of distributions of income among agents who are vertically differentiated with respect to some nonincome characteristic (health, household size, etc.). The first ranking is the possibility of going from one distribution to the other by a finite sequence of income transfers from richer and more highly ranked agents to poorer and less highly ranked ones. The second ranking is the unanimity among utilitarian planners who assume that agents' marginal utility of income is decreasing with respect to both income and the source of vertical differentiation. The third ranking is the Bourguignon (Journal of Econometrics, 42 (1989), 67–80) Ordered Poverty Gap dominance criterion. The fourth ranking is a new dominance criterion based on cumulative lowest incomes.     

How storefront displays influence retail store image

The image of retail stores offers an important means for differentiation in highly competitive retail markets. Storefront displays generally function to increase attention to the store or generate unplanned store visits, whereas their impact on store image remains unknown. This study therefore investigates perceived image differences between commonly used types of storefront displays and tests whether an image transfer takes place from the display to the retail store. The results show that more innovative displays achieve better image valuations and that store image benefits from the presence of a storefront display. Spillover effects from the display to the store even occur in the face of some resistance, such as in familiar stores and among consumers who have negative attitudes toward such displays.     

Toward a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making

Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behavior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reiterate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare criterion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in principle justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an independent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behavioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible examples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset clauses.     

Is there a pilot in the chain? Identifying the key drivers of change in the fresh pineapple sector

High-value export-oriented agriculture is today considered as a means of integrating smallholders into the world economy. This paper examines the geographic and organisational changes that have taken place in the fresh pineapple sector over the past 50 years. We begin with a historical analysis of the changes in leadership among producer countries, namely the dethroning of Côte d’Ivoire by Costa Rica. We show that this geographical shift has been accompanied by massive organisational changes: the pineapple sector is increasingly driven by large downstream actors who derive their power from the ability to impose their definition of quality to the whole chain, and from economies of scale and scope. Although varietal innovation plays a key role throughout the period, commercial and logistical innovation are of increasing strategic importance. However, because of the constraints imposed by the concerned supply chains, small farmers risk being excluded or marginalized.     

A Law and Economics Perspective on the EU Directive on Representative Actions

Journal of Consumer Policy - This article provides an analysis of the Directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers of 25 November 2020. The...     

Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract Terms

The domain of behavioural law and economics is winning increasing attention also in the field of consumer policy. How the insights of behavioural law and economics can be used in policy remains, to a large extent, unclear. In this article, the following question is asked: “To what extent can the insights from the behavioural literature be applied in a way to formulate concrete suggestions to policy makers?” The authors show that many of the findings of the behavioural literature are very context-specific and hence apply only with respect to particular products or services and particular consumer groups. Formulating general policy conclusions is therefore difficult. However, as far as the specific domain of standard form contracts is concerned, the authors argue that the behavioural literature has shown that the traditional remedy (mostly resulting from information economics), being to focus on information disclosure will not be able to remedy market failures resulting from failing information and the "signing-without-reading-problem." Hence, more substantive forms of intervention in standard form contracts (e.g., resulting from collective bargaining) may be indicated as a remedy.