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排序方式: 共有154条查询结果,搜索用时 125 毫秒
1.
This paper explores the explanatory power of Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis in managers' choice of LIFO versus FIFO. The association between FCF, and choice of inventory methods is based on the assumption that there is a potential conflict of interest between managers and shareholders when LIFO is the tax minimization method and that non-value-maximizing managers of firms with the FCF problem have incentives to choose FIFO, an income increasing method, in order to increase their compensation. However, since debt can act as a monitoring device and mitigate the agency problems of FCF, managers of firms with high FCF and high debt are less likely to choose FIFO than managers of firms with high FCF and low debt. The evidence is consistent with this expectation. 相似文献
2.
We investigate the importance of geo‐strategic and commercial motives for the allocation of German aid to 138 countries over the 1973–2010 period. We find that geo‐strategic and commercial motives matter. When we relate them to the political color of the German government in general, and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Federal Foreign Office in particular, we find their importance to be at least as strong under the socialist leadership. Socialist leadership decreases the amount of aid commitments, controlled for other factors. 相似文献
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4.
Axel Dreher 《World development》2011,39(8):1294-1307
5.
Using a new data set for 41 German non‐governmental organisations (NGOs), we analyse the allocation of NGO aid across recipient countries in a Tobit regression framework. By identifying for each NGO the degree of official financing, we address the largely unresolved issue of whether financial dependence on the government impairs the targeting of NGO aid. It turns out that German NGOs are more active in poorer countries, while they do not complement official aid by working under difficult local conditions. Beyond a certain threshold, rising financial dependence weakens their poverty orientation and provides an incentive to engage in ‘easier’ environments. In addition, we find that the NGOs follow the state as well as NGO peers when allocating aid. This herding behaviour is, however, hardly affected by the degree of official financing. 相似文献
6.
While the literature shows that perks can affect firm values positively or negatively, we argue that firms with higher perks are more likely to be associated with a lower quality of financial reporting, which, in turn, can affect the informativeness of stock prices. Based on hand-collected data on perks from Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with lower perks are associated with higher informativeness of stock prices (or lower R-square). Moreover, the positive association between perks and R-square is shown to be weaker for firms with higher financial reporting quality through audit and earnings quality measures. 相似文献
7.
Ferdinand M. Vieider 《Experimental Economics》2011,14(4):507-518
Accountability—the expectation on the side of the decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody
else—has been found by psychologists to strongly influence decision-making processes. The awareness of this issue remains
however limited amongst economists, who tend to focus on the motivational effects of financial incentives. Accountability
and incentives may provide different motivations for decision makers, and disentangling their effects is thus important for
understanding real-world situations in which both are present. Separating accountability and incentives, I find different
effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives
on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between
simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the normatively superior simple event, while incentives
have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction. 相似文献
8.
This paper analyses whether aid channelled through non‐governmental organisations (NGOs) is less affected by selfish donor motivations and better targeted to needy recipient countries than aid distributed by state agencies. We employ Tobit (and Probit) models and make use of an exceptionally detailed database that allows an assessment of the allocation of Swedish aid channelled through NGOs in comparison to the allocation of Swedish official aid. Our analysis provides mixed results. On the one hand, NGOs appear to be altruistic as far as available indicators on political and commercial motivations of aid can tell. On the other hand, needs‐based targeting of aid by NGOs turns out to be surprisingly weak. GDP per capita of recipient countries shapes the allocation of official aid, but not that of aid channelled through NGOs. The headcount of absolute poverty has a significantly positive effect on aid allocation, but its impact is not particularly strong when NGOs are involved. Overall, the Swedish case supports the sceptical view that NGOs are not necessarily superior donors compared to state aid agencies. 相似文献
9.
Ferdinand A. von Siemens 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2012,114(3):780-807
In this paper, I investigate how an increase in competition for workers influences the impact of social preferences on labor‐market outcomes. By sorting themselves into firms with homogeneous work forces, workers can ensure that they suffer less from social comparisons. Competition promotes choice and thus facilitates sorting. However, competition also boosts rent differences in the labor market, because firms cannot curb internal inequity among its employees without losing workers to competitors. To reduce their exposure to social comparisons, workers might engage in inefficient sorting into unemployment. Consequently, social preferences can have strong effects (i.e., unemployment) in a competitive labor market, whereas they only have a slight impact on labor‐market outcomes in a monopsony. 相似文献
10.